India Must Seize The Strategic Window In Western Myanmar As Chin & Arakan Rebels Push Back Junta

Most of Myanmar’s Chin and Rakhine provinces, which border India and Bangladesh respectively, have come under the control of the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) of the two provinces. 

Chin rebels have captured most of the Chin state that borders eastern Mizoram and southern Manipur. 

The Myanmarese military (called ‘Tatmadaw’), which seized power in the coup in February 2021 that set off insurgencies and uprisings all over the country, maintains a tenuous foothold only in the province’s capital Hakha as well as Tedim and Thantlang townships. 

Chin rebels are also slowly gaining control of Falan township, which was an important base of the Tatmadaw. The township was the headquarters of an infantry and an armoured brigade; now, just one infantry battalion is all that’s left of the junta forces there.

What’s significant is that all arterial highways and strategic locations in the province are under the control of the Chin rebels who are fighting unitedly under the banner of the Chin National Council (CNC). 

Defence experts say that the junta forces are in defensive mode and Hakha as well as Thantlang, Tedim and Falan townships are likely to fall to the Chin rebels by the end of summer this year.

The Arakan Army (AA) now controls almost the entire Rakhine state that shares a border with Bangladesh to its northwest. Only the province’s capital Sittwe (on the coast of the Bay of Bengal), as well as the coastal city of Kyaukphyu and the island of Manaung (in the Bay of Bengal) are in the control of the junta. 

But the AA has launched major offensives on these three cities, which are being guarded by not only infantry and armoured battalions but also the Myanmarese navy and air force. 

However, experts at Thailand’s Institute of Security & International Studies (ISIS) told Swarajya from Bangkok that despite the fierce resistance put up by the junta, it is facing severe setbacks. 

“The rest of Rakhine state is in the firm control of the AA. The junta forces defending Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, and Manaung are surviving only because they are getting their supplies by the sea route from the adjoining Ayeyarwady province (which lies to the south of Rakhine state).

But the AA and other resistance fighters are fast advancing into Ayeyarwady as well. If they overrun that province, the junta strongholds in the three cities in Rakhine will fall,” ISIS senior fellow Thitinan Pongsudhirak told Swarajya. 

The opportunities for India

The fall of Chin and Rakhine provinces to ethnic armed groups presents a good opportunity for India to secure its interests in the two provinces. 

These two provinces are critical for India’s ambitious Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit & Transport Project. 

The Rs 2904.4 crore project, once operational, will involve transporting goods from India’s eastern seaboard to Sittwe port in Rakhine and then upstream through the Kaladan river to Paletwa in Chin province, from where the cargo will be transported by road (109 kms) to Zorinpui in Mizoram. 

This project will negate the disadvantages of geography suffered by the seven landlocked Northeast Indian states that now have to depend on goods transported through the circuitous land route through North Bengal. 

Goods, including heavy machinery, can easily be transported through cargo ships to Sittwe and then to Paletwa, and from there to Mizoram. From Mizoram, the cargo can be easily transported to the other states of the region.

The cost of transportation of goods through this route will be at least 40% less than the existing land route through the Siliguri corridor.

Also, the time taken to ship goods from Bengal to Tripura or Mizoram through the Kaladan transit route will be about half of the time taken now using the land route through North Bengal. 

But the Kaladan project has been held up due to the armed conflict between the ethnic armed organisations of the two provinces and the junta forces that has been raging for the past four years. 

The complete capture of the two provinces by the rebels will bring an end to the conflict in Chin and Rakhine. India can then directly negotiate with the Chin rebels and AA for the resumption of work on the project. 

While most of the work on the riverine part of the project is complete, the road component (between Paletwa and Zorinpui) of the project has been held up due to the armed conflict around Paletwa. 

Paletwa is now firmly in the hands of the AA and is being administered by the United League of Arakan (ULA), the parent body of the AA. 

The rest of the territory through which the highway from Paletwa to Zorinpui on the Mizoram-Myanmar border passes is held mostly by the Chin rebels. 

