Long Read: Afghanistan Is Not Our Problem, But A Lesson Nonetheless

It has been more than a week now since the Taliban conquered Kabul, the last standing major city in Afghanistan in their pursuit of a complete political, yet forced, takeover of the country in the wake of an unplanned American exit.

As India entered the 75th year of its Independence, a neighbouring country fell to fascism dictated by religious fanatics with a history of violence against women and children.

For some young Indians, oblivious to the rule of the Taliban between 1994 and 2001, this was the first tryst with actual fascism against the one that they were made to believe existed in the mindless corridors of Instagram and Twitter.

Quick to respond, Indians flooded the social media with messages of empathy and reactions that were plagued with shock, horror, and grief. Some demanded that the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) must be extended to Muslims in Afghanistan, especially when the condition of women and children is destined to be problematic under the Taliban regime.

Some even wanted Indian boots on the ground, forgetting how the British, Soviets, and Americans, each at the peak of their power, could not achieve the ideal political settlement in the war-torn nation.

Nevertheless, a week later, the reality has set in, the evacuations are almost complete, and as the world copes and adjusts to the new politics of the Taliban, the Indian government must realise that Afghanistan is not our problem, but our lesson even as we invest our hopes in the resistance in Panjshir Valley or geopolitical prophecies.

China, already, has taken to the diplomatic chessboard against the Taliban, given the small Chinese region that borders Afghanistan in the vicinity of the Xinjiang region.

Merely a couple of days after the Taliban conquest of Kabul, China’s Foreign Ministry stated that the political developments in Afghanistan were a ‘measure of national consensus’.

Choosing to go diplomatic rather than offensive, the ministry further added that they were expecting the new Taliban regime to be an 'open and inclusive Islamic government' that not only caters to the citizens of Afghanistan but also other foreign missions, clearly hinting at the plausible Belt and Road Missions that China would hope to install in the state.

The Foreign Minister stated that they had spoken to Taliban leaders directly and received assurances that the new regime would never allow any forces to use Afghan territory to do things that endanger China.

In their optimistic outreach to the Taliban, the Chinese have been wanting to secure an insurance against any potential Uyghur terrorist groups to come together or request aid from Afghanistan to unsettle Xinjiang.

The Chinese have been courting the Taliban for a while now. Earlier this year, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi was in conversation with many Taliban leaders in Tianjin.

The Taliban, then looking for global legitimacy, assured Wang that Taliban posed no danger to the interests of the Chinese, emphasising how Taliban wanted to cultivate friendly relationships with neighbouring countries. Further, the Taliban even invited China to play a role in the economic and social redevelopment of the war-torn Afghanistan, an invitation Beijing would want to grab with both hands.

For China, exchanging promises of peace and economic partnership is a better bet than cultivating an enemy in the Xinjiang region. Further, the recent violence against Chinese workers in Pakistan would warrant patronising of the Taliban.

Pakistan, which has donned multiple hats in its friendship with Taliban — from that of a disciple to a guardian — has already legitimised the new regime, with the Prime Minister himself congratulating the fanatics for breaking the chains of slavery in Afghanistan.

During their short rule between 1994 and 2001, the Taliban got support from Pakistan in the form of millions of dollars, around $30 million in 1997-98 alone, ammunition, equipment, and intelligence thanks to the ISI.

While the Taliban had no formal relationship with India back then, Pakistan’s charity did ensure that the militant groups could use the Taliban’s help and experience to prepare against India.

As for China as well as Pakistan, the backing of the Taliban as the 'mandate' of the Afghani people is also about lowering the criticism against the regime in the global community.

Pakistan, historically, has harboured Taliban’s leaders, and even their political offspring, as the Americans discovered in 2011 in Abbottabad. Even today, the Taliban leadership has access to safehouses and hospitals and other facilities in Islamabad.

However, the closeness of Pakistan and China to the Taliban today, and the expertise of both the countries to create internal fissures within India through proxies in political parties, media, and other non-government organisations and business groups poses a growing internal security threat.

China, by virtue of its investment potential in Afghanistan, could use the services of the Taliban to create disturbances in India, just as Pakistan did during the late 1990s.

The teaser to this threat was visible in Mehbooba Mufti’s speech, where she compared the situation in Jammu and Kashmir to that in Afghanistan, implying that the day the patience of people in the region would run out, they would drive out the Indian forces out of the Valley, just as the Americans were from Afghanistan. One can only hope that Mufti was not, indirectly, reaching out to the Taliban or her Pakistani counterparts.

The trailer of this threat, this fanaticism, was witnessed merely a few months ago in West Bengal when Trinamool workers went on a targeted violence spree against supporters, workers, and voters of the Bharatiya Janata Party in the state, merely hours after the election results came out.

The violence that continued for weeks was rooted in communalism and religious ideologies even though many tried to dismiss it as routine political violence.

What else explains the remark of TMC leader Sheikh Alam during the Bengal election campaign, stating that four Pakistan like territories could be created if the 30 per cent of Muslim population came together.

A threat may also stem from the political volatility of Pakistan.

While many in India can choose to be wishful for the political collapse of Pakistan or the Talibanisation of the neighbour by virtue of cumulative jihad or the Pashtun unity, to have a region the size of Afghanistan and Pakistan put together, radicalised by the idea of a war against infidels, on India’s western front would not only intensify the external threat, but also internal, given there would always be political and social cheerleaders for a cause like this.

As the Talibanisation of Pakistan increases, two, five, or 10 years from now, India must draw lessons to better its internal security from Europe, which suffered because of the virtual radicalisation of the Islamic State.

Lone wolf attacks using knives, lorries, and trucks became the norm around 2016-17, as ISIS used the internet to radicalise people sitting thousands of miles away. If we can have people from Kerala joining ISIS, the potential Talibanisation of any young Indian cannot and must not be ruled out.

Thus, there is a strong case for India to further its internal security and surveillance apparatus as the Taliban threat will not come from Kashmir alone.

Lastly, the government must be careful as to how it approaches the conundrum of Afghani refugee groups not covered under the CAA.

While there is a case on humanitarian grounds to inculcate and have more Muslim Afghani refugees, the onus does not rest with India alone but also more than 50 Islamic nations, starting with Turkey which has chosen to build a wall to keep the refugees out. This responsibility must be communicated in the global forums, starting with the oblivious United Nations.

The problem of letting Afghani refugees in is not of settlement or resources, but that of a precedent. An honest conversation with respect to the condition of women and children under Taliban rule is warranted, for their condition is not dictated by geography but a culture that is followed across the world, mostly in the Middle East.

There is also the problem of sending them back at a future date, given the head of the Afghani community in India has already stated in clear words that more than 21,000 Afghan refugees will not go back to the country, and if anyone doubts their desperation, recall the clips of people hanging on to the planes of US forces before falling to their death.

Lastly, if India is indeed going to entertain all Afghan refugees, for whatever reasons, how does one sustain the case made for minorities only in the CAA, or sustain the protest against the Rohingyas or Bangladeshi illegal immigrants.

The government is treading on very thin ice here.

India’s problem is not Afghanistan, but the likes of Muftis, Trinamools, and mindless liberals that legitimise the Taliban for their armed appearances in press conferences. The swift takeover of a radicalised jihadi force will motivate many in India to embark on a similar path, and then there is always the potential backing from China and Pakistan.

In an evolving geopolitical world, Taliban is an evolving reality, and India’s response to its internal security threats will also have to evolve.