Schrödinger’s Kursk: A Front That Fell In Reality But Survives In West's Denial

Following our previous analysis on why the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) miscalculated their Kursk Gambit and why its failure was inevitable, the anticipated collapse has unfolded over the past two weeks.

The Kursk Collapse

At its peak, the AFU controlled approximately 900 square kilometers of territory, centered around the key logistics hub of Sudzha, which also served as the primary supply node for Ukrainian forces in the Kursk Salient.

For reference, as of September, while the Zelensky administration claimed control of 1,200 square kilometers, open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts like Suriya K estimated a more realistic maximum of around 900 square kilometers.

By January, Russian forces had made slow but steady gains, reducing Ukrainian control to around 600 square kilometers.

However, Russia’s primary focus remained in the South, where the period from August to January saw greater progress than March 2022 to August 2024. Between January and March, Russian advances in this sector averaged just 4-5 kilometers per day, sometimes slowing to 1-2 kilometers across the entire front. Even as recently as March 8, Ukraine still held nearly 450 square kilometers.

At the previously maintained pace, it was expected to take Russia another three to four months of methodical advances to seal the salient. Yet, by March 17, Ukraine retained only small, isolated pockets.

Sudzha, expected to become another Bakhmut and extract a heavy toll on Russian forces, surrendered within just 48 hours. How did Russia achieve such a dramatic breakthrough in what should have been a slow, positional battle?

Operation Potok (Flow)

Author’s note: As the Russian Ministry of Defense has not officially released details for this operation, the following analysis is based on reports from Russian and Ukrainian Telegram channels.

Between the night of March 7 and the morning of March 8, Russian forces executed a bold maneuver that, had it been conducted by Ukraine or a Western military, would likely have inspired Hollywood films and best-selling books. However, this operation has largely gone unnoticed.

The Strategy and Execution

The operation began in early March 2025, when Russian forces identified an opportunity involving the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline, a Soviet-era gas pipeline that previously transported Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine.

Since the outbreak of war, the pipeline had been inactive, yet it presented a covert infiltration route into Sudzha—the linchpin of AFU defenses in the Kursk Salient.

Russian sappers entered the pipeline, overcoming extremely challenging conditions to prepare it for troop movements. They installed oxygen pipes, created supply depots along the 15-kilometer route, and even carved out small assembly spaces with makeshift sanitation facilities.

Reports indicate that preparations for this operation began as early as February, underscoring its deliberate and methodical planning.

This was not Russia’s first use of "pipeline tactics". In January 2024, Russian troops successfully infiltrated 1.5 kilometers behind Ukrainian lines using a similar method in Avdiivka, hastening the fall of this key AFU stronghold.

The operation was led by Major General Apti Alaudinov, who assembled elements from multiple units, including:

• Vostok Assault Brigade (key reconnaissance element)

• Veterans Brigade (previously involved in Avdiivka)

• Akhmat forces

• 106th Airborne Division

• 11th and 16th Brigades

• 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment

• An unspecified number of special operations personnel

The mission was strictly voluntary due to the high likelihood of failure or being cut off and eliminated. Initial estimates placed the force at 200-300 personnel, but revised figures suggest around 800 troops participated.

The Infiltration

Much of the preparation time was spent purging residual gas from the pipeline and ensuring adequate oxygen levels. Multiple exfiltration points were mapped, and sappers accompanied the troops to drill emergency exits.

By March 1-2, units began entering the pipeline, gradually making their way to designated jump-off points. The arduous journey took up to four days for all units to position themselves, with those traveling the farthest taking an additional 3-4 days.

The pipeline’s maximum height of 4.5 feet meant soldiers had to crawl for extended periods. Despite the preparations, conditions were harsh—limited oxygen caused headaches and burning eyes, making breathing difficult.

On March 8, all units initiated their assault, targeting strategic locations such as Sudzha’s industrial park—a formidable defensive position—and the northern bypass road to cut off the garrison’s retreat.

The Outcome

When Russian forces emerged 15 kilometers behind AFU lines, total surprise was achieved. Some Ukrainian units attempted to resist, but most fled Sudzha in disarray—only to be ambushed on the bypass road by Russian forces, now deploying drone swarms to harass retreating units.

