The Myth of Policy Paralysis: A Rejoinder To T.C.A Srinivasa Raghavan

The discourse surrounding India’s purported “policy paralysis” has resurfaced with vigour, echoing familiar refrains about bureaucratic inertia, political indecision, and institutional decay. T.C.A Srinivasa Raghavan’s recent critique in The Hindu Business Line follows this well-trodden path, gently hinting that India’s governance challenges are a result of a failure of elite consensus and 'technocratic vision'. 

Yet this analysis which is steeped in the intellectual myopia of Delhi’s policy salons, conveniently sidesteps the elephant in the room: the Indian electorate itself.

To attribute Modi’s incrementalism to “policy paralysis” is to ignore the democratic will of a populace that has repeatedly rejected transformational change in favor of statist complacency. The 2024 electoral verdict has effectively constrained the reform-minded elements of the BJP.

The Electorate’s Embrace of Inertia: A Civilizational Preference

Raghavan’s lamentations about stalled reforms presuppose an India yearning for liberalization—a nation of closet Thatcherites held hostage by dithering politicians. Nothing could be further from the truth. The 2024 mandate, which reduced the BJP to 240 seats despite Narendra Modi’s explicit push for a “400-plus” transformational majority, revealed the electorate’s deep-seated aversion to radical change.

This was not a rejection of corruption or incompetence, but a conscious repudiation of modernity itself.

The results of 2024 were fairly unambiguous: every single part of the country which would potentially be classified as an ‘aspirational region’ decided to show up and say - Jitna Abadi Utna Haq. Reform side me Raq (with the honorable exception of Telangana) - Poorvanchal, Hyderabad Karnataka, Marathwada, a good portion of Rajasthan.

There is a pattern among the ‘Aspirational Regions’ which decided to stick with the BJP - each such region had a state BJP government which put cash in the hands of an average voter in the form of a “Ladli Behna” equivalent in this state, or had a state unit which promised one

Madhya Pradesh - the Ladli Behna (implemented before the 2023 Assembly Elections)

Chattisgarh - Mahatari Vandan Yojana, which was promised ahead of the 2023 Assembly elections and implemented before the 2024 Lok Sabha Election

Odisha - The BJP promised the implementation of ‘Subhadra Yojana’ to women if it came to power. 

Assam - The BJP promised the expansion of the Orunodai Scheme ahead of the election and implemented such an expansion in September 2024 itself.

Spread across states, the Indian voter displayed surprisingly similar behavioural trends - either reward me with free cash transfers ahead of elections, or I will endorse the opposition promises of expanded reservations, farm loan waivers, and entitlement expansion under slogans like Jitna Abadi Utna Haq (JAUH). 

When Rahul Gandhi demands caste census-driven redistribution, he isn’t courting controversy but channeling the zeitgeist of an electorate that views zero-sum identity politics as preferable to growth-oriented reforms. 

The sympathetic view about our electorate would be that it lacks the cognitive bandwidth to process complex policy trade-offs - i.e. the electorate prefers immediate material security (a monthly transfer or promise of one) over abstract concepts like “ease of doing business” or “private sector investment” which can result in an expansion of the pie.

This writer partially disagrees with this view due to his preference for a slightly more elegant answer. The 2024 results proved that Modi’s fatal error was overestimating this electorate’s appetite for change, especially the transformational kind while vastly under-estimating the default preference of the Indian voter - soul crushing inertia.

Even if the voter understood that an expansion of the pie will benefit him in the long term, his immediate concern is distribution of the existing pie.

The Opposition’s Redistributionist Gambit: Democracy as Collective Suicide

Raghavan’s analysis glides over the opposition’s successful weaponization of welfare populism. The INC-SP-RJD alliance’s campaign wasn’t merely anti-Modi: it was anti-reform, anti-meritocracy, and anti-growth.

- Expand existing reservations in government jobs for OBCs/SCs/STs significantly beyond the notional 50% cap, potentially taking it up to proportional representation as a percentage of population

- A not so discreet nod towards the idea of redistributing private assets via inheritance caps so that there is a ‘proportional’ distribution of wealth.

Such policies, far from being fringe proposals, won the opposition 234 seats. Their success lies not in deception but in authenticity.They reflect a preference for leveling down over rising up. 

The Intellectual Class: Complicit Architects of Paralysis

Raghavan’s critique, like much of India’s commentariat, also absolves the intellectual class of culpability. Yet it is this very elite, the IAS officers writing op-eds, JNU economists drafting manifestos, NGO-funded activists and pink paper columnists chanting the mantra of ‘not enough reforms’ once a month that has normalized redistribution as the default governance mode.The inertia of the electorate does not emerge in a vacuum, it is reinforced by this intellectual elite.

Raghavan in his article points to every possible reason from the PM’s energy levels to the RSS. He writes - “There is then the widespread impression that much of the reforms that are needed are now being guided by the RSS whose understanding of economic policy is basically socialist. This has been most apparent in the privatisation policy.” 

What he and others like him often overlook is the role of an increasingly aggressive opposition, which, emboldened by its 2024 success, has intensified its redistributive rhetoric. This has pressured the government into resorting to cash handouts and symbolic redistributive measures, effectively shrinking the fiscal and political room needed for meaningful transformation. This is what has stalled lateral entry into bureaucracy or the divestment of chronically underperforming public sector units.

Modi’s Constrained Realism: The Art of the Possible

Raghavan chastises the BJP for cautious governance post-2024, but this misreads Modi’s constrained mandate. With 240 seats and a not so favorable Rajya Sabha, the Prime Minister faces Weimar-level coalition pressures:

TDP’s Chandrababu Naidu litany of demands - No privatization of Vizag steel and an ever increasing number of central government projects for Andhra

JD(U)’s Nitish Kumar - Despite his ill health manages to find time to indulge in JAUH rhetoric directly or indirectly while constantly using Samajwadi arguments about economic reform issues.

Shiv Sena - which has in the past been against labor code revisions and might try to use its implementation this year as a major bargaining chip.

Even the hint of reform might spark an unforeseen reaction from one section of the country which can result in further electoral instability - think back to the swift uproar against lateral entry, especially by voices from the ‘aspirational regions’ of the country.

In this environment, incrementalism isn’t cowardice, but survival. 

The 2024 result helps us recognize an important fact about reform politics from the BJP - that even a hint of radical/ transformative reform triggers existential backlash. When 59% of Indians believe that the farmer agitation in Punjab was correct (and by extension the farm laws were wrong), how can you expect Modi to undertake ‘transformative reform’ and that too at 240 odd seats?

The “policy paralysis” narrative remains a convenient fiction for elites unwilling to confront uncomfortable truths. India isn’t stagnating due to Modi’s inaction or the RSS pushing it’s ‘socialist’ vision—it is consciously choosing stagnation through democratic means. Until the electorate discards its civilizational addiction to inertia, even a 400-seat BJP majority would struggle to enact transformation. 

Modi’s third term, far from being a reform opportunity, will likely consolidate this new consensus: increase in welfare spending especially via states and DBT, hidden deregulation, and a continued build up of state capacity. 

The hope is that 20-40 years down the line, India is significantly more urbanized and Indian voters have shed enough of their crab mentality to achieve a slightly faster pace of growth. The 2024 verdict didn’t create a new reality, it merely confirmed the quality of our electorate. India’s democracy has spoken: transformation can wait.