Fujian: China's First Supercarrier Is Almost Here

China’s newest aircraft carrier, the Fujian, is edging closer to service. In early September, satellite photos showed the 80,000-tonne flat-deck ship sliding out of Shanghai’s Jiangnan Shipyard, smoke rising from its engines after a stretch of post-trial maintenance.

The brief voyage marked the carrier’s ninth sea trial since launch, and unlike earlier outings, it sailed with two destroyers in formation, drawing attention as it moved through the Taiwan Strait toward the South China Sea.

Hints of commissioning are accumulating.

The flight deck is cleared, the hull freshly cleaned, and the usual testing flags are absent. The Fujian sails flanked by two destroyers, a formation more typical of an operational task group than a ship still undergoing trials.

Analysts suggest the carrier may be headed for Sanya or Yulin Naval Base in Hainan, home to the Shandong, China’s first domestically built carrier.

State media has dropped suggestions of a formal induction by late 2025, possibly timed to politically charged anniversaries, including 1 October, China’s National Day.

Local propaganda campaigns, from themed subway cars to slick online videos, are already in motion. Every detail, from dockside refuelling by a naval oiler to social media promotion, points to an imminent induction.

When the Fujian is formally handed over to the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), it will join Liaoning, a refurbished Soviet-era hull, and Shandong, giving China three operational carriers, a fleet size that seemed distant even a decade ago, when the PLAN was still learning how to operate its first carrier.

How Fujian Changes the Deck

The Fujian (Type 003) is a true supercarrier by Chinese standards. It displaces roughly 80,000–85,000 tonnes at full load and measures about 316 m long.

Its flight deck is completely flat, without a ski-jump, and features three electromagnetic catapult launchers alongside advanced arresting wires for recovery. This CATOBAR system allows Fujian to launch aircraft heavier and more fully loaded than China’s earlier ski-jump carriers, the Liaoning and Shandong.

On those older carriers, which use a STOBAR (Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) design, aircraft rely on engine thrust plus the inclined ramp to generate lift. This imposes significant operational limits as fighters often take off with reduced fuel or ordnance, large fixed-wing AEW\&C aircraft cannot operate at all, and simultaneous launch and recovery cycles are extremely difficult.

Fujian’s EMALS catapults, by contrast, accelerate aircraft along the flat deck using electromagnetic energy, enabling fighters, tankers, and AWACS to launch at maximum weight. The system also allows multiple aircraft to launch and recover in parallel, dramatically increasing sortie rates and operational tempo, a capability far beyond what ski-jump carriers can sustain. Analysts note that Fujian’s EMALS is similar in concept to the US Ford-class, representing a generational leap over both ski-jump and older steam-catapult carriers.

Fujian’s air wing is expected to include over 50 aircraft. Up to 40 will be fixed-wing fighters, likely a mix of Shenyang J-15T/T variants (heavier navalized fighters) and the new Shenyang J-35 stealth fighter. For specialized roles, the carrier will deploy the Xian KJ-600 fixed-wing AEW\&C aircraft, essentially a Chinese version of the US E-2D Hawkeye. The KJ-600 can only operate from a catapult-equipped deck and greatly extends radar coverage and command-and-control reach for the strike group.

Helicopters, estimated at 12, will conduct anti-submarine warfare, search-and-rescue, and logistics missions. With full catapults, Fujian can launch these aircraft with maximum fuel and weapons loads, allowing the carrier to sustain far-reaching, high-tempo operations in ways that Liaoning, Shandong, or India’s INS Vikrant cannot.

For comparison, the US Ford-class (for example, USS Gerald R. Ford) displaces about 100,000 tonnes and carries more than 75 aircraft. Ford also uses EMALS catapults, but nuclear propulsion gives the carrier unlimited range and endurance, while Fujian’s conventional turbines require regular refueling and limit continuous operations.

India’s INS Vikrant, by contrast, displaces about 40,000 tonnes and uses a STOBAR ski-jump deck. Vikrant carries roughly 30 fixed-wing fighters (primarily MiG-29Ks) and about 10 helicopters, but cannot operate a large fixed-wing AEW aircraft, heavy fighters, or tankers at full load. Its ski-jump launch method limits maximum takeoff weight and sortie rate, restricting the carrier’s operational envelope, especially on long-range missions where shore-based support is unavailable.

This shows Fujian is midway between India’s STOBAR carrier and America’s supercarrier. Its EMALS give a clear edge over STOBAR launchers (supporting heavier combat jets and AWACS), but at 80,000 tonnes it is still about 20 per cent smaller than a Ford-class. Crucially, Ford’s nuclear power allows indefinite deployment, while Fujian, like India’s carriers, must rely on tankers and ports.

In operational terms, Fujian greatly expands PLAN capability. Its flat deck and catapults permit higher sortie rates and all-weather operations. CATOBAR carriers can launch and recover aircraft simultaneously, boosting the tempo of air operations. In practice, this means more fighters and tankers aloft at once and longer persistence for AWACS, approaching the US carrier model of sustained air patrols.

