US Corn Meets Indian Scorn: The What, How And Why Of It

Governor Kim Reynolds of the US state of Iowa was recently in India. On the surface, the visit might seem innocuous, a routine trade delegation or ceremonial diplomacy. But Iowa is the largest producer of corn in the United States, growing roughly three times as much as Mexico, and Washington has long seen India as a key potential market for its surplus.

The visit was therefore not just ceremonial; it was a strategic push to persuade New Delhi to open its corn market to American exports.

For the United States, this is more than a simple trade question. Corn is the country’s single largest agricultural product, cultivated across the vast Midwestern states of Iowa, Illinois, Nebraska, Minnesota, Indiana, South Dakota, North Dakota, Kansas, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin.

In 2024-25 (October–September), the US produced 377.63 million tonnes of corn and exported 71.70 million tonnes. Washington’s frustration is rooted in both lost export opportunities and the political economy of US agriculture, where Midwestern states like Iowa rely heavily on international sales.

Why India Does Not Buy

India’s limited corn imports are explained by two long-standing policy decisions.

First, tariff structures heavily favour domestic production. India allows only 0.5 million tonnes of corn imports annually at a 15 per cent duty, with any quantities beyond this subjected to a prohibitive 50 per cent tariff.

Second, and far more crucially, India does not permit imports of genetically modified (GMO) corn. This is a deliberate, long-standing policy rooted in both public health concerns and political economy. GMO crops are engineered with bacterial genes to tolerate herbicides or resist pests, but they remain controversial globally, and India has consistently erred on the side of caution.

Attempts to introduce GMO maize for feed or fuel use have met resistance. A proposal in a now-withdrawn NITI Aayog report suggested permitting GM corn solely for ethanol production, ensuring that it would not enter the human or livestock food chain.

Yet even this narrow allowance has not moved forward. The current stance is clear. Indian farmers will not plant GMO maize, and imported GMO corn is not acceptable. This is why, despite producing some quantities of corn in the US that could theoretically feed India’s burgeoning poultry and livestock sector, imports from the US remain negligible.

These policies are far from incidental. They reflect a deliberate strategy to protect domestic agriculture, safeguard rural livelihoods, and maintain India’s broader food sovereignty. By keeping tariffs high and restricting genetically modified (GMO) imports, the government ensures that domestic maize farmers remain competitive, even when faced with cheaper foreign alternatives.

This has drawn sharp criticism from the US. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, for instance, has publicly questioned India’s refusal to open its market: “India brags that they have 1.4 billion people. Why do not 1.4 billion people buy one bushel of US corn?”

Opening the market to cheaper US maize without tariffs or restrictions would undercut Indian farmers, many of whom operate on smaller plots and cannot compete with the scale, efficiency, and yields of American production.

Political considerations also reinforce this stance.

India’s third-largest maize-producing state, Bihar, is approaching assembly elections, making any relaxation of tariffs or acceptance of GM corn politically sensitive. Opening the market could be portrayed as prioritising foreign exporters over local farmers, a narrative opponents would exploit.

It is to pre-empt the Opposition from reinforcing this narrative that Prime Minister Narendra Modi has framed his resistance to giving in to US demands on trade as a means to protect India’s farmers and small businesses.

Why the US Wants India to Buy

For the United States, India represents an enormous untapped market.

With rising per capita income in India and increasing consumption of animal products like milk, eggs, meat, and fish, the demand for feedstocks such as maize and soybean meal is expected to surge. The US Department of Agriculture projects that India’s domestic corn consumption will climb from 34.7 million tonnes in 2022-23 to 98 million tonnes by 2040 under a “rapid” per capita income growth scenario of 6.6 per cent annually, and to 62.5 million tonnes under a “moderate” 4.6 per cent growth scenario.

Meeting this demand would require imports of 46 million tonnes and 134 million tonnes in 2040 and 2050, respectively, under the rapid growth scenario, and 11 million tonnes and 26 million tonnes under moderate growth.

The urgency behind US pressure on India is compounded by the dramatic decline in Chinese demand for American corn. Until recently, China was the single largest buyer of US maize, accounting for $5.21 billion of the $18.57 billion in US corn exports in 2022, most of which was used as animal feed, making the Asian giant an indispensable market for American farmers, particularly in the Midwestern corn belt.

Trade tensions and tariff wars have rapidly reshaped this landscape. China has not bought significant amounts of corn from the US since 2023. By 2024, China’s purchases had plummeted to just $331 million. This was far below Mexico, which imported $5.51 billion, Japan at $2.73 billion, and even Colombia at $1.52 billion.

In the first seven months of 2025, imports fell further to a mere $2.4 million. Flaring diplomatic tensions over trade are unlikely to help the US case for more Chinese imports of its corn.

The decline is not merely about lost revenue. American urgency is heightened by the domestic political economy of US agriculture. States like Iowa are politically influential, and their farmers form a potent lobbying bloc. Governor Reynolds’ visit was therefore as much about domestic electoral calculations as international trade, if not more.

Washington sees India as the “next frontier” for corn exports, and the push to open the Indian market is a political necessity for Trump.