The Revolving Doors Of Supreme Court: How Short Stints Of CJIs Are Undermining Judiciary

The Supreme Court, the guardian of the Constitution and the highest pillar of justice, is grappling with an institutional crisis that escapes public scrutiny: the absurdly short and indefinite tenures of its Chief Justices (CJIs).

Over the past decade, the average term of a Chief Justice of India (CJI) has plummeted to nine months, with some serving as briefly as 17 days. This revolving-door leadership, rooted in constitutional ambiguity and administrative apathy, has crippled judicial efficiency and eroded public trust. The system’s insistence on retaining the archaic model, where CJIs retire mid-reform, leaving half-baked policies and a backlog of unresolved issues, is nothing short of an institutional failure.

Since 1950, the average tenure of a CJI has been 1.5 years, but this figure masks stark disparities. Justice Y.V. Chandrachud had a seven-year tenure (1978–1985), while recent history is riddled with truncated terms.

On the other hand, in the US, Chief Justices serve for life (on average, a 13-year tenure), and in the UK, the Lord Chief Justice serves a 5-year term with clear accountability.

Constitutional Ambiguity: A Self-Inflicted Crisis

India’s Constitution prescribes no fixed tenure for CJIs. The appointment of the Chief Justice of India is primarily governed by Article 124(2) of the Constitution, which empowers the President of India to appoint the CJI, typically based on the recommendation of the outgoing chief justice and in consultation with other senior judges.

Compounding this constitutional silence is the long-standing, unwritten convention known as the 'seniority principle'. It dictates that the senior-most judge of the Supreme Court is appointed as the next CJI. This practice has historically been justified as a crucial safeguard against potential political interference in judicial appointments, thereby aiming to ensure the judiciary's independence.   

However, the rigid combination of a fixed retirement age of 65 years and the strict adherence to the seniority principle leads to highly variable and frequently truncated tenures for Chief Justices. By the time a senior judge ascends to the apex position, they often have only a limited period remaining before their mandatory retirement. This results in terms ranging from a mere few months to a couple of years, with longer tenures being rare exceptions.

The seniority principle inadvertently ties the CJI's tenure to an arbitrary factor of the precise age at which a senior judge happens to reach the top of the seniority ladder, rather than to the functional requirements or institutional needs of the office.

The rule rigidly dictates who becomes CJI based on their elevation date and age, making the length of their term a mere byproduct of these factors, rather than a deliberate consideration of institutional needs. This creates a "constitutional paradox" where a well-intentioned convention, designed to secure judicial integrity, compromises the very stability of this institution.

Various bodies like the Law Commission and Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice (133rd Report, August 2023), have highlighted the need for stable leadership in regulatory bodies, yet the judiciary remains exempt from such logic. The absence of a fixed tenure undermines judicial independence, as CJIs nearing retirement may avoid contentious issues to secure post-retirement roles.

Inefficiency in Action: The Cost of Constant Turnover

1. The Master of the Roster: As the "Master of the Roster," the Chief Justice of India wields significant administrative power, including case allocation and court oversight.

However, frequent changes in this pivotal role disrupt continuity and impede the efficiency of the Supreme Court. Short tenures prevent CJIs from fully grasping the court's intricate dynamics and implementing long-term reforms, forcing each new Chief Justice to "reset priorities" rather than building on previous efforts, thus weakening institutional stability.

This concentration of administrative power, combined with brief terms, paradoxically transforms the "Master of the Roster" from a potential catalyst for reform into a systemic bottleneck, leading to inconsistent direction and administrative paralysis at the judiciary's apex.

2. Half-Baked Reforms: Every CJI enters office with a vision. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud (2022–2024) prioritised digitisation, launching the e-SCR portal for online judgments. Yet, his successor, Justice Gavai, inherits a system still plagued by inconsistent tech adoption.

Similarly, Justice N.V. Ramana (2021–2022) sought to address case backlogs through National Judicial Data Grid reforms, but his 16-month term allowed only partial progress. Most recently, Justice Sanjiv Khanna was acquainted with the responsibility of hearing the challenge to the Waqf (Amendment) Act, but retired midway.

When leadership changes every few months, long-term planning becomes impossible. Decisions on important and often long-pending cases are deferred.

Also, despite a relatively longer two-year tenure, Justice Chandrachud chose to leave petitions on marital rape to his successor, Justice Khanna, who subsequently did not assign the case.

Similarly, Justice Khanna, during his six-month term, was criticised for constituting and hearing "only one Constitution Bench," despite numerous substantial questions of law, such as the validity of the sedition law, remaining long pending.

He also could not completely hear the matter entailing the challenge to the Waqf (Amendment) Act. This deferral exacerbates the existing backlog of over five crore cases, diminishes the chances of judicial reforms and impacts core constitutional values such as the "rule of law".

3. The Collegium Chaos: The collegium system, already criticised for its opacity, suffers even more under the weight of fleeting Chief Justices who chair it. With each new Chief Justice, the judicial appointments process hits the pause button. As a result, over 40% of high court judge positions remain vacant as of 2025.

Meanwhile, litigants bear the brunt of these delays, stuck in a system hampered by inconsistent leadership and a collegium whose penchant for secrecy only deepens the public’s frustration.

Stability as a Cornerstone of Justice

A judiciary led by transient figures cannot uphold the rule of law. The current system, where CJIs scramble to leave a mark before retirement, breeds inefficiency, erodes accountability, and invites political interference.

As India aspires to become Viksit Bharat, a $5 trillion economy, it needs a judiciary anchored by stable, visionary leadership. The time for ad hoc arrangements is over. The Constitution must evolve to reflect the demands of a modern democracy.

Without tenure reforms, the Supreme Court risks becoming a relic, a hallowed institution unable to deliver on its promise of justice.