Caste Census Paradox: How It Could Backfire On The Ones Craving For It

The current push for a caste census may trigger the same paradox for OBC politics that the Supreme Court’s sub-categorisation verdict did for the SC community—a struggle between the rhetoric of unity and the reality of unequal gain.

Caste Census: A Double-Edged Sword

Modi government’s decision to include caste data in the national census—the first such exercise since 1931—has been welcomed with fervour by regional parties like the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), Samajwadi Party (SP), and Janata Dal (United) (JD(U)).

While JD(U) – part of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) – could be justified in taking credit, opposition leaders like Lalu Yadav and Akhilesh Yadav have also jumped the gun in snatching credit for the decision by the Modi government.

From Unified Backwardness to Singular Caste Politics

All three parties are rooted in the post-JP and post-Mandal era which saw the political rise of the OBC community as a distinct and powerful political class. Their 'socio-economic backwardness' was cited as the reason to forge a political unity among them.

While Akhilesh’s father, Mulayam Singh Yadav, is credited with breaking the Brahmin-Kshatriya hold on UP politics, Lalu Yadav branded himself as someone who, despite belonging to a community classified as 'backward', could secure and wield power in defiance of the 'upper castes'.

Nitish Kumar, on the other hand, took a middle ground and remained in the good books of both the Mandal and Kamandal sides of the political spectrum.

In Bihar, the RJD has traditionally banked on Yadavs, who are the biggest caste group in the state with more than 14 per cent share in the state population.

In Uttar Pradesh, the SP leans on Yadavs, estimated at 8–10 per cent of the state, supplemented by select OBC subgroups and Muslims.

The JD(U) targets Kurmis (the caste which Nitish Kumar was born into) and Koeris, who together make up about 7.10 per cent, while also having a significant hold over Extremely Backward Classes (EBCs), which comprise 36 per cent of the state population.

The common thread linking all these parties and their leaders is that they began as leaders of the OBCs but ended up becoming identified with one specific caste.

And it is this identification with a particular caste only that might lead to the census becoming a problem for these parties.

The Trap of Data

Regarding the caste census, these parties believe that a scientific exercise would finally provide hard numbers to back their long-standing argument of OBCs constituting the demographic majority in India, yet remaining underrepresented in state power and public institutions. It is supposed to strengthen their case for expanded reservations in education, jobs, and governance.

However, the very data these parties are asking for may end up revealing that certain caste groups within the OBC umbrella have secured positions, benefits, and privileges disproportionate to their numbers.

The 'Yadavisation' of State Power

The process of pulling in OBC votes for these parties would begin with kowtowing to the most dominant or numerically superior caste group coming under the OBC bracket. Thus, Mulayam Singh Yadav and Lalu Yadav ended up with Yadavs, while Nitish Kumar, being devoid of options, harked on the Kurmi-Koeri section of OBCs.

It was almost inevitable thus that when SP, RJD occupied positions of state power, the benefits of the new polity landed in a sizeable chunk in the homes of particular caste groups.

During the Samajwadi Party’s rule in Uttar Pradesh, the most common allegation against the government was the ‘Yadavisation’ of the system.

A 10-year-old report confirms that during the SP government, 600 out of 1,526 police stations were headed by Yadavs. Main cities like Lucknow, Kanpur, Mathura, Ghaziabad, Sambhal, and Badaun had more than 40 per cent of police stations headed by Yadavs only. Senior officials estimate that more than 50 per cent of posts were unofficially reserved for Yadavs – a pattern seen in other recruitments too.

However, it was not just during the SP reign that the Yadav community saw disproportionate acquisition of benefits. In 2011, under a BSP government, when the Provincial Civil Services (PCS) examination declared the results of the mains examination, 147 candidates out of 176 in the OBC category were Yadavs. After protests, the government released a new list of 86 qualified students, 54 of whom were Yadavs. Fifty out of these 54 were finally selected after the interview, again a mathematically rare event.

Here are some more details:

• In PCS 2011 examinations, Yadav candidates averaged 138/200 interview marks; non-Yadav OBCs got up to 110 marks.

• From May to November 2013, UPPSC filled 186 lecturer posts, with 129 (69.4 per cent) Yadavs.

• In June 2014, 640 of 1,256 UP Lower PCS 2008 seats were executive, with 89 (13.9 per cent) Yadavs.

• All 89 Yadav candidates in UP Lower PCS 2008 scored 34–35 in the 50-mark interview, when the minimum and maximum marks scored by others were 18 and 35 respectively.

• Of 86 Sub-Divisional Magistrates appointed in PCS 2011–2013, 56 (65.1 per cent) were Yadavs.

