BJP's Defeat In Jharkhand Could Turn Santhal Pargana Into A Graver Security Risk In Relation To Chicken's Neck

The results of the 2024 Jharkhand Assembly election came as a surprise for many. Despite significant anti-incumbency against the ruling Hemant Soren government, the Indian National Inclusive Developmental (INDI) Alliance returned to power.

Four alliance members together won 56 seats out of 81, with the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) making its presence felt for the first time in a decade and a half.

Remarkably, two of RJD's four victories came in Godda and Deoghar — seats that it snatched from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

Godda is one of the entry points to the Santhal Pargana division, which consists of Sahebganj, Pakur, Dumka, Deoghar, Jamtara, and Godda.

For Lok Sabha, this region is divided into three constituencies, namely Rajmahal, Dumka — both reserved for the Scheduled Tribes (STs) — and Godda.

In Godda, BJP’s Nishikant Dubey registered his third consecutive Lok Sabha victory, while Rajmahal and Dumka went to JMM.

Dubey was effectively in charge of assembly constituencies in the region, but he could not repeat his Lok Sabha magic. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) lost 17 out of the 18 assembly seats in Santhal Pargana.

The BJP lost 16 of the 17 seats it contested, Jarmundi being the notable exception. In 2019, it had won four.

In light of the fact that Santhal Pargana is tribal-dominated (officially) and that BJP had played a decisive role in the formation of Jharkhand, this is a watershed moment in the BJP’s history with this region.

But even beyond the BJP, this result has national security implications for India — all thanks to the changing demography (into which we will delve later), which is affecting the voting choices and lives of indigenous communities.

Santhal Pargana and National Security

Apart from being known as a tribal, predominantly Santhal, belt, the Santhal Pargana division holds strategic significance for India’s national security.

Earlier, it was part of Bihar and closely connected to the state's Seemanchal region, which consists of districts likes Purnia, Katihar, Araria, and Kishanganj.

Long before illegal immigration changed things, Seemanchal had a considerable tribal population, a few thousands of whom still live there, especially in Purnia and Kishanganj.

Kishanganj, however, is now a Muslim-majority district with almost 68 per cent of its population Muslim, highest across the Santhal Pargana and Seemanchal regions.

Most of these Muslims are not Indians; their forefathers can be traced back to Bangladesh. In local parlance, these Bangladeshis are called Bhatias. Over the last two and half decades, they have spelled trouble for both Hindus and local Muslims.

Kishanganj lies at the corner of the northeastern region of Bihar and shares its borders with the Uttar Dinajpur and Darjeeling districts of West Bengal. It virtually acts as entry points for the Mamata Banerjee-ruled state.

Interestingly, all these places share one commonality other than the changing demography — proximity to the Siliguri Corridor, or the "Chicken’s Neck," as it's referred to commonly.

The Chicken's Neck

It is one of the most crucial spots for India's national security. Located 100 kilometres (km) from Kishanganj, it connects all of the northeastern states to mainland India. It also acts as a gateway to East Asia.

Sikkim, Bhutan, and China are located to the neck's north, while Nepal and Bangladesh are situated at its western- and southernmost points.

Tibet’s Chumbi Valley is less than 150 km from this place. This is the valley which hosts the India-Bhutan-China trijunction.

The British built the Siliguri Corridor as a connecting link between Bengal and Assam. But until 1975, it was often prone to misuse.

When Bangladesh was part of Pakistan, hostility always waited at the southern point of the corridor. Similarly, until Sikkim merged with India in 1975, India did not have a good buffer viz-a-viz China. The corridor is narrow (17-22 km) and fragile, given that it is the lone land passage to the North East and East Asia.

Because of how narrow the stretch is, many experts believe that India should have leveraged its role in the 1971 Bangladesh liberation war to widen the corridor by taking more land from Bangladesh.

The corridor covers the northern part of Uttar Dinajpur district and the southern part of Darjeeling district in Bengal. The Darjeeling hills, earlier dominated by Gorkhas, are now frequently inhabited by Muslims who come from Bangladesh.

These migrants enjoy the patronage of the Banerjee government. In Uttar Dinajpur, for instance, the 2011 census figure put the Muslim share of the population at 49.92 per cent.

In the south and southeast of the corridor lies Bangladesh, while not more than 100 km southwest lies Bihar's Kishanganj district, with its about two-third Muslim population, mostly from Bangladesh.

Even between Kishanganj and the corridor, there is very little relief for pro-India people and forces. Two places, namely Islampur (68 km away) and Naxalbari (28 km away), lie on this route.

Naxalbari is largely believed to be the place where Leftist insurgency originated in India, which is why its usefulness to anti-India forces cannot be doubted.

