India-Pakistan Hostility: America’s Good Intentions May Not Reflect Ground Realities

Noble may be the intent of a big power to bring estranged neighbours, anywhere in the world, to the negotiating table. However, if that is done without realistic assessment of the ground situation and without considering the likely immediate response, the effort would be doomed to failure. One cannot be unfair to a nation such as the US because its institutional understanding of the international security environment is usually up to date. Yet its actions may not always support its thinking.

The context here is the statement of Nikki Haley, US Ambassador to the United Nations, about a proposal to mediate between India and Pakistan and stabilise the potential conflict situation in South Asia; something which has seen many critical moments in the last 28 years. The statement reads:

It has to be assumed that Ambassador Haley was referring to US mediation and not merely facilitation because other parts of her statement did refer to the administration’s intent to be proactive about preventing the bubbling over of conflicts, with even the President personally involved.

Pakistan, of course, was quick to respond by welcoming the statement, forgetting that it is a signatory to the Shimla Agreement of 1972, which lays down bilateralism as the only means to problem resolution with India. India’s spokesman Gopal Bagley, an old Pakistan hand, clearly rejected the idea. Pakistani media made it out to be a result of the five-day visit of Indian National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval to Washington where purportedly discussions on Pakistan, its terrorist problem and nuclear weapons were held with a number of high-ranking officials.

So what has actually triggered the sudden rush of blood to look towards reversal of a policy which has been followed to the tee by at least three previous administrations on the trot? The State Department has seldom given credence to rants by Pakistan at the UN General Assembly sessions or any other international gatherings, but to think that Pakistan’s importance is in any way insignificant to the US scheme of things would be a half truth. Pakistan’s geo-strategic location bears tremendous importance for the US. It controls the access to the heart of Asia and the reverse access to the Indian Ocean. It flanks both Afghanistan and Iran, two countries the US has deep interests in, in different ways.

However, the real importance of Pakistan is in the negative. The more it is in confrontation mode with India, chasing a charade and a dream of wresting Jammu and Kashmir through its avowed strategy of ‘a thousand cuts’, the more it ties itself in knots. Its pursuance of perceived interests both at borders and in neighbouring territories has led it to adopt the notorious policy of friendly and unfriendly terrorists, employing the former as strategic assets. To add to it are its infirm democratic credentials and a military which rules the roost and takes all the strategic decisions.

The US analysts have for long worried about the state of security of the nuclear arsenal reputed to be fourth largest in the world with its control in military hands. But all this has been known for long and it’s for these very reasons that the US policymakers have treated Pakistan with kid gloves, ensuring they do not push it over the top. They need it for the logistics route to Afghanistan and for the stabilisation efforts there. They also need US influence over it to prevent it completely playing to the Chinese tune.

In fact, if there is any plausible reason for alarm bells in Washington forcing some rethink, it could be the recent parleys between Russia, China and Pakistan; reportedly for the purpose of stabilising Afghanistan. The US is looking for a way to remaining more relevant in South Asia at a time when other big powers appear to be stealing a march. Should it therefore be presumed that the US is insufficiently enthused by its emerging strategic partnership with India?

A better explanation may be the necessity for a super power to balance its options far better than to put all eggs into one basket; it does make strategic sense from a US standpoint, after all, the investment in Pakistan’s stability has been costly and over quite a long time. That should not in any way put off Indian policymakers, who are known to be pragmatic and comprehensive in thinking. The importance of the US-India strategic partnership cannot be dented by such actions.

The only other perceivable trigger appears to be the high profile status suddenly occupied by the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), its operationalisation considered by many as the most strategic event for long. There is no doubt that it gives Pakistan a confidence boost with talk of the current 5 per cent being converted to 7 per cent growth in GDP terms, in the next three years. It is possible the US thinking harped on the feasibility of a strategically emboldened Pakistan with Chinese backing, undertaking a dangerous mission against India. That would be catastrophic and the source of much instability in Asia.

India is confident of its stand over J&K notwithstanding the very turbulent conditions which have existed there for the last one year. Drawing it out into internationalisation and mediation will force it to compromise on its stance which has been amply clarified. It wishes stability and will work towards that. Its approach in adopting bilateralism has ensured it a position of strength with very few ever questioning its credentials.

An article by Robert Cassidy in National Interest magazine, “How Pakistan Warped into a Geopolitical Monster” refers to the support which terror groups affecting Afghanistan and the rest of the South Asian region receive at the hands of the Pakistani establishment. He goes on to say “As long as they enjoy external enablement, they have no incentive to reconcile”. Perhaps the strategic stalemate in Afghanistan is in the minds of the officials of the Trump Administration, who probably feel that progress towards peace between Pakistan and India will help Islamabad shed its propensity to depend on terror groups to deliver its strategic interests.

The US establishment’s approach appears to reflect some advantage that it perceives in reducing tensions in the subcontinent. No attempted backroom diplomacy is being reported and such actions are usually preceded by shuttle diplomacy. Admitted that Nikki Haley’s projection is actually loud thinking about what the US may wish to see in the near future. Many administrations have thought similarly but have avoided delving into any form of mediation or even facilitation except in crisis times. One is reminded of the Gates shuttle diplomacy of 1990 and the Clinton Administration’s role during Kargil in 1999. These examples should never be applied to the larger relationship issues between India and Pakistan. India’s stand is quite clear. It will engage Pakistan in dialogue but not under duress and definitely not with Pakistan continuing to sponsor proxy war in India.

The Trump Administration may be attempting to change policies, which it may feel have not delivered the dividends on ground. That is sensible but the degree of sensitivity of issues has to be kept centre point and consultation before decisions and even loud thinking would always be prudent.