Clause By Clause, Strike By Strike: How India Is Strategically Rewriting International Law

For decades, India’s engagement with international law has been defined by a posture of restraint. Despite being one of the earliest signatories to foundational treaties, from the UN Charter to the Geneva Conventions, India has largely approached international law as a system to be navigated carefully, not shaped assertively.

The Era of Restraint

India has long positioned itself as a status quo power: cautious in its assertions, reactive in its legal framing, and often conservative in its international positions. This normative conservatism was not merely ideological; it reflected India’s desire to avoid entanglements, project moral high ground, and preserve sovereign discretion in a postcolonial, developing world.

This orientation manifested most clearly in India’s historical handling of bilateral disputes, particularly with Pakistan. Even amidst repeated acts of provocation, such as cross-border terrorism, ceasefire violations, and insurgent support, India chose to abide by treaty commitments and multilateral obligations, even when such obligations constrained its strategic and diplomatic manoeuvrability.

This was evident in its enduring fidelity to the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960 and brokered by the World Bank, which allocated the use of the Indus River system between India and Pakistan. The IWT survived wars, armed skirmishes, and diplomatic breakdowns. Unlike other nations that might have used critical resources like water as strategic leverage, India continued to honour its legal commitments even in the face of blatant provocations.

The IWT became emblematic of India’s approach to international law: one rooted in principled adherence rather than instrumental calculation. It symbolised a belief in law as a stabilising force, even when the other side weaponised legal forums, obstructed technical cooperation, or invoked treaty mechanisms in bad faith. India’s restraint was often praised in international circles, but domestically, it was increasingly questioned, particularly in the context of national security.

That calculus has shifted in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terror attack in May 2025, which saw a deliberate and large-scale strike by non-State actors operating under direct control and supervision from Pakistan. In response, the Indian government made an unprecedented declaration: it would hold the IWT “in abeyance” until Pakistan took credible action to dismantle cross-border terror networks.

This is not a rhetorical threat. It has marked a legal turning point, a moment when India stopped seeing international law merely as a restraint and began using it as a weapon of strategic calibration.

Far from abandoning the rule-based international order, India has begun redefining its engagement with it. In doing so, India did not exit the IWT nor violate its substantive provisions. Rather, it leveraged procedural ambiguity, diplomatic precedent, and treaty interpretation to create a new space—one where international law could serve as a force multiplier, not a handcuff.

This Op-Ed argues that India’s response to the Pahalgam attack marks a decisive evolution in its international legal posture: from passive compliance to active legal statecraft. It is a shift from observing the rules to interpreting them, from being a subject of law to being a shaper of norms. This is not just a story of legal diplomacy; it is the emergence of India as a confident, sovereign actor willing to deploy international law with precision and purpose in the service of national interest.

Contextual Trigger: The Pahalgam Terror Attack

The fulcrum of India’s recent shift in legal posture can be traced to the Pahalgam terror attack, an event that not only claimed __ innocent lives but also served as the catalyst for a broader recalibration of India’s strategic and legal doctrine.

While acts of cross-border terrorism have unfortunately punctuated Indo-Pak relations for decades, the attack in Pahalgam in May 2025 distinguished itself through both its symbolic and operational impact. Coming on the heels of multiple high-level diplomatic engagements, this strike, attributed to Pakistan-sponsored non-State actors, served as a breaking point in India’s tolerance for asymmetric provocation under the shadow of outdated legal restraints.

Unlike in previous instances, where India’s response was largely confined to diplomatic condemnation or tightly calibrated military reactions (e.g., surgical strikes or air raids), the Indian government opted for a novel legal approach.

The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), India’s highest decision-making body on matters of national security, authorised an unprecedented legal manoeuvre: placing the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance until Pakistan demonstrated credible and verifiable action against cross-border terrorism.

For those familiar with Prime Minister Modi’s strategic worldview, this move is not an impulsive step but a calibrated response that has appeared in earlier attempts to redesign India’s external engagements on its own terms.

The phrasing—“held in abeyance”—was both deliberate and strategic. It carefully avoided the formal invocation of withdrawal or termination under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), particularly Article 60 (termination or suspension of a treaty due to material breach) and Article 62 (fundamental change of circumstances: rebus sic stantibus).

Instead, India adopted an intermediate legal posture, invoking procedural ambiguity as a tool of pressure, without crossing into technical breach. By doing so, India not only sidestepped the reputational and diplomatic costs that typically accompany formal treaty exits but also created a contingent performance structure, linking the treaty’s continued observance to Pakistan’s counterterrorism conduct.

This move represents a marked departure from India’s historically cautious approach to international law. For decades, India had persistently upheld the IWT even under extreme provocation, including during full-scale wars and sustained terrorist aggression. It did so despite the treaty’s structural limitations: it allocated three western rivers to Pakistan, imposed rigid usage conditions on India, lacked an exit clause, and required slow, sequential dispute resolution mechanisms vulnerable to procedural misuse.

By suspending its participation in the treaty’s procedural apparatus rather than breaching substantive obligations, India transformed international law from a defensive shield into an offensive lever.

It signalled that legal frameworks were no longer sacrosanct abstractions immune to recalibration in the face of persistent bad faith. Rather than rejecting international law, India redefined its relationship with it—asserting sovereign interests through law, not outside it.

The brilliance of India’s legal tactic lies in its preservation of legal ambiguity. By not formally exiting the IWT, India retained the high ground of legal credibility. This tactic forced Pakistan into a reactive posture. Unable to demonstrate Indian treaty breach, yet deeply unsettled by the suspension of cooperative mechanisms, Pakistan found itself legally cornered.

