Weaponised Imagery: How Maxar’s Satellite Data May Be Helping Pakistan And What India Can Do About It

In the modern battlefield, high-resolution satellite imagery has become an indispensable asset. It enables militaries to plan operations with surgical precision, minimising risks to civilians while targeting high-value threats. 

A recent example of this was seen on May 7, 2025, when India launched Operation Sindoor—a coordinated series of missile strikes on nine terrorist camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). These attacks were in retaliation for a devastating terror assault in India's Pahalgam on April 22, which killed 26 civilians.

What made Operation Sindoor particularly impressive was the level of accuracy achieved by India.

The operation targeted key terrorist infrastructures, including the Jaish-e-Mohammed headquarters in Bahawalpur and Lashkar-e-Taiba in Muridke—both deeply embedded, by design rather than by accident, in densely populated civilian zones.

Avoiding civilian casualties while hitting terrorist strongholds required the kind of precision only made possible by satellite imagery capable of capturing images with resolutions as sharp as 30 centimetres.

Such high-resolution imagery enables military planners not only to identify and confirm the exact locations of terrorist infrastructure but also to assess surrounding structures, estimate potential collateral damage, and plan strike timings and angles that minimise risk to civilian life.

According to defence insiders, India relies not only on its sovereign satellites but also on commercial satellite imagery from Maxar Technologies—a leading US-based provider—along with other international commercial providers.

Maxar’s Capabilities and India’s Dependency

Maxar Technologies operates some of the world’s most advanced Earth observation satellites. Many of these satellites, costing upwards of $200 million, can capture images with 30-centimeter resolution.

These images are detailed enough to discern targets like infrastructure, vehicles, etc. While this level of clarity powers tools like Google Maps, it's also essential for national security and defense.

India’s dependence on Maxar stems from its limited domestic satellite capabilities. The Indian Cartosat-3 satellite was designed to offer 30-centimeter resolution, but in reality, it provides good quality imagery at about 50 centimeters.

Additionally, Cartosat-3 operates alone, which limits how frequently it can revisit the same area—far from ideal during fast-paced military situations. 

“India doesn’t possess a sub-50 centimeter satellite constellation, which is required for daily revisits to areas of interest," the source explained. 

Because of this gap, India turns to external providers like Maxar and Airbus for critical imagery, especially during time-sensitive operations. 

However, this reliance introduces a serious strategic concern: Maxar also sells the same imagery to Pakistan. 

Selling to Both Sides

Maxar’s business model supports commercial access to high-resolution satellite imagery for a wide range of clients, including foreign governments and militaries. This open-access approach raises immediate concerns, particularly amid heightened tensions following Operation Sindoor, as Pakistan is widely expected to retaliate.

In Pakistan, Maxar’s imagery is distributed through a local reseller, Business Systems International (BSI), which has been publicly acknowledged as a partner on Maxar’s website.

Since 1990, BSI has provided Optical, SAR, and Aerial imagery, along with geospatial information products and solutions. These services have been extensively used by defense and intelligence organisations, national security agencies, strategic partners, and commercial clients to support advanced mapping, surveillance, and monitoring capabilities in 3D and 4D.

What adds a troubling layer to this arrangement is BSI’s ownership. The company is run by Obaidullah Syed, who was convicted in 2022 for orchestrating a years-long illegal export scheme in violation of U.S. national security laws. 

Syed conspired to export sensitive computer technology without proper licenses to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), a government entity designated by the United States as a potential threat to national security. By concealing end users and submitting false export data, Syed helped a nuclear-related agency circumvent U.S. oversight for nearly a decade.

This case is not an isolated incident. Similar covert procurement activities have previously been documented as being carried out at the behest of Pakistan’s powerful intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

For instance, in 2020, five individuals linked to a front company called “Business World” in Rawalpindi were indicted for running a network that illegally exported U.S.-origin goods to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs, including PAEC and the Advanced Engineering Research Organization (AERO).

Against this backdrop, the situation becomes even more concerning in light of recent satellite imaging patterns flagged by insiders. 

One source with access to Maxar’s data pointed out that there was a notable uptick in tasking activity over the region around Pahalgam in the weeks before the April 22 terror attack. 

While such imagery could have been commissioned by a variety of clients under Maxar’s open commercial model, the possibility that adversarial actors may have accessed and exploited this data cannot be ruled out. 

This raises critical questions about the role of commercial satellite imagery in potentially enabling hostile surveillance or the anticipation of Indian security operations.

The Pakistan Army and ISI, India has said, were behind the Pahalgam attack. 

India's Response

India’s defense community has become increasingly vocal about these issues. 

At the DefSpace Conference held in Delhi earlier this year, Maxar was questioned about its data sales to Pakistan. However, Maxar officials reportedly gave evasive responses, claiming it provides data to all US allies—a category that could include both India and Pakistan.  

But Indian analysts argue that this approach dangerously equates two countries with vastly different records on terrorism and regional stability.

One defense expert emphasised, "Maxar cannot claim neutrality when selling the same data to both sides in a conflict zone, especially when one of those sides is actively supporting terror networks."

This sentiment is echoed by others who believe India should leverage its economic influence to pressure Maxar and, through diplomatic channels, push the US government to restrict access to such sensitive data for Pakistan.

India is a significant market for satellite imagery, and experts believe that this could be a bargaining chip. 

"India, given its size and strategic importance, already represents a substantial client for Maxar’s services," said an industry expert. 

"With such a vast market and ongoing collaboration, it’s reasonable for India to expect greater alignment of interests. Maxar should consider demonstrating its commitment by disengaging from dubious actors and defense-related partnerships with Pakistan in general."

For the U.S. to compel Maxar to sever defense-related ties with Pakistan would not be without precedent. In March 2025, the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) suspended Ukrainian access to Maxar’s commercial satellite imagery platform, the Global Enhanced GEOINT Delivery (GEGD) system, following a directive from the Trump administration.

This move, which significantly impacted Ukraine’s ability to monitor Russian troop movements, demonstrated that Washington is not only capable of intervening in the operations of private satellite firms but also willing to do so when it aligns with shifting geopolitical priorities. 

If such action can be taken against an active war partner like Ukraine, then there is every reason for India to expect similar measures when the threat involves a state like Pakistan—whose military and intelligence agencies have repeatedly been linked to terror activity.

With rising tensions and the potential for retaliatory action from Pakistan leading to escalation, this matter is more urgent than ever.