The Arrival Of Manohar Parrikar
Recent statements by Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar have drawn some flak and accusations of being indiscrete. They may, however, be the signal for his true arrival in the hot seat of one of the most complex jobs in government.
It was Manohar Parrikar 1.0 when he took over the sensitive and crucial portfolio of Defence Minister in Nov 2014; technically the defence of India rests with him and he was catapulted from the purely political job of leading his state – Goa, into being Defender Number 1. It was a veritable minefield that he entered. Very frankly, if I were to assume the appointment of Raksha Mantri and had no military background, I would be in a state of paralysis, of the mind and body. It is mind boggling to comprehend geo-strategy in the first place but to apply it to national security can be a real personal challenge.
To thereafter look at organizations, order of battle, terminologies which are decidedly alien, logistics, equipment and its vintage, ammunition, research and development, modernization, procurement and acquisition, budgeting, personnel issues, terms and conditions; it can go on and on and can be daunting. Being unaware of all the above and with no personal equations with anyone who works with you, can send shivers down anyone’s spine. You can make mistakes in most jobs but here is a job in which a mistake can mean the end of the nation. He has been in the job for over six months having initially concentrated on the abysmal state of equipment in all three Services, the procurement process and the defense budget.
Some robust decisions have been taken in terms of the number of projects approved by the Defence Acquisition Council, operationalizing Make in India to the extent possible and cutting down the sanctioned strength of the Mountain Strike Corps (MSC) from the approved 90,000, temporarily to the more appropriate 35,000 to enable budget support. The decision to buy 36 Rafale jets off the shelf in a government-to-government negotiation was presumably also his recommendation. This is no mean achievement in the short time that he has been at the helm.
However, more than anything it is his utterances in the last few days which have drawn surprise and attention. These need analysis to determine what lies behind them and whether they are just flashes in the pan or a more nuanced expression of the policy he intends following in the operational realm having got the grip on all other tricky obstacles that were in his way. This is what he has said:-
“We have to neutralise terrorists through terrorists only. Why can’t we do it? We should do it. Why does my soldier have to do it?” he said.
In clarification later, he said “Every case is handled firmly with clear-cut intelligence for targeted kills, ensuring minimal if any collateral damage.”
In a subsequent statement in the continuum of action-reaction from Pakistan he said:-
“If someone harms my country, I have to take pro-active action … The Army’s basic purpose is that if anyone attacks the country, attack him back. Pay him back in the same coin………one does not keep 13 lakh-strong Army to preach peace”.
The problem with literal analyses is that they get the context horribly wrong. I doubt Mr Parrikar was aware of the details regarding the Ikhwaan and its activities in Kashmir, the issue to which many analysts have drawn parallels. There is no doubt a whole gamut of counter groups, and it has been a system in vogue to counter many insurgencies around the world. All he was probably meaning was that violence couldn’t be countered by peaceful gestures alone; it also needs violence to put down violence, convey messages of intent and capability and disallow adversaries to take advantage of your lack of pro-activeness.
All other measures follow. In effect, Mr Parrikar was reiterating a simple logic that nations, adversely affected by insurgency/terror brought on through proxy, follow. Hard military power has to be used to reduce levels of violence and erode terrorist capability before one can start mixing soft power to prevent the population slipping out of control. There is simultaneity in this strategy and the balance is flexible.
Mr Parrikar’s subsequent clarification actually reflects the strategy that the Army is following today in J&K. No large scale search and destroy operations except in jungles away from populated areas; only focused intelligence based operations, surgically conducted with minimal or no collateral damage. That is fine; it is the strategy of the day demanded by the presence of terrorists. However, India’s Defence Minister carries the right to convey to our adversaries and those who think they can take us back to 1989 that our quiver is not empty and that for all the soft power that we may use today, our hard power is still intact for use appropriately. As the Defence Minister, Manohar Parrikar has only done his national duty.
I am glad that Mr Parrikar decided to issue the second statement after the reaction from Pakistan to his first. People expected him to be defensive. I am equally glad that the MEA issued no clarification. Let Pakistan feel what it wants to. If it perceives that our intelligence agencies are interfering in its internal security issues so be it. For far too long has India been at the receiving end from Pakistan.
Denial and subterfuge is its forte. Once in a while there is a need to speak directly in a manner Pakistan understands. The MEA and its representatives are not expected to do that. It is for the military security managers to do it. That is why Mr Parrikar’s statement should be followed with some plain talking by the Army Chief.
Mr Parrikar is right; you don’t keep an Army of 1.3 million to find fault with it every day and answer to its equipment woes, problems of veterans and terms and conditions of soldiers. Once in a while, the very same Army, the Air Force and the Navy expects that their professional virtues and capability be spoken about, not in just ceremonial terms but with actual conviction. Let the Nexus of Pakistan’s deep state once again make attempts against the lives of our soldiers on the LoC. I am sure Mr Parrikar’s recent visit to the Northern Command would have been exploited to send the appropriate message to our commanders and troops.
Leaving the domain of irregular warfare aside, we find Pakistan often speaking of tactical nukes to counter our strike forces when they enter across the IB. This is as big a ploy as the supposed nuclear ambiguity of the Eighties and the ghost Pakistan Army Reserve Centre of 1990 which forced caution on us. 2002 saw the inception of the Proactive Strategy forcing Pakistan to take counter measures. It is now attempting to gain a psychological advantage with threats of tactical nukes. Mr Parrikar’s approach of doing some plain speaking will probably lead him to be taken quite seriously. These mind games is something that Pakistan has been adept at. It is about time that a credible political leader speaks in a similar tone. Infusion of offensive spirit and looking beyond irregular warfare is something that a Defence Minister with an intellectual mind and proper understanding of strategic issues can bring to the Indian military scene which has been beset with insurgencies and terrorism for some time.
Clearly the arrival of Manohar Parrikar 2.0 augurs well for the Services and for the nation. Six months is a very short period to come to grips with complex security issues. There are even greater expectations from Mr Parrikar because he has made it evident that he is a facilitator and a problem-solver. There are problems galore awaiting solutions but a strong and capable Defence Minister is something India has missed for quite some time. Manohar Parrikar 2.0 is probably just that Defence Minister.