Bihar: Why BJP And RJD Have The Same Ticket Distribution Formula

In the months leading up to the Bihar elections, there was a sense of uneasiness among political players and community leaders regarding ticket distribution. The stakeholders were struggling to balance competing social priorities.

For instance, risking the anger of its volatile upper-caste base, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led central government decided to include caste enumeration in the population register.

Meanwhile, the Mahagathbandhan, the Bihar chapter of the Indian National Developmental Inclusive (INDI) Alliance, was focused on expanding its upper-caste appeal.

Yet, these contrasting strategies, though visibly energetic, had limited effect and were not enough to overturn Bihar’s entrenched caste arithmetic.

After the ticket distribution, the BJP and the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) remain the two largest political units in the state. In 2025, the BJP is contesting 101 seats, nine less than its 2020 tally of 110, while the RJD is contesting 143, just one less than its 2020 number of 144.

Of the 101 seats allotted by the BJP, 49 have gone to upper castes. Rajputs, who constitute about 3.45 per cent of Bihar’s population, have received 21 seats; Bhumihars (2.86 per cent) 16 seats; Brahmins (3.66 per cent) 11; and Kayasthas (0.6 per cent) one.

Although the overall count is lower in percentage terms than the 2020 figure of 59 upper-caste candidates out of 110, it is still significant given recent developments such as the caste census, the controversy around Mohan Lal Yadav’s stands on reservations, and perceptions that the BJP is giving a free hand to aggressive elements from numerically dominant castes at the peril of upper castes.

Upper castes in Bihar have long expressed discontent with the party. They feel it has backtracked on its stated and unstated promises of clean governance, ideological clarity, and reforms in the reservation system favouring merit-based inclusion.

Except for the 10 per cent EWS quota, which also benefits a section of Muslims, upper castes who dominate urban constituencies feel increasingly alienated from the BJP’s current political agenda.

Compounding the discontent, prominent leaders like Rajiv Pratap Rudy and R. K. Singh have lost internal prominence, weakening the party’s connect with Rajputs, Bihar’s most politically mobile upper-caste group, and all upper castes by extension.

This sense of being politically orphaned led to the strong expectation that the BJP would dramatically reduce their tickets in favour of a major expansion of outreach among Extremely Backward Classes (EBCs), particularly in anticipation of Nitish Kumar’s eventual political decline.

Recognising BJP’s vulnerability, both the Mahagathbandhan and the Jan Suraaj Party have launched distinct strategies to woo upper-caste voters.

RJD’s Mirror Image Strategy

If the BJP is struggling to reinvent its social coalition, the RJD faces the inverse problem, how to sustain an already dominant one.

For the RJD, expectations regarding its traditional vote banks were different. Yadavs, at 14.26 per cent, and Muslims, at 17.70 per cent of Bihar’s population, remain the party’s core communities. But unlike Hindu upper castes, these two groups have multiple suitors.

Among Muslims, potential vote splits could occur between the RJD’s ally, the Indian National Congress (INC), Asaduddin Owaisi’s All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM), and Prashant Kishor’s Jan Suraaj Party (JSP). Nitish Kumar’s Janata Dal (United) [JD(U)] also continues to attract a section of Pasmanda Muslim voters.

Among Yadavs, the BJP has emerged as a contender in recent years, aided by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s personal appeal and the resurfacing of local Hindu–Muslim conflicts in some regions.

Tejashwi Yadav’s projection as the true inheritor of Lalu Yadav’s political legacy has worked as a strong counter to the nationalistic party’s outreach. The otherwise fragmented Yadav community appears to have consolidated behind him, while Muslims, lacking a statewide alternative to counter the BJP, increasingly see Tejashwi as their most viable political shield.

Conventional wisdom suggests that with such a head start, Tejashwi would adopt a more flexible approach to ticket distribution. His allies, the INC, Mukesh Sahani’s Vikasheel Insaan Party (VIP), and the Left parties, expected a greater say within the alliance. Demographically too, a consolidated Yadav base was expected to create space for broader representation.

A parallel can be drawn from Uttar Pradesh.

In the 2024 general elections, on the back of unconditional support among Yadavs, Akhilesh Yadav reduced the number of Yadav candidates from 10 in 2019 to just 5, while significantly increasing Non-Yadav OBC and EBC representation from 6 to 23. This strategic shift helped the Samajwadi Party jump from 5 to 37 seats.

In contrast, Tejashwi Yadav allocated 36 per cent of RJD’s tickets, 51 out of 143, to Yadavs, who constitute 14.26 per cent of the population. Muslims, despite comprising 17.70 per cent of the population, received only 19 seats, around 13 per cent of the total, the same as in 2020.