Changing Demography

On the other hand, Islampur, a town in Murshidabad, had 68.07 per cent Muslim population, as per the 2011 census. It is now nearly an established fact that most of these people are either children of Bangladeshi migrants or first-generation Bangladeshi migrants themselves.

According to the 2011 census, Murshidabad itself had 66.88 per cent Muslim population, while nearby Malda had more than 51 per cent Muslim population.

These two are border districts and have been busted multiple times for the presence of terror modules. Drugs, narcotics, illegal land grab, illegal money transactions, and sex-trafficking are among the major crimes here.

Both these districts enjoyed the undivided attention of security agencies during the anti-CAA riots, and in a way became the epicentre of conspiracies to derail the country.

Experts say that the crimes here occur because the illegal migrants from Bangladesh are poorly educated and vulnerable to manipulation in their attempts to make more money.

When they come to India, they find jobs easily in the informal sectors of construction, farm labour, and as domestic help. This writer has observed (in Seemanchal) that they survive on pennies for decades, mostly making a living by serving the wealthier upper-caste Muslims. 

But the ‘roti, kapda, makaan’ theory does not explain the illegal migrants' fertility rate rising or staying the same as compared to when they were living in Bangladesh. Neither does it explain how they are able to move from village to village while driving out those who have been living there for long. It also does not explain why when this writer interacted with tribals in Kishanganj, an influential (local) Muslim man became their spokesperson. Such instances are becoming the norm in Santhal Pargana as well.

A Look Back at the History

There is an age-old demand for the formation of a separate nation of Bangla-speaking people. It is rooted in the eighteenth-century history of Bengal Presidency when it comprised modern-day Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, Bangladesh, Assam, and other northeastern states.

With subsequent partitions in the twentieth century, many were not happy with the breaking of Bengal into multiple provinces. Sarat Chandra Bose, the elder brother of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, was among them. That is why when Clement Attlee proposed a separate Bengal nation, Sarat supported it.

Eventually, Bengal was partitioned. Muslim-majority East Pakistan went to Pakistan, while the western part stayed with India and became West Bengal.

In the modern day, this demand has been modified into one where the whole of erstwhile Bengal Presidency is to be turned into a Muslim-dominated region and a seperate nation created out of it. 

The hurdles to executing this plan are huge, one of them being the scarcity of a Bengali-speaking population beyond Bangladesh, West Bengal, and Assam. In Assam, one can expect a further decline, with Himanta Biswa Sarma getting on a spree to drive out illegal Bangladeshis.

But the rising Muslim population is one leg upon which the Greater Bengal movement can stand, and they have done well these last five decades. They have been able to get the media, academics, politicians, and even the legal system over to their side.

Bangladeshi Migration

With assistance from every front, illegal migration to India has witnessed an uptick. According to figures from Union Minister Kiren Rijiju, approximately 2 crore Bangladeshis live in India. Their main habitats are the Bengali districts of Malda, Murshidabad, Dinajpur, Seemanchal of Bihar, and Santhal Pargana of Jharkhand.

Malda, Murshidabad, and Uttar Dinajpur are hotspots. It is only after these districts ran into overcapacity with respect to illegal migrants that they began to spread out to Seemanchal and Santhal Pargana.

The easternmost tip of Jharkhand in the Pakur district of Santhal Pargana is just under 10 km from the Indo-Bangladesh border. Even from Kishanganj, this border is within walking distance.

Significant illegal Bangladeshi migration to India can be traced back to the 1971 Bangladesh liberation war and its aftereffects. The Congress did not think to curb illegal migration, while the Left government in Bengal effectively encouraged it.

Even after the Left was replaced by Mamata Banerjee, who had even cried on this issue in Parliament, the migrants kept flocking to India.

In Bihar, Lalu Prasad Yadav's RJD succeeded the Congress. They openly supported illegal migrants to build the then-newfound Muslim-Yadav (M-Y) solidarity. Yadav started to attend Iftar parties and gave migrant Muslims more political power — a tradition later continued by Nitish Kumar. 

This political power was used by local politicians to promote radical clerics, who then got an institutional mechanism running for procuring Aadhaar cards and citizenship documents based off fake information.

The number of Bangladeshis moving to India kept rising. According to the 2011 census data, Muslims made up 38.5 per cent of the population in Purnia, 42.95 per cent in Araria, and 44.47 per cent in Katihar.

However, people on the ground often refute this figure, claiming that Muslims do not get all members of their family registered. If local accounts are to be believed, Muslim population has crossed 50 per cent in Araria and Katihar since about 2010. In nearby Supaul, Muslims are in the majority in a village named Bhagwatpur (named after Lord Vishnu).

