The Bitter Aftertaste Of Pakistan's Cup Of Tea In Kabul

In 2019, when Pakistan captured Wing Commander Abhinandan after a dogfight over Kashmir, a photograph of him holding a tea cup became a source of triumph in Pakistan, a fleeting symbol of Islamabad’s gloating over a brief military success against India.

Two years later, a more enduring image seemed to cement Pakistan’s sense of triumph. Lt. Gen. Faiz Hameed, then head of the ISI, calmly sipped tea in Kabul after the Taliban’s takeover. That photograph, widely circulated in Pakistani media, was meant to signal that Pakistan had outmanoeuvred two superpowers and finally achieved its long-sought objective of strategic depth against India. It was a visual affirmation that Islamabad had secured a compliant, friendly Kabul, a lever to shape Afghanistan’s foreign policy and ensure that no government in Kabul would ever act against Pakistan’s interests.

By 2025, however, both those symbols of triumph have turned to ridicule. Earlier this year, Indian strikes on Pakistan’s air bases exposed the vulnerabilities that Islamabad had long tried to mask with bravado. The myth of invincibility was shattered, leaving the Pakistani establishment scrambling to reclaim a narrative of strength.

Meanwhile, in Kabul, the Taliban, once considered a Pakistani protégé, have begun to engage with India in ways that would have been unthinkable in 2021. The carefully staged image of Pakistan’s victory in Afghanistan now appears farcical. All the swagger, the public displays of confidence, and the self-congratulation were smoke and mirrors.

Reality on the ground is steadily eroding Islamabad’s pretensions, and the Pakistani deep state is no longer in full control of Afghanistan.

It is against this backdrop that last night’s Pakistani air strikes in Kabul must be understood. Reports indicate that the strikes targeted positions associated with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and their leader Noor Wali Mehsud, who has long used Afghan territory as a base for operations against Pakistan. Initial reports claimed Mehsud had been killed, though he later surfaced to deny the reports.

Regardless of the immediate outcome, the timing of the strikes was deliberate. They coincided with the visit of Taliban Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to New Delhi, India’s first high-level engagement with the Taliban since 2021. Pakistan is sending a signal both to Kabul and to New Delhi that it retains military and strategic agency in Afghanistan even as its political influence wanes. It is also a marker of growing frustration in Rawalpindi with the Taliban's refusal to comply with its demands and its increasing engagement with India.

Muttaqi’s visit to India is more than ceremonial. For decades, India’s relationship with the Taliban has been fraught with suspicion and hostility. The Taliban’s support for groups opposed to India, from the Haqqani network to Pakistan-linked militants, has long prevented India from establishing formal ties.

Since 2021, however, India has carefully recalibrated its approach. Without formally recognising the Taliban government, New Delhi has steadily re-engaged, reopening a small diplomatic mission in Kabul, dispatching humanitarian aid, and exploring trade routes through Chabahar port in Iran. India’s objective is clear. It wants to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a staging ground for anti-India militancy, stabilise the country economically and politically, and assert its strategic footprint before Islamabad or Beijing can fully monopolise influence in Kabul.

The deterioration of Pakistan-Taliban relations has been stark and rapid. In 2021, Lt. Gen. Faiz Hameed’s tea-drinking moment symbolised Pakistan’s apparent mastery over Kabul. Islamabad believed that it had secured the Taliban’s loyalty and that Kabul would act as a compliant satellite state in Pakistan’s regional strategy. The TTP, in Islamabad’s calculations, would be neutralised or at least contained by its Taliban allies. Reality, however, has diverged sharply from this vision.

Over the past four years, the Taliban have resisted Pakistan’s repeated requests to crack down on the TTP, insisting that the TTP’s activities are Pakistan’s internal problem. Cross-border attacks into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan have surged, and the TTP has entrenched itself further in Afghanistan, enjoying safe havens and operational freedom.

The Taliban’s outreach to India, particularly through economic and diplomatic channels, signals a willingness to diversify their foreign relations, reducing reliance on Pakistan. The Taliban leadership, keenly aware of domestic pressures and internal factions, is reluctant to antagonise groups like the TTP, which share historical and ethnic links with Afghan Pashtuns.

For Pakistan, this represents a betrayal. The allies it once viewed as loyal now prioritise Kabul’s autonomy over Islamabad’s desires.

Meanwhile, the Taliban’s ties with India have quietly but steadily strengthened, much to the frustration of Rawalpindi. The visit of Amir Khan Muttaqi is just the latest sign that Kabul is no longer content to rely solely on Islamabad. Over the past two years, India has managed to build a cautious rapport with the Taliban, sending humanitarian aid, reopening a small diplomatic presence in Kabul, and facilitating trade through Chabahar port.

These are not just gestures of goodwill. They are deliberate moves to carve out a space for India in Afghan affairs, signalling to the Taliban that New Delhi can be a partner without being a patron. The Taliban, in turn, have responded with measured engagement, showing up for talks, entertaining Indian projects, and increasingly seeking India’s assistance.

Even the recent Moscow Format forums, where India joined Russia, China, Pakistan, and the Taliban to oppose US President Donald Trump's pressure on the Taliban to hand over the Bagram airbase in Afghanistan, show that India is willing to walk the talk, making sure Afghanistan does not slip entirely into Islamabad’s or Beijing’s orbit.

Meanwhile, Pakistan and its sole ally China have moved heaven and earth to keep Kabul in their orbit. In August 2025, just months after Pakistan's battering in Operation Sindoor, Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi flew to Kabul for a three-way summit with Taliban officials. That Wang Yi chose to fly to Kabul straight after visiting Delhi added a quiet, almost symbolic touch to the trip.

Frustration in Rawalpindi has been mounting for some time, and it is now spilling over into more overt forms of coercion. The recent air strikes in Kabul are the clearest manifestation of this frustration. Rawalpindi’s patience with Kabul is wearing thin as the Taliban continue to prioritise their own autonomy over Pakistan's interests. Cross-border attacks by the TTP, which Islamabad once assumed would be curtailed by its Afghan allies, have become increasingly brazen.

For Pakistani generals, each attack is now a personal affront, a public reminder that the carefully nurtured relationship with the Taliban is failing to deliver the dividends that had long justified the strategy Rawalpindi pursued for decades. Pakistan had long sought to resolve its “two-front dilemma”, aiming to neutralise threats along its western border so it could focus solely on India in the east. The promise of strategic depth in Afghanistan was meant to mitigate one front, allowing Islamabad to concentrate on the other.

Instead, the Taliban’s refusal to rein in the TTP and their growing engagement with India has left Pakistan exposed on both borders, with little of the leverage it once assumed it had. The air strikes in Kabul are a blunt reminder that Rawalpindi’s carefully nurtured Afghan strategy has faltered and that coercion may be the only tool left to signal strength, even if it can no longer guarantee compliance.

Ishaq Dar, Pakistan’s finance minister and a longtime key figure in the country’s political establishment, was perhaps right when he said that "the country is paying a price for that cup of tea in Afghanistan." The photograph of Faiz Hameed sipping tea, once a symbol of Pakistan’s triumph and strategic mastery over Kabul, now reads as a cautionary tale of overreach and miscalculation.

For India, this is a quiet vindication. It is also a reminder to India’s perennial pessimists. Delhi often gets more right than it is given credit for. Its wins are quiet, its setbacks magnified.