Why Some “Hesitations” Will Remain In India-US Ties

Narendra Modi’s evocative phrase - about India and the US “overcoming the hesitations of history” - will surely go down in history as a key marker of improving bilateral ties. However, we also need to go beyond the hype of phraseology to understand that such “hesitations” seldom go away all of a sudden. There will be as many hesitant moments in Indo-US relations in future as in the past, with one major difference: they may not derail the overall trajectory of healthy ties between the world’s largest and the oldest democracies.

The reason why we are less hesitant about allying with the US today is obvious: China. Our previous hesitations developed from the Nehruvian-Left mindset and the practical consequences of the Cold War between capitalism and communism. We had to choose one or the other, and since we chose “non-alignment”, the binary logic of Abrahamic thinking automatically placed us in the Soviet camp. Our non-alignment had a pro-Soviet texture.

Today, as we head towards a new cold war - where the US sees China as the prime threat to its geopolitical interests and is also engaged in Russia/Putin-bashing - we are in another kind of non-aligned phase that actually involves strategic alignment. We have some space within which we can manoeuvre an independent foreign policy, but we also have a stronger alignment with the US.

The congruence of Indo-US interests, apart from the need to constrain Chinese hegemonism, lies in increased trade, access to defence technology and equipment from the US, the fight against jihadi groups, etc. Despite irritants like the US bid to make offshoring costlier by hiking visa fees, and the dispute over pharma patents and generics, the broader commitment to increasing trade cooperation and investment is a given.

But it is difficult to see hesitations disappearing completely between the two countries.

The US electorate is currently fretting about the loss of jobs and a shrinking middle class. The Indian political leadership has to provide ever-expanding opportunities to its growing and aspiring middle classes. This is tailor-made for a clash in short-term economic interests.

Indian civil society is also moving away from its singular attraction for the US as the gateway to jobs and upward mobility. The Hindu elite is wary of the threat from aggressive evangelical groups trying to proselytise Indians, and this will always be a sore point between the two nations. At heart, the US is a Christian country; at heart India is plural, but is uncomfortable with out-and-out evangelisation. This will remain a friction point in the foreseeable future.

India’s interests in West Asia involve closer ties to countries like Iran, which was till recently in the doghouse of US policies. Thankfully, that has now changed under President Obama, as the US has realised that global jihad has ideological roots in Saudi Wahhabism rather than Iranian Shia-ism. Its foes looked friendlier than its allies.

More problematic for us, the US always remains vulnerable to Pakistani charms, as the state department bureaucracy has been weaned on Cold War attitudes, where the US differentiated between “our SOBs and their SOBs”. An army-influenced Pakistani state is always easier to do business with than a cautious democracy like India. Consider how easily Pakistan abandoned its pro-Taliban policy (at least outwardly) when George Bush said “either you are with us or against us” after 9/11. Pakistan, with its unifocus on anti-Indianism, can always offer the US quicker returns on its investments than India. So, despite Pakstani perfidies, the US is not going to suddenly bat for India. If Hillary Clinton becomes the next US President, Pakistan will have more admirers in the US than it has now.

Even in the case of Russia under Vladimir Putin, India will not find it easy to reconcile itself to US positions that seem to date back to the Cold War. Russia is no threat to the US or Nato anymore, but US foreign policy is still biased against Putin. This is one reason why Putin has backed the Assad regime in Syria against his jihadi enemies, including Islamic State. India cannot be on the side of the US against Putin’s Russia. Whether Putin runs a dictatorship or a democracy inside Russia does not affect Indian interests in any way. In fact, we have to count Russia as a friend, given our close defence ties in the past.

Modi’s speech to the US Congress in putting away the hesitations of the past may be broadly correct, but some hesitations will remain. “Hesitations” are easier to set aside between two individuals who have decided to change their minds about one another than between two democracies with prickly electorates and differing perceptions about where their interests lie.