This imbalance substantiates Prashant Kishor’s critique that Muslims have become “the oil in RJD’s lantern”, enriching the party while dimming their own influence. Yadavs, on the other hand, secured nearly 150 per cent more tickets than their population share, comparable to upper castes in the BJP, who hold about four times their demographic weight.

Upper-Caste Chessboard: RJD vs JSP

In 2025, the RJD has fielded six Bhumihar candidates, a community traditionally hostile to Lalu Yadav’s party due to its treatment during the RJD’s earlier regimes.

Locally, the conviction is seen as politically motivated and allegedly influenced by BJP leaders unhappy with senior Shukla’s decision to contest the Lok Sabha elections on an RJD ticket. Shivani’s candidature holds potential to sway upper-caste sentiment in the Tirhut region, which covers Muzaffarpur, East and West Champaran, Vaishali, Sitamarhi, and Sheohar districts.

In contrast, the Jan Suraaj Party’s outreach to upper castes has been understated yet strategic. Its urban appeal rests primarily among educated upper-caste youth frustrated by the lack of viable employment opportunities in Bihar. The JSP’s emphasis on clean governance, easy credit access, a services-led economic revival, and a clear development roadmap resonates with this demographic.

Moreover, its demand for representation proportional to population appears more palatable to upper castes than the broader, anxiety-inducing discourse around expanding the reservation pie with no talks on the upper limit.

Sociologically, upper-caste voters in Bihar tend to vote based on two criteria, the safe and competitive space for preservation of their influence and the prominence of established leaders. While the RJD has chosen the latter route, the JSP has opted for the former.

The Yadav Question: Control, Conflict, and Continuity

Representation, however, remains central to the RJD’s own equation with Yadavs. Sociologically, the Yadavs are considered the most advanced among the backward classes defined by Mandal politics. Lalu Prasad Yadav’s rule symbolised their dominance across state institutions, which often came at odds with Kurmis and Kushwahas, pushing Nitish Kumar to form his own faction.

Through political power, bureaucratic influence, and entrepreneurial expansion, the Yadav community moved from agrarian and cattle-rearing roots into the corridors of power, both legitimate and illicit, including sand and liquor trades.

This expansion slowed after Nitish Kumar’s ascent, as administration reined in patronage-based growth. Those who adapted to governance-driven politics advanced; those who did not continued to depend on local dominance, often organising community associations or operating as localised power brokers, kshatraps, capable of mobilising anywhere between 20 and 1,000 votes.

These micro-power brokers act as election contractors, expecting government contracts in return for mobilising their community. Each seeks unrestrained influence, either independently or through allegiance to a larger leader such as Tejashwi Yadav.

Caught between loyalty and leverage, Tejashwi must constantly negotiate with this constellation of small but indispensable actors who define the RJD’s grassroots might. To manage them, he relies not just on charisma but on visible symbols of dominance, from the share of Yadav candidates to the assertion of “Tejashwi ki sarkar”.

It is this dependence on transactional loyalty that makes his position more fragile than Akhilesh Yadav’s. While Akhilesh is now an established leader commanding the loyalty of Yadavs across Uttar Pradesh, Tejashwi’s influence remains conditional on his ability to restore the community’s historical sense of control over power.

Doubts about this exist even within the RJD’s internal ranks. The entry of Sanjay Yadav, a relative outsider, is perceived by old RJD cadre as a sign that Tejashwi is distancing himself from the traditional Lalu-era loyalists, hence his nepotistic hold on kshatraps is at risk.

“He does not like to sit with us. The access to the house has become fortified, Tejashwi Bhaiya now only meets rich people. That is why we are supporting Tej Pratap Bhaiya,” said Suraj (name changed), the son of a former influential RJD leader in Raghopur.

The Tejashwi–Tej Pratap divide is a macrocosm of broader intra-community conflict for supremacy within the Yadav hierarchy. Each local power broker has distinct interests, often tied to the representative’s proximity to power. The only way to unify them is through a larger promise of shared dominance, one that can only materialise if a favourable Yadav leads the government.

That is the subtext behind Tejashwi’s choice of words when he says “Tejashwi ki sarkar” instead of “Mahagathbandhan ki sarkar”. It signals to his core constituency, which is not at ease with hard bargaining by Congress and Mukesh Sahani’s hard bargaining, that ultimate power will rest within their community.

By giving the Yadavs a disproportionately large share in ticket distribution, Tejashwi Yadav seeks to reinforce this assurance.

It is a pragmatic political strategy with an inherent survival mechanism designed to consolidate his most loyal base, even if it risks alienating others in the long run. The BJP also took the same approach.

Brute pragmatism won over idealism, inclusion, and diversification.