Russia-India-China Foreign Ministers' Meet: What Gives?

It’s been a busy week for Foreign Minister S Jaishankar. There was the first meeting of the ‘India-UK Joint Working Group on Cyber Deterrence’, another of the SCO Council of Heads of Government, consultations with Estonia, the formal announcement of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Delhi next month for the annual India-Russia summit, and drumming up foreign investment at the Vibrant Gujarat curtain-raiser.

And it wasn’t yet the weekend.

But Jaishankar’s most important appointment was his chairing of the Russia-India-China (RIC) Foreign Ministers’ Meet, which was held by video link on Friday 26 November.

The poignancy of the date was paramount, since his department also summoned a senior diplomat from the Pakistani High Commission, to hand over a note verbale — a formal record of information given to another country — on how Pakistan has now dragged its feet for 13 long years, over bringing the Pakistan-based perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks to justice.

Cynics would say that both were wasted efforts, since the Pakistanis are no sooner going to stop using terrorism as a tool against India, as the Chinese will abandon their strategic necessities of underwriting Rawalpindi’s security, to usher in an era of peace and prosperity with India.

Nonetheless, it is important that we analyse the latest RIC meet for key takeaways.

As outgoing Chairman (it passes by rotation to China for a year now), Jaishankar said that this RIC meeting would cover the Wuhan virus pandemic, reforms in multilateral systems (meaning, inter alia, international bodies like the Security Council), and global hot spots.

He also informed that only the opening statements would be made public, which means that the real discussions would be classified.

He got to the nub after suggesting that the Vasudaiva kutumbakam concept be adopted under the RIC mechanism, to foster cooperation in multiple sectors: the ongoing global epidemic showed a dire need for a ‘One Earth One Health’ approach, meaning, “a timely, transparent, effective and non-discriminatory international response to global health challenges including pandemics, with equitable and affordable access to medicines and critical health supplies”.

Translation: no country should be allowed to subvert the World Health Organization, to cover up catastrophic blunders with global consequences as the Chinese did in Wuhan.

The next point was on ‘Reformed Multilateralism’; basically it reiterated India’s long-standing demand, that the Security Council should be expanded to include India and a few others as permanent members, in recognition of changing global dynamics.

Pertinently, though, our Foreign Minister used the phrase ‘international law’ rather than ‘rules based order’. This was a nod to the Russians’ old gripe that the Americans did as they pleased, by invoking the latter phrase and citing exigency, rather than following prescribed procedures.

Jaishankar’s third, and most important, point was on Afghanistan. India was concerned about developments there, and on the hindering of land access by Pakistan; although, of course, these sentiments were conveyed in humanitarian terms of seeking to supply aid to “the suffering…Afghan people”.

Translation: if Rawalpindi and the Taliban think they can make merry with Beijing’s blessings, then they’ve got another thing coming.

Wang Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, went next. He informed his ‘two old friends’ that in his view, anti-globalism, unilateralism, protectionism, hegemonism, and power-politics were gaining momentum, to pose challenges to a world already reeling from the economic debacle caused by a resurgence of Covid-19 across the world.

There were no hollow laughs at either the grating, excessive bonhomie, when none existed between two out of three participants, or such flagrant casuistry, at focusing only on the epidemic’s resurgence while conveniently sidestepping its origins.

Perhaps, the other two ministers managed to keep a straight face only because of their professionalism.

Oblivious to the ironies inherent in his remarks, Beijing’s representative ploughed on. The world, he declared, was entering a fresh era of transformation. China intended to achieve prosperity within this, by seeking peace, respecting humanity, sovereignty, and by practising solidarity with India and Russia.

That collection of bromides, in a nutshell, defined China’s approach to global affairs — a sanctimonious, somewhat delusional view that the right words spoken at public forums are enough to paper over real intentions and fundamentally destabilizing acts.

What else was Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, expected to say after that but advocate multilateralism, multi-polarity, increasing the relevance of the United Nations, complain about unilateral, motivated sanctions (a reference to America and pressure on the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia to Western Europe), and caution against protectionism?

However, he did say that in Russia’s view, the RIC format remained a relevant platform for achieving security and economic integration in the Eurasian space.

Unfortunately, the net result of China’s present needs is that the RIC forum, along with a healthily-united Eurasian counterpoise to the West which Russia desperately seeks, will remain a chimera until China changes its approach.

And this is Russia’s conundrum — getting India and China onto the same page, so that the three might together force a long-overdue change in global affairs.

Russia needs this desperately since, in addition to accommodating the aspirations of the two growing giants of Asia, it also has to balance out Europe plus America, while consolidating its nascent powers of setting global energy prices.

That’s not going to happen as long as China works levers to keep India in check.

When the Non Aligned Movement died with the Soviet Union, an effort was commenced with the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO). But that didn’t work out because the Russians were chary of India’s leanings, Chinese equivalence wanted Pakistan on the same pedestal as India, and everyone else said that India and Pakistan in the same boat was a non-starter.

The next attempt was BRICS — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — which seemed to gain traction after Modi won in 2014. They even set up a development bank together, the BRICS Bank, with KV Kamath as its first head.

But six years later, the bank is now called the New Development Bank, and it has yet to open a regional office in India (there’s one in each of the other four BRICS member countries).

RIC is the third attempt. And yet, within the RIC ambit, China remains Russia’s problem, not India’s. Has China grown so large that the Russians are no longer capable of making them see even some sense?

If yes, then RIC is destined to go the SCO and BRICS way. Or else, Russia will have to make a few, hard choices on recognizing India’s security concerns as not just valid, but linked as well, to Russia’s quest for that elusive Eurasian sphere.