Rafale Is A Fait Accompli. Now India Must Make It Count.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) has formally sent the government a proposal to purchase 114 more Rafale fighters from France. On the surface it looks like just another big-ticket acquisition. In reality it is the logical continuation of a decision India already made years ago. The Rafale, whether we admit it openly or not, is now a fait accompli for India’s combat fleet.

Why? Because the IAF has already gone through the motions of evaluating, testing, and selecting this aircraft. Thirty-six Rafales, delivered with India-specific enhancements costing billions of dollars, are already in frontline service. They are stationed at Ambala and Hasimara where pilots and technicians have mastered their operation. The infrastructure such as simulators, hangars, spares depots and engine servicing facilities is already in place. A whole ecosystem has been created for the fleet.

Running another global competition would mean starting all over again. Years would be lost in trials, field evaluations, new contracts, new logistics pipelines and new training, while squadron strength continues to decline. For an air force operating at barely 31 squadrons against a sanctioned strength of 42, time is the one commodity it cannot afford to waste. Choosing the Rafale again avoids that trap.

The Navy has reinforced this logic. Its order for 26 Rafale Marine fighters for aircraft carriers means both services will operate variants of the same aircraft. Common training, maintenance and supply chains will deliver economies of scale.

This ecosystem effect matters more than enthusiasts of shiny competitions admit. India has learned the hard way that operating too many aircraft types creates inefficiencies. Standardisation is strength.

So let us accept the reality. The Rafale is going to make up a substantial part of the IAF's fleet going forward. The question is not whether to buy more but how to structure the deal so that India extracts the maximum long-term benefit.

If Rafale is a fait accompli then three imperatives must guide negotiations.

1. Full-spectrum integration

The first and most important principle is that whatever we want must go on the aeroplane. India cannot afford a fighter that flies with French weapons in one war, American pods in another, and Indian missiles in none. Indigenous weapons integration has to be non-negotiable.

The Rafale’s architecture allows this but it must be guaranteed contractually. Already the IAF has been pushing to integrate indigenous missiles like Astra, Rudram anti-radiation weapons and smart glide bombs. The Navy’s contract has provisions for Indian weapons. These are encouraging signs but they must be expanded and locked in for the larger 114-aircraft order.

Why is this so critical? Because India is investing billions in its own missile programmes. The Astra beyond-visual-range missile, the Rudram family of anti-radiation weapons, the SAAW glide bomb, these are not boutique experiments, they are frontline systems. If the Rafale is to be India’s mainstay it cannot be ring-fenced by foreign restrictions. Every new Indian weapon from hypersonic missiles to electronic warfare pods must be cleared for carriage.

Integration should also extend to Indian sensors, datalinks and communication systems. The Rafale is capable of carrying multiple targeting pods and advanced radar upgrades. India must insist that its own secure datalinks and electronic countermeasure suites can be integrated without begging Paris for permissions each time. The guiding principle should be that the Rafale is India’s fighter and not just a leased French platform.

The second imperative is industrial. India cannot afford another deal where “Make in India” turns out to mean tightening bolts on imported kits. If 114 Rafales are to be built in India the offsets must go far beyond screwdriver assembly.

This time Dassault and Safran are already proposing deeper partnerships such as fuselage production by Tata Advanced Systems, maintenance and overhaul facilities in Hyderabad and joint ventures with HAL for avionics support. But India must demand more.

Offsets should cover genuine transfer of technology in areas that matter such as advanced composites, flight-control computers, electronic warfare modules and radar subsystems. Instead of final assembly lines that disappear once deliveries are done, India should secure production rights for key components that feed into the global Rafale supply chain. That ensures the factories stay alive long after the last jet rolls out.

This approach also aligns with India’s broader goal of building a capable aerospace ecosystem. HAL, DRDO and private firms are all developing capabilities. A Rafale offset package that gives them exposure to cutting-edge avionics or EW design will shorten the learning curve for indigenous projects like the Tejas Mk2 or AMCA.

The Rafale deal therefore is not just about fighters. It is about building the industrial muscle India needs to break free of perpetual dependence. If this order does not leave India with at least one globally competitive aerospace production line then it will have been a wasted opportunity.

3. Engines for AMCA and TEDBF

The third imperative may be the most strategic and that is engines. Every Indian fighter project, from Tejas Mk2 to AMCA and TEDBF, would run into the same bottleneck as Tejas Mk1A, which is propulsion. India’s Gas Turbine Research Establishment has decades of experience but has not yet delivered a reliable 110 kilo-newton class engine. Without this, AMCA and TEDBF risk becoming endless prototypes.

That deadlock is now beginning to shift. India and France are working on a deal under which Safran and GTRE will jointly develop a new fighter engine.

The plan is to build nine prototypes within twelve years, starting at 120 kilo-newtons and scaling up to 140 kilo-newtons. What makes this effort different from past attempts is the commitment to transfer the most guarded technologies including single crystal turbine blades and digital engine controls. The engines will be developed in India under Indian intellectual property rights with Safran handing over complete technology to DRDO.

If this programme stays on track, it could power the AMCA and TEDBF from the start rather than leaving them as airframes waiting for an imported engine. Imagine the symbolic shift if by the time the 114th Rafale is delivered, the AMCA prototype is already flying on an Indian-developed engine born of the Rafale offsets. That would turn the Rafale from a foreign acquisition into the stepping stone that gave India propulsion independence.

This linkage is not optional. If India fails to integrate the engine programme into the larger Rafale package, it risks repeating the history of building aircraft shells while importing engines from abroad. Every serious aerospace power mastered propulsion through co-development and absorption. India now has both the market leverage and the strategic opening to make it happen. What is required is firmness in negotiation and clarity of purpose.

What matters is not the aircraft itself but the terms on which India embraces it. If New Delhi uses this deal to hardwire integration, offsets and propulsion into the country’s defence industrial base, the Rafale could mark the moment India stopped being a buyer and started becoming a builder. If it settles for less, the IAF will get its squadrons but the nation will remain trapped in the same cycle of dependence.