From Nagpur To Nowhere: How Hindutva Lost The Dalit Narrative In Maharashtra

Just two kilometres separate Reshimbaug from Deekshabhumi in Nagpur. Yet the ideological distance between the RSS headquarters and Ambedkar's memorial might as well be measured in light years.

For a century, this unbridged divide has been the Achilles' heel of the Hindutva project in Maharashtra – a paradox of proximity without connection, that symbolises the larger failure of Hindu consolidation.

As the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) celebrates its centennial, it proudly claims success in uniting Hindu society across the spectrum. The organisation, often styled as "Matru-Sanstha" (mother organisation) of Hindus worldwide, has spent decades attempting to mitigate what it calls "breaking India forces." Founded in Nagpur, its vision was to forge a unified Hindu political force through its offspring, the BJP—consolidating General, OBC, SC, and ST votes under a single saffron umbrella.

This strategy has succeeded brilliantly among urban voters and OBCs, transforming BJP from a party once dismissed as "Brahmin-Bania" into Maharashtra's dominant political force.

Yet one crucial segment remains stubbornly resistant – the state's 12 per cent Scheduled Caste population, particularly the politically conscious Mahar community.

Understanding the Fragmented Landscape

The resistance isn't uniform across all SC communities. Five major subcastes – Mahar, Matang, Charmakar, Dhor, and Valmiki – constitute 90 per cent of Maharashtra's SC population, creating a complex demographic landscape.

The Mahar community, following Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar, largely converted to Buddhism and secured disproportionate benefits of the reservation system for itself, while the Hindu Dalit communities remain socio-economically disadvantaged.

This internal stratification created potential openings for BJP-RSS. The Hindu Dalit subcastes like Matang, Charmakar, Dhor, and Valmiki have "never been susceptible to the ideological opposition" to RSS-BJP. Being "scattered and placed in a socially disadvantageous position by the dominant Mahar community," these groups developed their own caste icons rather than exclusively deifying Ambedkar.

Through affiliates like the ABVP and VHP, the Sangh nurtured a second-tier leadership among these communities, exemplified by figures such as former MLA Ram Satpute.

However, this piecemeal approach couldn't overcome the fundamental challenge posed by the numerically dominant and politically mobilised Mahar community, which remained committed to repelling Hindutva's outreach.

To overcome this ideological hostility, RSS established the Samarasta Manch in Pune on 14 April, 1983 – deliberately named to distinguish it from the Marxist concept of "Samata" (equality). Yet four decades later, results remain limited.

As one Samarasta Manch karyakarta from Marathwada confides, "While the Vichar Parivar activities are not overtly opposed in the SC-Mahar dominated areas, the community continues to maintain a cautious yet neutral stance towards it." He adds that "overtly sympathising with the Sangh is still considered taboo at a larger societal level amongst Mahars."

This resistance didn't emerge in a vacuum. The "Purogami" or progressive ideological forces that shaped Maharashtra's Dalit narrative, consistently portrayed the RSS-BJP's Hindutva as a project to impose Brahminical hegemony and and an attempt to undermine the Indian Constitution by substituting it with the Manusmriti.

The Shiv Sena – BJP's longtime ally – reinforced this perception by opposing the state publication of Ambedkar's Riddles in Hinduism and the renaming of Marathwada University, widening the trust deficit among the Dalits, especially the Mahars.

Before 2014, the BJP played second fiddle to the Shiv Sena and faced the community's ire due to this alliance. The party thus never established independent credibility with Dalit voters, entering each electoral cycle with a trust deficit that proved difficult to overcome.

Symbolic Gestures and the Koregaon-Bhima Setback

The BJP's direct outreach to the Mahar community began meaningfully only after 2014, when it formed the state government.

The party nominated Amar Sable (SC-Mahar) to the Rajya Sabha, appointed Ramkumar Badole (SC-Mahar) as social welfare minister, purchased Ambedkar's London residence, and initiated the long awaited construction of the Babasaheb Ambedkar memorial at the Indu Mill.

Yet, these symbolic efforts yielded minimal returns and whatever limited goodwill they generated was completely wiped out after the 2018 riots that followed a skirmish at the Koregaon-Bhima victory obelisk.

Radical organisations were quick to launch a narrative campaign, portraying the incident as an attempt by the pro-Hindutva outfits to attack the Dalit community members and accusing the government of defending those organisations due to their allegiance to Hindutva.

The Vichar Parivar failed to counter the narrative, and its inability to contain it increased trust deficit amongst the community members. Rather than bringing Dalits closer to BJP, the incident pushed them toward more radical positions, creating a deeper chasm between Hindutva and Ambedkarite ideologies.

Ironically, this Dalit consolidation temporarily benefited BJP through an unintended consequence. The Koregaon-Bhima incident helped revive Prakash Ambedkar's Vanchit Bahujan Aghadi (VBA), which formed an alliance with the AIMIM for the 2019 elections. By securing 7 per cent of votes and effectively depriving the UPA of winning seven Lok Sabha seats, VBA's emergence actually served BJP's interests by splitting opposition votes.

This electoral division created a false sense of security, and may have slowed the party's efforts and resolve to develop leadership within the Mahar community. Between 2019 and 2024, BJP took no extensive measures to conduct outreach among the Mahars or even among the Dalit youth. The party grew complacent, assuming VBA would continue splitting opposition votes indefinitely.

