SC Order On Karnataka Trust Vote Will Not End Horse-Trading; If BJP Loses, It Will Try Later

The Supreme Court’s decision to curtail the time given to Karnataka Chief Minister B S Yeddyurappa to seek a trust vote to just one more day – he will have to prove his majority by tomorrow, 19 May – was widely expected. The three-judge bench could not have overturned Governor Vajubhai Vala’s decision to give Yeddyurappa first crack at ministry formation without directly encroaching on the rights of another constitutional functionary, but it will probably use this opportunity to decide how much leeway governors should have in such situations in future.

It is possible that Yeddyurappa may not be able to muster the numbers so quickly, especially since the bulk of the Congress and Janata Dal (Secular) or JD(S) MLAs have been spirited away like cattle to resorts in buses, but one cannot also presume that the game is over if he is defeated on the floor of the house tomorrow. MLAs cannot be stashed away in resorts forever, and no matter what the Congress and JD(S) do, there will always be a bunch of disgruntled MLAs in the ruling alliance who may be willing to switch sides, given the right incentives.

The only two conclusions one can draw from this first instalment of the Karnataka episode are the following, one, “picture abhi baki hai.” We haven’t seen the last of money-muscle politics. The second conclusion is that no party has the high moral ground here, and venality cannot be wished away in contested political spaces.

Few things demonstrate the obvious amorality of Indian power politics than the developments of the last three days after the elections failed to throw up a clear verdict. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) got 104 – eight short of a clear majority – as both Congress and JD(S) slipped from their previous totals, the former more than the latter.

So, when it came to government formation, the Congress (with 78 MLAs) quickly decided to back the JD(S) (with 37) to stake a claim, and the BJP used its clout with Governor Vajubhai Vala to get a foot in the door. The BJP claimed pre-emptive rights as it was the single largest party in the next assembly, even though the numbers on the JD(S)-Congress side looked more convincing.

Both sides fought to win, and morality had no role here. The BJP used a friendly Governor to get first rights to form a government, a government that cannot sustain without defectors from the rival formation; the Congress and JD(S) opted for an unholy embrace.

You can know power is the only overarching objective when both parties tailored their arguments – to the public and the Supreme Court – to suit their current exigencies.

H D Kumaraswamy of JD(S), who swore not to tie up with either the Congress or the BJP, went back on his promise and invented a funny reason for changing his mind about the party he abhorred till recently: he said he was making up for an ethical deficit of the past, when he had tied up with the “communal” BJP.

Both the Congress and the BJP used the other side’s arguments to justify their latest bids for power: the BJP used the largest single party argument to say it had the right to first refusal to form a government, and the Congress cited precedents in Goa and Manipur to say that the largest post-poll alliance should have been called first. The most ridiculous nonsense came from Rashtriya Janata Dal leader Tejashwi Yadav, son of convict Lalu Yadav, who said that since he was still the largest single party in Bihar, he should be invited to form a government. He seems to have forgotten a simple fact that a government already exists in Bihar, and if he wants to, he can anyway bring in a vote of no-confidence against Nitish Kumar, defeat him, and then stake his claim.

The Supreme Court has shortened the time available for the trust vote – the Governor gave Yeddyurappa 15 days in order to prevent “horse-trading”, a quaint term used to describe the purchase and sale of MLAs before a vote.

But the question is this: can horse-trading be prevented even after a trust vote? What, if not horse-trading, was involved when the larger party (Congress) agreed to become a junior partner in a coalition with the JD(S)? And are we naïve enough to presume that those who don’t defect to the BJP are driven by moral uprightness? The mere fact that Congress and JD(S) MLAs have been herded like cattle in buses and sequestered in resorts suggests that they may have been promised other benefits of office or money-making opportunities for staying loyal. Barring diehard party loyalists, even the horses not traded are sure to be given consolation prizes for not straying.

This is obvious from the fact that even before the selection of candidates, many parties charged aspirants application fees. According to this Times of India report, the Congress charged Rs 25,000 from each applicant for a party ticket, with SCs getting a discounted rate of Rs 15,000, and ministers paying a premium at Rs 1 lakh.

The JD(S) charged Rs 20,000 per aspirant, and Rs 15,000 for Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe candidates.

But one can’t be sure that the official fees are anything but the tip of the iceberg in many cases. Before the last assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh, Mayawati of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) was accused of charging super premiums for those seeking BSP tickets: two disgruntled members of her party alleged she was charging Rs 2-10 crore for each ticket.

Thus, while horse-trading may be a post-poll sport for political parties, the need for it is in-built into the structure of Indian politics, where the winners spend big sums to first obtain party tickets, and then incur additional crores during the campaign to get elected. A post-election seat deficit for either party (or combos) is thus an opportunity to ensure that these costs are recovered from whoever is willing to pay for changing loyalties.

But there is also a deeper point to be made: horse-trading is not merely about MLAs or MPs offering themselves to the highest bidder. Significant chunks of the electorate also indulge in buying and selling of votes, depending on how much party candidates are willing to pay for it. Voters benefit most (in terms of short-term allurements) when contests are keener, as was the case in the Karnataka assembly election.

According to news reports, Rs 116 crore was seized in terms of cash, jewellery and liquor from people linked to various parties in the run-up to 12 May, when polling was held in Karnataka. Since the amount seized is likely to have been a fraction of the sums actually paid out to voters, we are essentially talking of votes being bought at hefty, one-time premiums.

One need not assume that money ultimately tilts elections one way or the other, especially if there is a wave, but in tight elections, money does speak.

Samuel Huntington, in his book Political Order in Changing Societies (by “changing societies” he meant poor or less developed countries), says that two kinds of corruption take place in such electorates: the poor trade votes for economic benefits, and the rich incur economic costs to influence political outcomes and future policies.

This is what is at play in India, and Karnataka is only the latest example. To expect too much morality in India’s highly contested political spaces is futile.

Ethical behaviour may be talking points in TV shows, but Indian politics has turned amoral like never before.