So, the Special Forces have struck, and struck hard. As per initial reports available, the casualties across the Line of Control are ‘significant’. The response of the Pakistani establishment at the time of writing this article is reflective of the confusion that we caused by not sticking to the script, which is fair. Weren’t we expected to exercise restraint?

The timing of the strike is significant. These have come at a time when the general consensus (including this author's view) was that we have let pass the window of opportunity for a retaliatory strike. The overwhelming focus of the nation state was on comprehensively isolating Pakistan on the global stage, while simultaneously expanding the scope to address the disparate constituencies in Pakistan. A strategy that was apparently perfectly balanced and nuanced in its form, yet crystal clear in its potent content. With this kind of a well-crafted strategy, it should be a matter of time before the deep state of Pakistan shall come to heel and we shall be free from the scourge of cross-border terror, right?

Unfortunately, that is not going to be the case.

Of course, India needs to craft a strategy that shall tweak all options of statecraft available to it. We need to isolate Pakistan diplomatically, to starve it economically, to review and renegotiate the Indus water treaty, to actively support the festering unrest in Balochistan and the tribal northwestern province. However, let us face facts. These are options that are being dusted off the shelf of strategic neglect over the years and being explored or formulated with an urgency as we speak. Make no mistake - each of these shall take years of relentless, concerted effort before it can even begin to deliver results. Assets need to be created, infrastructure support catered for, relationships built. We shall need to build the capacity and the institutional bandwidth to lend credence to executing this long term strategy. In the meanwhile, we shall continue to bleed, relentlessly.

If there is one thing that a business school graduate and a military man shall agree upon, it is the fact that any strategy that cannot be executed in letter and spirit to deliver results in a defined time frame is barely worth the paper it is enunciated on; sometimes not even that.

Therefore, is cross-LoC strike a credible option that we can leverage immediately even as we build the capacity and bandwidth for a more comprehensive strategy? Of course, it is!!

The Line of Control is a paradoxical beast.

On the one hand, it is a benign, inanimate, imaginary alignment. On the other hand, it is a living, breathing beast, which comes alive with the shadows of the night. A seductive beast that shamelessly charms the dominant, aggressive suitor. It is the inability to comprehend the opportunities that this very paradox presents that cause many of our armchair apologists to make a terribly skewed and inadequate appreciation of the options of a credible military response along the LoC.

The problem is, India wants Pakistan to wake up and smell the proverbial coffee, while Pakistan is instead busy riding a high, snorting the poppy being cultivated along its northwestern frontiers! The roots of this fundamental fault line lies in the incorrect mapping of the stakeholders and precisely aligning the focus of our response to the specific stakeholder. In our overpowering desire to teach Pakistan a lesson, we are by default ignoring the concept of targeted messaging.

The prime stakeholder in the execution of this asymmetric war is the Pakistan Army, who is represented by the soldier manning a post along the LoC. The specific target, therefore, is not the Pakistani state, but a soldier who mans the posts along the LoC. Once this mapping has been understood and rationalised, a clear and credible, two-pronged approach to deter such misadventures can be brought into effect. These twin prongs executed in tandem, retain the potential to fundamentally alter the levels of this asymmetry.

Prong One

Every single infiltration attempt by the terrorists happens with the full knowledge, support and active indulgence of a specific post of the Pakistan army along the LoC. In fact, for an infiltration attempt to have even a reasonable chance of success, the active involvement of the Army post is a given. Each infiltration attempt - successful or unsuccessful- is routinely traced back to the specific Pakistani post that facilitated the militants, within a matter of days if not hours. Once this is confirmed, the Pakistani military should be reduced to rubble. This should be effected by bringing the full weight of our military resources at hand in that sub-sector of the LoC to bear upon that particular post. Small arms, rockets, short-range missiles; light medium and heavy artillery – everything. The effect of such a concentrated action, where a couple of thousand tonnes of TNT is delivered on a couple of small pickets or posts, each not larger than 20 ft by 30 ft, housing about 10 – 20 men in the space of about 24 hours can be incomprehensibly devastating.

To comprehend the effects of such a course of action is not easy. Not unless one has had the misfortune of having experienced such a merciless pounding. In fact, the next time folks on that posts are presented with the fait accompli of having to support an infiltration attempt, the support will be half-hearted at best. Chances are, the success rate of any infiltration attempt through that particular post for the next couple of months shall be significantly low. And that bout of collective philosophy imbibed by those 10-20 men is highly infectious through the ranks, at pickets and posts all along the 750 odd km that constitute the LoC. Trust me, hard learnt lessons on self-preservation travel lightning fast.

Prong Two

Every infiltration attempt or terrorist action in or near the vicinity of the LoC must be responded to with effective military raids similar to the one conducted last night, somewhere along the length of the LoC.

As a professional who has foot-slogged for long and done a thing or two to earn a living in these environments, I know for a fact that the LoC offers more than adequate opportunities for response not just by the Special Forces, but also by highly motivated and skilled Infantry units, straddling both the tactical and operational levels. Make no mistake - each of these actions are much more than just 'ego massages'. The technical and tactical skills of our Special Forces and the will and wherewithal to effect short, sharp actions across the LoC is tested and proven. What we have lacked is the political spine and the institutional bandwidth to effect such responses in suitable windows of time and space to amplify their impact on the one hand and the resilience to shape consequence management within reasonable proportions on the other.

In terms of deterrence, the application of such a consistent policy to firmly and rapidly effect military response is what shall define the character. Each response by itself may not account for much - it should instead be viewed as a sum of its parts. The efficacy of the consistent message delivered by the execution of this twin-pronged strategy of sharp and swift military action as a response mechanism over a period of time is very powerful in shaping and leveraging deterrence as a policy tool.

The naysayers and apologists shall decry these options as ‘high risk’ options that could spin out of control. To them, I ask – what is the low-risk option preferable to them? Another 18 soldiers being butchered as they sleep in their tents? There shall also be the armchair alarmists who shall remind us that the Pakistani state shall pull the nuclear trigger. That is a bluff that must be called. The nuclear escalation matrix is a carefully considered response structure built to be employed when the existence of the country is endangered. Not for every shallow breach, tactical or operational penetration along the LoC.

Of course, there will be retaliation. India must be prepared to absorb the retaliatory attempt of a strike at its assets along the LoC that is almost inevitable. But that will only serve to turn the narrative to the nation’s advantage. India should and must deny the Pakistani terror complex a free run and it must get out of its siege mentality. Instead of being constantly reactive, India must prevent Pakistan’s asymmetric warfare strategies through proactive action. We must fight them on our terms, and play to our strengths.

As Brahma Chellaney once said, our response to the strategy of death by a thousand cuts cannot be to survive by a thousand bandages!

Subin Balakrishnan

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