The 2024 general elections shattered this complacency in spectacular fashion. BJP's overall electoral strategy was to replicate the 2019 scenario, anticipating that the SC electorate would vote the VBA in large numbers. Two factors decimated this strategy: Prakash Ambedkar's ambivalence vis-a-vis his ties with Maha Vikas Aghadi and the powerful ‘Sanvidhan Khatre Me Hain" (Constitution in Danger) narrative that resonated deeply with Dalit voters.

VBA's vote share collapsed from 7 per cent to 2.78 per cent, channeling these votes to MVA and creating a major upswing against NDA. The Mahar community, except for a few constituencies, wholeheartedly voted I.N.D.I alliance to defeat the NDA.

Although BJP-RSS recognised the shift of Dalit votes away from the VBA, they did not have any mechanism to counter it.

Electoral data tells this story clearly.

After some promise in the 2014 general elections, BJP's performance in SC-reserved constituencies plummeted. The 2019 success was mainly due to the VBA splitting the SC votes, not genuine support. The 2024 general election clearly shows the consolidation of Dalit votes towards the MVA, revealing that Dalit votes remain largely anti-BJP and have the potential to abandon the party and counter-consolidate with even a slight discomfort.

Structural Failures Behind Electoral Defeats

This electoral volatility wasn't just bad luck – it stemmed from systemic organisational failures that had accumulated over decades. Instead of building authentic community leadership, BJP approached SC communities with cynical pragmatism, inducting established SC leaders at the ward, panchayat and assembly level in order to win the election in sight. While practical, this strategy restricted the growth of ideologically-aligned SC cadre and left them disillusioned.

The SC Morcha, which should have been a vibrant platform for community engagement, virtually became a unit for political compensation, lacking a dynamic approach and innovative thinking.

Organizational appointments also revealed bias – among 77 organizational districts, only one belonged to the Mahar community and one to the Charmakar, showing no significant representation to the community members at the grassroots level.

Even when talented leaders emerged organically, the BJP hesitated to embrace them.

The party appeared reluctant to provide candidature to the Mahar community, fearing it may antagonise the Hindu Dalit or the other dominant castes.

The case of Pramod Gharde exemplifies this failure – this young party karyakarta and social worker from the Mahar community in Umred (Nagpur Rural) enjoyed personal popularity across castes, but was not preferred. Contesting as an independent, he secured 23 per cent of the votes, denting the party's prospects of winning the seat.

Unlike its concerted efforts to develop OBC leadership statewide, BJP demonstrated an inability to establish/cultivate a pan-Maharashtra political leadership amongst the SC community, instead relying on figures like Ramdas Athawale whose influence among the community has diminished. This organisational vacuum made the party vulnerable to opposition narratives.

The Cultural and Digital Disconnect

The deepest failure wasn't merely organisational but cultural. While the BJP excelled at symbolic gestures, it failed to engage with the cultural touch-points that actually shape Dalit consciousness. The party lacked credible narrative amplifiers in the political domain that could amplify the BJP's stance on key issues in layman's terms.

This failure was particularly damaging because electorates are more influenced by cinema, music, ballads than by intellectual literature.

Artists like Anand Shinde, Adarsh Shinde, Sambhaji Bhagat, Kadubai Kharat, Shahir Vitthal Umap hold tremendous influence on the SC community sentiments due to their relatable music/songs. A Marathi television serial on Ambedkar was a major hit amongst the community members, yet the Sangh Parivar never cultivated such an ecosystem for a relatable outreach.

The digital realm magnifies the disconnect. The new age SC community is majorly influenced by Instagram, yet the right-wing ecosystem lacks mass content creators to counter the anti-BJP narrative and set the pro-BJP narrative. While opposition forces effectively mobilise young Dalits through social media, the BJP-RSS remains conspicuously absent from these spaces.

Ideologically, the party has struggled with the 'Buddhist Vs Hindutva' narrative deployed by radical elements that attempts to alienate the Buddhist (Mahar) community from the Hindu religion. While the right-wing ecosystem attempts to counter this by embracing Buddha, the narrative still persists.

More troublingly, history testifies that forces inimical to India and its culture utilise Buddhism to lure Hindus away from their religion before eventually delivering a final severance from all Indian faiths.

A century after RSS's founding, the path from Reshimbaug to Deekshbhumi remains untraveled. Despite their close physical proximity, these institutions "represent vastly different ideologies". Bridging this gap is crucial for Hindu unity, yet it tseems increasingly impossible without a fundamental change in approach.

Forces antagonistic to Hindutva have made successful outreaches to the SC community in Maharashtra. For a movement that prides itself on consolidating Hindu votes, for the RSS this represents a critical failure that undermines its core mission.

It would not be exaggeration to say that the BJP-RSS's approach to Dalits has been characterised by symbolism without substance, tokenism without empowerment, and electoral arithmetic without authentic engagement.

Until it addresses these fundamental organisational, cultural, and narrative deficiencies, the support of Maharashtra's Scheduled Castes community will remain for the Sangh parivar the yet-to-be-breached fort – within sight but beyond reach.