Indian Navy Has A Peacetime Accidents Problem

Four days ago (on 21 July), the Navy’s multi-role frigate, INS Brahmaputra, suffered a major incident at Mumbai's Naval Dockyard while undergoing refit.

A fire engulfed the frigate and was controlled by the ship's crew with the help of firefighters from the Naval Dockyard by the morning of 22 July. However, despite all efforts, the ship tilted to the side.

Whether the frigate can be salvaged and returned to service is uncertain at this point.

This is the third such incident at the Naval Dockyard Mumbai, with INS Brahmaputra’s sister ship INS Betwa slipping at the dockyard in 2016 being the second.

In 2013, two blasts ripped through INS Sindhurakshak — a Kilo-class submarine — while being berthed at the Naval Dockyard, which is the third such incident. Eighteen sailors lost their lives in the incident, and the submarine was declared a total loss.

These are three major accidents that have happened in the last 11 years. However, the Indian Navy has a history of such incidents.

As Sandeep Unnithan pointed out in 2013, the Indian Navy, between then and the 1990s, had lost one warship every five years in peacetime.

Not only do these incidents raise questions about the skills and training of the personnel in the Navy and the Naval Dockyard, but they also dent its already stretched combat ship fleet in these uncertain times of an unstable geopolitical environment riddled with proxy wars, terrorism and grey-zone warfare, etc.

Every time a ship suffers damage, it significantly impacts the Navy's capabilities.

For example, the INS Sindhurakshak submarine was the Navy’s most advanced submarine when it encountered the accident. It had just completed its refit in Russia four months earlier, making it the most capable submarine of that time.

Then, one night before the submarine was to leave the dockyard for patrol, it suffered an accident.

This is not limited to just tactical assets. Strategic assets like the nuclear-powered INS Arihant and the leased INS Chakra from Russia have both suffered damage.

Sometime in 2017, India’s pride and its first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), INS Arihant, suffered damage as water entered its propulsion chamber, forcing it to sit in repairs for more than ten months.

Similarly, INS Chakra, another nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), suffered damage to its sonar dome while entering Visakhapatnam in October 2017. It reportedly cost $20 million to fix the damages in Russia.

Chakra suffered another major damage in 2020, when, according to Russian news media TASS, a high-pressure air cylinder exploded on board the submarine, damaging both hulls and prompting the Navy to end its lease one year earlier than planned.

These are ominous signs for the Navy, which is vying to expand its role as China sets its sights on maintaining a permanent presence across the Indian Ocean.

When the Yemeni-based Houthi militias started hitting merchant ships and Somalia-based piracy reared its head once again, the Indian Navy deployed ten warships in the Gulf of Aden and to the western extremities of the Indian Ocean to combat this.

Similarly, it sent warships to the South China Sea when things heated up between the Philippines and China.

These incidents are occurring in a relatively low-stress environment, which is concerning for the Navy. Imagine the potential consequences in a high-stress situation, such as war.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is already the world’s largest navy in the number of warships.

If the Indian Navy is to confront the Chinese on the high seas, it needs every seafaring asset available, all of which must be combat-ready.

Therefore, the Navy must critically examine why it has failed to prevent such accidents during peacetime. Whether it needs improved sailor training, new standard operating procedures, or other measures, corrective actions must be implemented promptly.