By the evening of March 8, Ukrainian forces had lost key defensive positions north of Sudzha, including Malaya Loknya and Martynovka. The next day, Russian forces retook another stronghold in Kazachya Loknya. Ukrainian troops suffered heavy losses during their hasty retreat from the northern part of the bridgehead.

While the fall of Sudzha was decisive, another overlooked factor was Russia’s earlier establishment of fire control over the salient’s only two supply roads using first-person-view (FPV) drones, impervious to jamming. By mid-January, these drones had significantly disrupted AFU supply convoys, creating a severe logistical bottleneck.

In a desperate attempt to alleviate pressure, Ukraine launched an offensive toward Ulanok in February. Western media outlets, including Newsweek and Radio Liberty, hailed this as a major counteroffensive. However, they failed to mention that it was crushed within two days and was primarily an effort to relieve the AFU’s precarious supply situation.

Once this counterattack failed, logistical support to the salient dwindled, rendering the Ukrainian position unsustainable. Sudzha had stockpiled supplies, but once it fell, the collapse of AFU positions in Kursk was inevitable. From 400 square kilometers which it held around March 7, AFU now holds 60 square kilometers of Russian territory and even these will fall in the coming week.

What next?

The fall of the Kursk Salient marks a significant shift in the ongoing conflict, demonstrating the effectiveness of Russian tactical ingenuity and the impact of sustained logistical pressure on the Ukrainian forces.

The use of the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline as a covert infiltration route was a masterstroke, allowing Russian troops to bypass formidable defenses and achieve a decisive breakthrough. Furthermore, Russia’s ability to leverage drone warfare to sever Ukrainian supply lines played a crucial role in accelerating the collapse.

While Ukraine has suffered a major setback, the broader implications of this loss will unfold in the coming months, shaping the next phase of the war.

One thing is certain, Ukraine kicked a hornet's nest by their offensive in Kursk. In July, this was a backwater area, thinly garrisoned on both sides with energies focussed on the Donbas region. By March 15^th, Ukraine is in full retreat and Russia has slowly deployed a large offensive capable force in this region.

Only one unit, the 155^th Guards Naval Infantry Bg is estimated to have been redeployed from the Southern direction to the Kursk direction, the rest of the units being the reserves are being redeployed to this front (except for small specialised units) from Kharkiv and Vovchansk fronts.

Ukraine however withdrew from active combat its elite units like the 47th Mech Brigade (armed with a complement of Abrams and Bradleys) and 14 other combat-trained veteran units. Ukraine has since August lost bastions in Vuhledar, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka, along with a vast stretch of territory between Donetsk’s western outskirts and the Pokrovsk–Velyka Novosilka line.

Meanwhile, Russian forces have also made gains along secondary fronts, advancing to the western outskirts of Pokrovsk and the Dnipropetrovsk region’s border, crossing the Oskil River near Kupyansk and capturing parts of Toretsk and Chasiv Yar north of Donetsk. 

Till March 8, Kiev was convinced that the trade-off was justified, Zelensky even said that Russian territory in Kursk would be an important piece of the upcoming negotiations but now it turns out, it is all to naught. In the south, prepared defenses by Ukraine have both slowed down and are extracting a heavy toll on the RU units on the offensive.

Now with terrain that is very favourable for large-scale manoeuvre warfare, and not that heavily fortified, will Russia launch a major offensive in this direction or continue with its now finely honed attritional and drip warfare strategy, is something only time will tell.

One thing is for certain in the future direction of the war in this sector, Russia will now focus on taking Sumy next. And early moves indicate that this could be a real possibility in the near future.

Kiev regime meanwhile is convinced that it is all a lie. CNN even released a map on Monday showing Sudzha outside AFU control. This is delusional beyond belief. Perhaps, in the end, the reality may seem to the Ukrainian administration, and its supporters in the West, to be some sort of Schrodinger’s Kursk!

Also read: Ukraine's Miscalculated Kursk Offensive Of August 2024 That Accelerated Its Collapse