In Jharkhand, the Soren government followed suit by not discouraging illegal entry into Santhal Pargana. If anything, joining hands with the Congress and Lalu Yadav’s RJD only resulted in Soren's inability to protect his fellow tribals.

As reported earlier in Swarajya, Muslims form more than 38 per cent of the population of both Sahibganj and Pakur, and their numbers are rising. 

Muslims also form more than 25 per cent of the population of Godda district, nearly 24 per cent of the population of Deoghar district, more than 22 per cent of the population of Jamtara district, and more than 10 per cent of the population of Dumka district.

Between 2019 and 2024, the Muslim population increased by 117 per cent on 267 booths of Madhupur constituency. The average increase in such figures is 15-17 per cent. In 25 assembly constituencies, the rise was more than 120 per cent.

Four seats, namely Rajmahal, Pakur, Jamtara, and Madhupur, went to Muslim candidates in the 2024 Jharkhand Assembly election. JMM back in power would mean that they continue to exercise control and Bangladeshis find it easier to settle in Santhal Pargana.

The more worrying aspect in all this is the infantilisation of tribals living with the Bangladeshis migrants.

Godda Parliamentarian Dubey revealed that there are at least 100 villages where the Mukhiya is a tribal woman but that real control lies with her Muslim husband, who is likely to be of Bangladeshi origin.

Through such instances, which are commonplace in regular homes, Bangladeshis are able to suppress tribals and prevent them the mental and physical space to think independently.

There is a repetition in how all this unfolds. Bangladeshis are given space in local masjids, which then help them procure local documents. Then they set traps like love jihad or infiltrate local party cadre to gain power and prominence. Then the cycle repeats.

It is fallacious, therefore, to say that all this illegal migration is simply for ‘roti, kapda, makaan’.

This became more evident after the ouster of Sheikh Hasina from power in Bangladesh. The country's social media was abuzz with calls against India. Popular social media accounts started to post photos of Greater Bangladesh and incite people on the issue. There even exists a quora page for creating an international ecosystem around their cause.

This is evident in Indian security agencies' reports too. Babulal Marandi, the state BJP president of Jharkhand and a probable chief minister candidate, who is known for his no-nonsense attitude on national security, took to X about it:

“According to intelligence agencies, there is a conspiracy to create a country called 'Banglastan' by combining large parts of Jharkhand (Santhal dominated areas), Kishanganj district of Bihar, West Bengal, most of the north eastern states, Nepal and some parts of Myanmar,” he wrote.

Marandi added that Islamic fundamentalists in Bangladesh are eager to fulfill the goal of a Ghazwatul-Hind (war against non-Muslims) and an Islamic Bangladesh.

The danger became imminent after the demographic change in Santhal Pargana. Majority of the Muslims living there raised the urgency of the issue, which even Marandi pointed out.

Effectively, the Bangladeshis living in large numbers in five districts of Jharkhand, four districts of Bihar, and three districts of West Bengal are likely to compromise India’s security. Not to forget, all these districts are connected to each other. Here they are on Google Maps:

All those locations identified in red are the districts of Jharkhand, Bihar, and West Bengal that suffer at the hands of illegal Bangladeshi migration.

For an example of how the issue can cause a trouble, during the anti-CAA riots, Sharjeel Imam, a Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU)- and Indian Institute of Technology (IIT)-educated radical Islamist, was seen asking lakhs of people (Muslims) to occupy the Chicken’s Neck and block it. 

And what was it for? To browbeat the Indian government into preventing persecuted Hindus easier access to Indian citizenship. It was also to stop the Centre from implementing the National Register of Citizens (NRC) that would mean that a majority of Bangladeshis living in India would have to be deported.

Nearly a month after Marandi expressed his apprehensions, Jashimuddin Rahmani Hafi, the chief of the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), an al-Qaida-affiliated terrorist outfit, released a video warning India that he and his organisation would block the Chicken’s Neck in India. He also asked Banerjee to declare independence from India.

These elements will now be encouraged by the nationalist party’s loss in Santhal Pargana. One and a half generations of Bangladeshis have settled here; those who helped these people stay may ask for a return on their investment. With local politics on their side, nothing is off the table, even attempts to cut off the Chicken's neck.

Currently, 13 Indian districts, namely Uttari Dinajpur, Murshidabad, Malda, Kishanganj, Purnia, Araria, Katihar, Sahebganj, Pakur, Dumka, Godda, Deoghar, and Jamtara, are all near each other. They all lead to the crucial Siliguri Corridor.

One district provides connectivity to the others, and they end up at the Chicken's Neck. Illegal Bangladeshis have infiltrated all these places and live not far from the link roads connecting these cities. How does that prospect sound?