Who Benefits From Assad’s Fall In Syria?

Who gains from the fall of President Bashar al-Assad? Honestly none in the Middle East or beyond. Several might make tactical gains, but strategically, the region is the biggest loser.

As seen in several other countries, removing a dictator brings thousands of jubilant people to the streets. Accusations of violations often accompany a sense of relief. But the day-after reality tends to be stark, uncertain and even fearful. Syria will not be different.

More seriously, the Islamic Republic is the biggest loser. Smelling the impending fall of President Bashar Assad, Iranian diplomats fled the embassy premises literally hours before rebels took over Damascus.

The Syrian setback comes against the already weakened ‘Axis of Resistance.’ Iran was not able or willing to respond to the Israeli airstrikes of 26 October, whose military impact is still shrouded in secrecy. The Israeli offensive was sandwiched between the killings of Hasan Nasrallah and Yahya Sinwar, key members of the Iranian strategy against Israel. Despite the initial criticisms and misgivings, Israeli actions have considerably reduced the military capabilities of Hamas and Hezbollah and, in the process, weakened the Iranian options in Syria.

Syria has been the conduit for the Iranian supplies to Hezbollah since the founding of the militant group in 1982. Tehran’s involvement in the Syrian civil war in support of the regime only enhanced its influence. Despite repeated Israeli airstrikes on supply routes—often with Russia's knowledge, as another backer of the regime—Iranian support persisted.

The Bashar regime's fall also marked the rebel forces' anti-Iranian attitude; hence, Iran will have to rework its strategy. So long as there is interest convergence, proxies are a cheaper option. The patron suffers dearly when the militant groups pursue options that are not in sync with the national population. This is more apparent in Lebanon; the critics—both within and outside the Shia community of Lebanon—are not in agreement with Hezbollah pursuing a policy that is detrimental to Lebanese interests.

The same holds for Syria when Iran sought to shore up support for a domestically unpopular Assad regime. While Ayatollah Khamenei blamed Israel and the United States for the events, support for Assad also contributed to regional anger against Iran.

Russia is another major loser. President Vladimir Putin stood by Bashar and ensured the latter’s safe exit and asylum. Embattled in Ukraine, Russia had to cut its losses and will be preoccupied with retaining its military assets in Syria rather than saving Assad. When push comes to shove, Syria is more important than the Bashar regime. 

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is elated at the downfall of Assad, something he has been trying since popular protests began in Syria in March 2011. He is eager for the early return of an estimated 3 million Syrian refugees in his country, and the ideological convergence of some of the Islamist groups in Syria is an added advantage.

Still, Assad was a better option, especially since the beginning of the civil war; with diverse ideological and patronage makeup, the post-Assad political climate is far more uncertain, and Türkiye might have dealt with the problem of Syria not having a strong leadership that could unify the diverse population.

While Assad was an adversary, Israel was better off with him than without. A weaker Assad tied down with domestic uncertainties and protests was a strategic asset as that reduced the Syrian ability to undermine Israel's regional security. Assad’s preoccupation with survival, especially with the help of Hezbollah fighters, meant that he was unable to wield any influence over the militant group.

At the same time, active involvement in Syria also stressed Hezbollah at two levels: lessening the number of militants available for the Israel front; and anger and unpopularity among the Lebanese and Syrian refugee population. Even during the civil war, Assad presented a symbol of central authority, and now Israel will have to deal with the deeply divided and patronless post-Assad political order. Limited territorial gains in recent days along the Golan Heights and attacks against Syrian military assets will not change the basic challenge; a weaker Syria is far better for Israel than an imploding neighbour.

The post-Assad Syria radically differs from post-Saddam Iraq. Despite all its blunders, errors and omissions, the Bush Administration was ready to work for a democratic transition in Iraq. The prolonged civil war and sectarian violence were also accompanied by Iraq moving towards a more inclusive and democratic polity. Much to Arab anger, Iraq turned into a Shia state politically and adopted a federal constitution with greater autonomy to the Kurdish Regional Government in the North. Governments changed through elections rather than bullets.

Such a transition in Syria is unlikely. Securing a post-Assad central authority will be extremely difficult, if not impossible. There are far too many social divisions, dozens of rival militant groups espousing conflicting ideologies, and many external patrons. While everyone speaks of a ‘united and inclusive’ Syria, getting there will be impossible.

Authoritarian and undemocratic leaders of the Middle East give a façade of stability and strength, but they plunge their countries into far more serious challenges when they fall. Syria is just the latest example.