China Says Indian Ocean Not India's 'Backyard'
During an interaction with Indian journalists in Beijing, Senior Captain Zhao Yi, associate professor at the Institute of Strategy in China’s National Defense University, said that while China recognizes India’s special role in stabilizing the strategic Indian Ocean region, the perception that it is India’s “backyard” may result in clashes.
Referring to the presence of other powers in the Indian Ocean – US, Australia, Russia – Yi questioned if indeed the Ocean was India’s backyard, why should these powers be present there.
This plain speaking is not the usual Chinese style. Beijing’s regular tactic with India is to keep its leaders guessing about its stance vis-a-vis New Delhi.
That’s exactly what happened ahead of PM Narendra Modi’s visit to China. When we thought our PM has after all been able to strike a chord with the Chinese through Weibo – China’s microblogging site, the Chinese announced the building of a strategic $46 billion economic corridor through the PoK as part of 51 deals signed. Caught unaware, India demarched China at its embassy in New Delhi while the Indian ambassador to China took up the matter with the Chinese foreign ministry.
When we thought Mr Modi received the highest level reception as he arrived at the ancient city of Xian (also President Xi’s hometown), the Chinese coupled its hospitality with reports of its deadliest attack submarine Yuan Class 335 crossing the Arabian Sea before entering Karachi port.
The latest string of Chinese surprises came when Beijing blocked India’s move in the UN demanding action against Pakistan over release of the 26/11 Mumbai attack mastermind and LeT commander Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi.
The first thought is why this statement now, when not too long ago they were content that China is not the ‘target’ of India’s ‘Oceanic efforts’?
The answer is the transforming Indian posture underscored in the recent Myanmar operation against militants of Northeast India. A country which for long only espoused restraint in its actions, the Myanmar strike seems to have woken up a a lot of India’s neighbours to the fact that India is finally considering its hard power capabilities.
The strike underscored two things clearly – one, while India favours a peaceful border, any threat to the security in the border region will be answered with a fitting response, and two, the maturing capability of building up specific intelligence of the Indian defense forces which helped them to stage the attacks.
The timing of India’s transformation is particularly important. It comes at a time when Beijing is getting more ambitious about furthering its influence abroad. China’s recently released defence white paper points towards its leaders’ aspirations to expand the country’s influence far and beyond by realigning its maritime prowess from “offshore waters defence” to “open seas protection”.
Experts in India have said that this means China will look at the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) with renewed focus in its bid to be the centre of action from Australia to the Middle East and Southern Africa.
Now, during his March tour, Modi, apart from stepping up cooperation with nations like Seychelles, Mauriritius and Sri Lanka on maritime security cooperation and sustainable economic development, has also emphasized on cooperation with major powers in the Indian Ocean, notably the US.
During the January visit to the US, the two nations also signed a broad framework for expanding cooperation in the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific. This, experts feel, enhances the strategic bargaining power of India vis-a-vis Beijing in the IOR.
While China knows that militarily, India may be no match, what it is particularly worried about is India’s access to major world powers for defence cooperation. It has always been uneasy about India forming any major alliance, especially in the Indian Ocean region. A case in point is the 2007 Malabar exercise in Bay of Bengal, because India expanded it to include Australia, Japan and Singapore, apart from the US.
So now this time, when the Malabar drill includes Japan along with the regular participant, the US, that’s certain to prick China.
China’s fear is it might have to confront a collaborated, joint force comprising Indian and its major power partners at the Indian Ocean.
Reports have it that in the Bay of Bengal, India will hold its first-ever IN-RAN naval exercise with Australia in October, and the JIMEX exercise with Japan in November.
Additionally, there is a growing concern in Washington that the Indian Ocean could be the next spot of China’s power projection. To come down to specifics, the US feels China is moving close to the US base in the Indian Ocean — Diego Garcia on the Chagos archipelago in Mauritius with a stepped-up Chinese investment in the country.
No wonder then that a major focus during the recent visit of the US Defence Secretary Ash Carter was “maritime security cooperation”. Quite symbolically, the Secretary also visited India’s Eastern Naval Command in Vizag.
Towards the eastern part of the Ocean too, China is facing increasing competition.
During his recent Bangladesh visit, PM Modi not only inked the historical deal to resolve the longstanding border dispute with Dhaka, but interestingly, also signed a bilateral agreement acquiring rights for Indian cargo vessels to use Bangladesh’s Chittagong port, backed by China, and the Mongla port.
The port facility at Chittagong in Bangladesh is one of the ports included in the so called ‘string of pearls’ along with others like Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri lanka, Marao in the Maldives, and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar.
To much of Beijing’s dismay, Japan, China’s arch rival, is also in the race to up its ante in the Bay of Bengal. As per reports, Tokyo is likely to build Bangladesh’s first deep-sea port at Matarbari. All this, when China’s Sonadia port project in Bangladesh has seen no progress.
Worse still, the Sonadia project might ultimately get dumped as per a report in Bangladeshi media. One of the reasons that officials cite is the unease of the world’s top economic powers with China’s involvement. So, seemingly, Dhaka might decide to abandon China rather than isolate itself from other world powers.
So in the guise of a warning, this statement by China actually shows its anxiety about the future of the free play it has had in India’s neighbourhood for so long if New Delhi really moves towards a harder posture.