The message was clear: India would no longer permit treaties to operate in a political vacuum, insulated from security realities.

India’s decision to withdraw from both the Court of Arbitration proceedings on Kishenganga and Ratle, and the Neutral Expert proceedings—both elements of the IWT’s dispute resolution framework—signalled a deliberate break from procedural orthodoxy. These forums had been weaponised by Pakistan, with support from the World Bank, to stall India’s legitimate hydropower development.

This must be seen in the light of India’s resistance to World Bank intervention and multilateral adjudication. It is not rooted in an aversion to law—it is a rejection of procedural bad faith.

The argument was simple: where third-party mechanisms are used not for justice but for attrition, their legitimacy collapses. This resonated with broader Global South concerns about legal asymmetries in international institutions.

The broader significance lies in this act’s jurisprudential nuance. It neither abandoned the legal order nor violated it; instead, it introduced a strategic asymmetry. India framed itself as law-abiding yet no longer legally passive, willing to test boundaries while remaining within the bounds of plausible legal interpretation.

In this sense, the suspension of the IWT was not merely a geopolitical message—it was a juridical signal that India’s era of legal restraint had ended, and a new phase of legal assertiveness had begun.

The result was striking. Pakistan’s legal avenues narrowed. Its capacity to invoke the International Court of Justice was barred by India’s jurisdictional reservations. Its appeal to the UN Security Council was stymied by veto politics and the framing of the issue as bilateral.

With the treaty mechanism in procedural freeze and India opting out of third-party adjudication, Pakistan was left legally isolated—faced with an international system that demanded consent it could not compel.

Decoding the Legal Strategy in Military Response

The suspension of procedural cooperation under the IWT was only the opening legal move in a broader strategic play. It signalled not just India’s frustration with an outdated bilateral framework, but also its willingness to deploy legal instruments as tools of coercive diplomacy.

However, the real inflection point came with Operation Sindoor — India’s calibrated military response that went beyond prior precedents. While the IWT manoeuvre tested the limits of treaty law, Operation Sindoor redefined how international legal doctrines of self-defence, proportionality, and sovereignty would be interpreted and applied by a rising power under persistent asymmetric threat.

The architecture of this legal strategy rests on three interlocking elements: the invocation of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, the use of treaty law as calibrated leverage, and the disruption of procedural mechanisms as a form of diplomatic messaging.

India grounded this operation in the legal doctrine of self-defence, invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter, which recognises the inherent right of states to use force in response to an armed attack. This framing was pivotal. It shifted the legal terrain from one of interstate aggression to one of counterterrorism in response to a sustained pattern of cross-border assaults.

India did not declare war. Nor did it breach treaty obligations in a conventional sense. Instead, it positioned its conduct within the globally accepted legal framework for self-defence, even while operating within the territory of another sovereign state. This marked a doctrinal shift — from passive endurance to active legal articulation.

India’s justification drew heavily on contemporary interpretations of the “unwilling or unable” doctrine, which permits the use of force against non-State actors when the host state is either complicit or incapable of preventing attacks emanating from its soil. The characterisation of Pakistan as a permissive incubator for terrorism became central to this logic.

By invoking the “imminence” of further attacks, India avoided the procedural entanglements of waiting for another act of aggression. This anticipatory posture — where India framed its actions as a necessary intervention to prevent further terrorist strikes — has strong parallels with the 2006 Israeli incursions into Lebanon and the US targeted killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi in Yemen. These precedents, though controversial, have established a body of state practice that India now joins — asserting legal grounds for pre-emptive self-defence in the face of asymmetric threats.

Importantly, India rejected the imposition of legal symmetry between itself and Pakistan. It consistently emphasised that its actions were directed at non-State actors, not the Pakistani state — thus eschewing recognition of a formal armed conflict under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which could confer reciprocal legal obligations.

This careful rhetorical and legal distancing allowed India to maintain narrative control while minimising the risk of escalating the conflict into an international armed confrontation.

The Birth of Legal Statecraft

India’s recent turn in international law, especially post-Pahalgam and the IWT suspension, marks not just a tactical adjustment but a deeper paradigm shift in legal strategy.

Long known for cautious compliance and a rules-based image, India is now deploying international law not merely as a shield of legitimacy, but as a sword of statecraft — a means to apply pressure, shape narratives, and advance strategic interests.

The decision to place the IWT “in abeyance” without breaching it exemplifies this shift. Instead of exiting the treaty, India operated within its grey zones — invoking doctrines like rebus sic stantibus and withdrawing procedural cooperation to generate leverage without collapse. This was not legal defiance, but calibrated discipline.

India’s framing, too, was deliberate. By emphasising “non-State actors” and “imminent threat,” and by relying on open-source intelligence over multilateral inquiries, India mirrored established Western precedents and contained the legal narrative.

What emerges is a state no longer content with merely following norms but actively interpreting, testing, and reshaping them. India is becoming not just a legal subject but a legal strategist — part of a broader global shift where emerging powers seek to redefine the very language of lawful power.

We are witnessing the birth of legal statecraft in the Indian context: a mode of international engagement where treaties, doctrines, and legal mechanisms are not sacrosanct constraints, but tools in the service of national interest, deployed with subtlety, precision, and purpose.

In the evolving multipolar order, where traditional power hierarchies are eroding and legal regimes are increasingly sites of strategic contestation, India’s assertive yet disciplined legal manoeuvring represents a maturing identity — not as a passive recipient of norms, but as a confident norm entrepreneur. This must be appreciated.