For the SP, the tilt toward the Yadav community was apparent in their ticket distribution as well. In the 1996 general elections, the Samajwadi Party (SP) fielded 8 Yadav candidates. This was followed by 10 in 1998, 9 in 1999, 9 in 2004, 11 in 2009, 13 in 2014, and 11 in 2019.

Even when Akhilesh Yadav distributed tickets to only four Yadav candidates in 2024, all of them went to his family members, including the Akhilesh-Dimple couple. Up until a month ago, the list of SP’s district heads included 22 Yadavs.

Bihar’s Story: From Voice to Monopoly

The story echoes in nearby Bihar as well.

Within five years of Lalu Yadav ascending to power, the narrative shifted as his rule started to be described as ‘misrule’; officers started seeking transfer to protect themselves from humiliation; people became hesitant to showcase their prosperity; women became more and more dependent on their male family members for security; more poor people became poorer than their brethren became rich.

In this era, it was observed that from government contracts to land dealings, the state government was preferring beneficiaries from the Yadav community.

With rallies like 'Tel Pilavan, Lathu Ghumavan raila', (oil the sticks, swing the lathis rally), it was understood that the community had tacit support from the state machinery. The laathi was a reference to the Yadav community, with the instrument identified with cattle-rearing, that is seen the traditional occupation of the caste.

Apart from Lalu himself, Surendra Yadav, Sadhu Yadav, and Subhash Yadav were some of the other prominent names who kept the state machinery on the dial.

According to the Bihar Caste Survey 2023, out of 6,21,481 OBC government servants, 2,89,538 (46.59 per cent) are Yadavs. Lalu Yadav and RJD did well in the upliftment of Yadavs but failed to do the same for other communities under the OBC bracket.

For instance, in the 2020 assembly elections, 33 per cent of RJD tickets were distributed to Yadavs. In 2023, 15 district heads of RJD came from the same community. Muslims are also said to be feeling alienated due to RJD’s tendency to field Yadav candidates from the seats on which the Muslim community itself is in a decisive position.

Kurmi-Koeris and Luv-Kush Unity

The Kurmi-Koeri community expected the same from Nitish Kumar as well. Kumar obliged, but he balanced his obligation to the overall betterment of the state quite well. Under him, Upendra Kushwaha, Shakuni Choudhary (father of Bihar’s deputy chief minister Samrat Choudhary) – Koeri-Kurmi unity was renamed as the Luv-Kush combination.

The Luv-Kush nomenclature, along with relatively more respect for the community in the general public, was crucial in getting well-deserved political representation. The landowning farming community now holds a vast sway in state jobs.

Yadavs hold 46.6 per cent of OBC government jobs, while Luv-Kush hold 36.9 per cent of them. The Yadav community's share in population is 14.27 per cent compared to 7.09 per cent for Koeri-Kurmi.

The combined Koeri-Kurmi job-holding rate is about 2.47 per cent, which is a higher per-capita representation in government jobs than Yadavs at 1.55 per cent.

The Coming Reckoning

These imbalances are not unique to these states. Across states like Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, and many others, dominant OBC castes have long dominated or even monopolised the benefits of reservation policies and political patronage.

Critics keeping tabs on regional politics often say that the RJD, SP, JD(U), and other regional parties have formed a system in which one set of backward castes replaces 'forward castes' in wielding power, while the most marginalised remain at the bottom of the hierarchy.

However, most of these discussions are taken as anecdotal evidence in most places. The Caste Census – which comprises not just the head-counts but also the enumeration of their economic and social positions – will transform these anecdotes into data.

If the results reveal that some dominant OBC castes have become the new elites in themselves, the moral ground of many political outfits could slip from underneath them.

A Census That Could Reshape the Regional Politics

Regional parties are aware of these disparities, and they have been taking on some course-corrective measures, which is proving to be tough. Appeals to lesser-represented caste groups often conflict with the need to retain dominant caste support, creating political instability.

BJP’s tactics of catering to the non-dominant section have proved to be effective in the past – especially in Uttar Pradesh. Even in Bihar, a significant chunk of Yadavs are looking for other options because of Tejashwi Yadav’s attempt to get Kushwahas under the RJD fold.

In Jharkhand, a party named All Jharkhand Students Union Party (AJSUP) led by Sudesh Mahato is often termed as a party of Kurmi Mahato. However, in the 2024 assembly elections, Jairam Mahato-led Jharkhand Loktantrik Krantikari Morcha emerged as a credible option for the disenfranchised section of Kurmis.

The Census data is almost certain to destabilise the equilibrium of OBC parties. Survival depends on their ability to mould themselves while retaining a significant chunk of their older loyal base.