Essentially, Fujian’s design and capabilities will allow the PLAN to approach the operational model long mastered by the US Navy.

Fujian’s conventional propulsion is its first major constraint. Unlike nuclear-powered carriers, which can remain at sea for months without refuelling, Fujian relies on steam turbines that require regular replenishment.

This means long-range operations would be inherently limited. Extended deployments far from China’s shores or foreign bases would tie up tankers and escorts, adding logistical complexity that China is still building the capacity to handle.

The scarcity of nearby naval bases compounds this limitation. China has few major bases in the Western Pacific, with Sanya in Hainan being the closest. Its only foreign base, at Djibouti in the Indian Ocean, is far removed from the theater where Fujian is expected to operate. Without a robust network of ports and forward support facilities, sustaining a carrier strike group at sea for extended periods becomes a daunting task.

Unlike the US Navy, which can leverage a network of bases along the Western Pacific, extending from Guam to Japan, China is still dependent on creating temporary supply chains or relying on replenishment at sea. This reduces operational flexibility and increases vulnerability during far-seas operations.

Experience is another critical bottleneck for Fujian. Carrier aviation is highly complex and requires years of practice to master. The PLAN has only been operating carriers since 2012, and its early experience was largely symbolic, focused on short coastal sorties and training exercises.

By contrast, the Indian Navy has been operating carriers since 1961, and the US Navy has decades of operational lessons spanning multiple wars and technological generations. Developing a corps of highly trained pilots, deck crews, and operational planners for Fujian, capable of executing simultaneous launches and recoveries, is still a work in progress. Mistakes in carrier operations can be costly, making training a central concern before Fujian can reach its full potential.

Geography also imposes operational limits. The First and Second Island Chains act as natural defensive barriers, monitored heavily by US, Japanese, and allied forces. The First runs from Japan through Taiwan and the northern Philippines, while the Second stretches farther east to include Guam and the Mariana Islands.

These chains are closely monitored by US, Japanese, and allied forces. Any deployment of Fujian beyond the South China Sea means operating past these barriers, exposing the carrier to long-range surveillance, submarines, missile systems, and air patrols, which significantly complicates sustained operations far from home.

While the carrier can reach areas like Guam or the western Pacific, such operations would be under constant observation and potential threat, restricting tactical surprise. Operating in contested waters increases risk and forces the PLAN to balance ambition with caution, at least until its experience and defensive systems mature.

Vulnerability to modern anti-ship threats is another challenge. All aircraft carriers are high-value targets, and Fujian is no exception. The proliferation of long-range anti-ship missiles, advanced submarines, and precision-guided systems means that a carrier strike group must rely heavily on a layered defensive screen of destroyers, frigates, and electronic warfare assets. Any lapse could expose Fujian to serious damage. Even with a strong escort, the carrier’s survival in a high-intensity conflict is not guaranteed.

Sailing farther than ever

But China’s carriers have already begun to push far beyond home waters, a development with serious implications for but the US and India.

Liaoning even crossed the Second Island Chain, steaming near Japan’s Minami-Tori-shima (over 3,000 km from mainland China). The deployment lasted weeks. Liaoning spent 24 days at sea and Shandong 16, with at least one carrier beyond the First Chain for 27 consecutive days. These exercises also achieved a very high sortie rate. Liaoning flew 90 sorties in one day (June 14) and 80 on another day, far above anything in earlier drills.

These milestones signal the PLAN is shifting its focus from near-seas defense to sustained, coordinated long-range operations.

The strategic concept behind this is the island-chain framework: China’s navy historically operated inside the First Island Chain (Taiwan–Japan–Philippines), then aimed to push through the Second Chain (Guam, Mariana Islands) and beyond. The recent drills show China is actively testing those limits.

Fujian will further accelerate this trend. As China’s first CATOBAR carrier, Fujian can field heavier, longer-range aircraft. Its EMALS catapults make possible large fixed-wing AEW planes (like the KJ-600) and tanker variants, platforms that extend the reach of the carrier strike group dramatically. In effect, Fujian will allow PLAN to project power farther from China’s shores than Liaoning or Shandong could.

For India, the shift is a reminder that past experience is no guarantee of present advantage. A navy capable of operating carriers deep into the Pacific can just as easily project power into the Indian Ocean. This potential is reinforced by China’s overseas bases in Djibouti and Cambodia, access to facilities in Pakistan, and investments in civilian ports along Africa’s eastern seaboard that offer replenishment points.

At present, the vast majority of China’s fleet is geared for a conflict in the western Pacific rather than an Indian Ocean contingency. However, Chinese security scholars have already floated the idea of a dedicated Indian Ocean fleet, even though one has yet to take shape. Given the scale and pace of China’s naval modernisation over the past decade, such a development could emerge in the relatively near future.

Projecting power into the Indian Ocean may not currently be the PLAN’s primary mission, but even the limited assets it has deployed there have placed significant strain on the Indian Navy. Any expansion of those deployments would only deepen that pressure.