Why Mohan Bhagwat's Call For Larger Families Deserves Attention

In a recent address, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) chief Mohan Bhagwat urged Indian couples to consider having three children, arguing that communities with fertility levels below this threshold face the risk of gradual extinction.

His statement drew sharp criticism from political opponents, who questioned the legitimacy of such advice. Yet, when examined against India’s demographic realities, Mohan Bhagwat’s call emerges not only as valid but also as a timely warning for the nation’s future.

The Numbers Do Not Lie

India’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR) has already fallen below the replacement level of 2.1. The Sample Registration Survey Statistical Report 2023, published recently, places the national TFR at 1.9. Eighteen states and Union Territories now record fertility below replacement levels.

• Bihar has the highest TFR among major states at 2.8.

These figures are alarming. A fertility rate below replacement means fewer young workers in the future, more dependents, and an eventual imbalance between retirees and the workforce.

In addition to this, the low TFR snowballs into slow economic growth, a rising dependency ratio, an ageing society, and changing family structures, creating challenges in consolidating India’s position in the global political economy. In this context, Mohan Bhagwat’s warning is therefore not a matter of ideology, but of demographic survival.

Learning From History

India’s demographic journey has been shaped by dramatic changes. In the 1950s, the TFR was around 6, largely driven by high infant and child mortality. Families had more children to ensure survival. With advances in healthcare and a decline in mortality rates, fertility rates naturally dropped.

By the late 20th century, birth rates rather than mortality became the decisive factor shaping India’s TFR. Today, while the population will continue to grow until approximately 2063 due to demographic momentum (the effect of past high fertility cycles), the longer-term trajectory is worrying.

If fertility continues to decline, India risks facing the same demographic challenges as Japan, South Korea, and China: an ageing population, shrinking workforce, and economic stagnation.

Some states, such as Andhra Pradesh, have already recognised this. With a TFR of 1.5, the state is considering financial incentives for larger families. Such proactive measures underline the seriousness of the issue and the need for policy innovation at both state and national levels.

Rural–Urban Divide

India’s fertility dynamics also reveal a stark rural–urban divide. Rural India’s TFR remains close to 2.1, cushioned by cultural norms, family support structures, and community-based childcare. Urban centres, however, hover around 1.6 due to lifestyle pressures, smaller family structures, and economic constraints.

If this imbalance continues, rural communities will shoulder the burden of sustaining national fertility, while urban areas contribute to demographic decline. This calls for targeted urban policies such as affordable housing, childcare support, workplace flexibility, and family incentives to encourage childbearing in cities.

This noticeable dip in the TFR in urban centres, which have been considered political bastions of the BJP and have voted generously, may lead to political setbacks for the party. In addition to this, the influx of illegal migrants from neighbouring countries into urban centres such as Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata, and Bangalore could further tilt the demographic advantage in the Opposition’s favour.

Religious Demographics and Fertility

Fertility trends also vary across communities. Research by Shamika Ravi and others shows that between 1950 and 2015, the Hindu population share declined by 7.82 per cent, while the Muslim share rose by 43.15 per cent, reflecting higher fertility among Muslims.

Census-based district-level analysis further confirms that Muslim families, on average, continue to have more children than Hindus. A research paper titled Hindu-Muslim Fertility Differentials in Major States of India: Indirect Estimation at District Level from Census by Saswata Ghosh highlights significant variations in fertility trends across religious groups. The study shows that, out of 422 districts across 14 states, Hindus in 195 districts have a TFR less than or equal to the replacement level of 2.1 (the national average), compared to only 137 such districts for Muslims.

While overall fertility is falling across communities, these differences fuel political debates. Yet, the larger takeaway is not inter-religious competition but the recognition that sustaining fertility across all communities is essential for balanced national growth.

These trends demonstrate why Mohan Bhagwat’s concern is not misplaced. Without conscious efforts, demographic imbalances could reshape India’s social and political fabric.

Political Consequences

In Kerala, available demographic indicators suggest that the share of live Muslim births has undergone a marked shift since 2014. From that year onwards, the proportion of live births among Muslims consistently crossed 40 per cent, peaking at 44 per cent in 2019, despite the community comprising only 26 per cent of the state’s population as per the 2011 Census. This disproportionate rise may pose challenges for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in consolidating its electoral mandate.

In West Bengal, demographic patterns appear to have been influenced by large-scale, state-facilitated irregularities. Illegal immigration from Bangladesh, including the settlement of Rohingya refugees, has substantially reshaped the population profile of border districts, largely to the advantage of the ruling Trinamool Congress (TMC). The Muslim population, which accounted for approximately 12 per cent in 1947, had grown to 27 per cent by the 2011 Census. Such targeted demographic expansion not only strains local resources but also raises concerns of political manipulation.

A parallel trend is evident in Assam, where the Muslim population rose from around 12 per cent in 1951 to nearly 40 per cent in recent decades. This shift is primarily attributed to cross-border migration, compounded by political instability in Bangladesh, leading to significant demographic imbalance.

Across all three states, a common feature is the electoral challenge faced by the BJP: the need for consolidation of the Hindu vote base. However, achieving this has proven difficult in practice, as foul play often overshadows fair play.

Comparison with International Practices: China

Any debate on India’s population trajectory is incomplete without a comparison with China. Following rapid population growth after the 1950s, China launched strict family-planning measures under the slogan later, longer, fewer. This culminated in the infamous One Child Policy of the 1980s, enforced through incentives as well as punitive state controls.

While initially effective in curbing growth, the policy disrupted China’s natural demographic arc. By the late 2010s, the country’s population began to shrink. Recognising the damage, the government started relaxing restrictions in 2013 and officially ended the One Child Policy in 2017. But the reversal came too late. The policy had already created the unsustainable “4-2-1” family structure, meaning four grandparents, two parents, and a single child. As a result, China’s birth rate collapsed from 6.1 in 1970 to just 1.28 in 2020. In short, China’s family planning policy won the battle but lost the war.

India too experimented with coercive population control during the Emergency under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, most notably through the Nasbandi sterilisation campaign. Fortunately, it failed. Had it succeeded, India might have faced the same demographic crisis as China. Instead, India followed a more natural trajectory, with fertility rates gradually declining from around 6 in the 1960s to about 2 today. In this respect, democracy proved to be India’s greatest safeguard, preventing disruptive state intervention.

That said, the steady decline now signals a new challenge. India risks repeating China’s mistake, not through overreach, but through neglect. If falling birth rates are left unaddressed, they could create long-lasting demographic fault lines. To avoid such collapse similar to what China and Japan now face, India must proactively encourage practices and policies that sustain healthy fertility levels.

The Way Forward

Mohan Bhagwat’s statement highlights a strategic national concern. Demography is not just about family size; it underpins economic vitality, social security, and geopolitical influence. A shrinking working-age population threatens productivity, innovation, and fiscal stability.

Addressing the fertility challenge requires a comprehensive approach:

• Policy incentives such as tax benefits, childcare subsidies, and housing support.

As the saying goes, “Demography is destiny.” If India wishes to preserve its demographic dividend and sustain its global rise, it must act now to stabilise fertility rates. In this light, the concerns raised by the RSS chief merit serious consideration, beyond the political noise.