Defence and strategic affairs experts also say that there is little chance of the junta — which has suffered crushing defeats all over Myanmar and has been weakened beyond measure — recouping its strength. 

“The most likely scenario is that the Chin and Rakhine rebels will consolidate their gains and entrench themselves in their respective states. The Chin National Council (CNC) and the United League of Arakan (ULA) will eventually come to a settlement with the junta, which will have to bestow some sort of autonomous status to the two states. Ultimately, Myanmar will evolve into a loose confederation of states,” a senior analyst of Malaysia’s Institute of Strategic & International Studies who did not want to be named told Swarajya. 

This view is endorsed by a Myanmarese defence expert who was associated with the Yangon-based Myanmar Institute of Strategic & International Studies. 

“The military has, in the past, conceded autonomy to some areas in the northern and eastern Kachin and Shan states that had been captured by the rebels there. The Tatmadaw will have to do the same in the case of Rakhine and Chin provinces as well,” U Maung Thit, a former senior researcher at the institute, told Swarajya from Bangkok. He fled to Thailand two years ago. 

This presents a great opportunity for India because New Delhi will then have to deal with only the ULA in Rakhine and the Chin National Council (CNC) in the Chin state.

“Dealing with single entities, instead of multiple ones, is always preferable. Due to the uncertain situation caused by armed conflict in these two provinces where we have interests and investments, we were having to deal with not only the State Administration Council (SAC)—the government run by the junta—but also with the ethnic armed organsiations. That was troublesome,” a senior officer in India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) told Swarajya. 

“It will be easier for us to secure our interests and investments, including the Kaladan project, when the situation in Chin and Rakhine stabilises and the conflict ends. We are expecting that to happen over the next few months,” the MEA official added. 

What’s left unsaid here but is of immense importance is that India will be able to gain a lot of strategic depth once the conflict in the two provinces ends and the ULA and CNC establish their administrative control over the Rakhine and Chin states respectively.

China is the giant dragon in the room here. Beijing has deep strategic interests in Rakhine—it is developing a port at Kyaukphyu and is setting up industries in a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) there. 

China is also building gas and oil pipelines from Kyaukphyu through Rakhine, Magway, Mandalay, and Shan provinces to its southwestern province of Yunnan. 

It is, thus, also in Beijing’s interest that the conflict in Rakhine ends and one entity (the ULA) establishes administrative and security control over the province to ensure stability. 

This presents an opportunity for India to join hands with China in pressuring Myanmar’s Tatmadaw to see the writing on the wall and concede defeat in Rakhine as well as Chin states, and sit at the negotiating table with the ULA and CNC to sign a peace accord. 

As already stated, such a peace accord will, perforce, have to grant autonomy to the two states, with Naypyidaw (the Myanmarese capital) exercising only nominal control over Chin and Rakhine. 

What India must do now

In Chin: India already has a huge advantage here that it can easily leverage to secure its interests.

Mizoram chief minister Pu Lalduhoma oversaw a merger between two rival factions of Chin rebels—the Chinland Council and the Interim Chin National Consultative Council—at his state capital Aizawl on February 27. 

The Chinland Council’s armed wing — the Chin National Army — and the Interim Chin National Consultative Council’s armed wing — the Chin Brotherhood Alliance — were engaged in fierce internecine clashes. 

The two rebel Chin entities merged and formed a new body — the Chin National Council (CNC). Mizoram CM Lalduhoma was the prime force behind this merger. 

Though the Mizoram CM’s “unity efforts” drew angry reactions from many quarters in New Delhi at that time, realisation has quickly dawned on the foreign affairs and strategic establishments in New Delhi that the development can be leveraged to India’s benefit. 

Lalduhoma enjoys a lot of clout over and goodwill in the Chin National Council. This comes in handy for India to secure its interests in the Chin province, primarily the Kalandan project. 

The Myanmarese junta’s air force has been carrying out air strikes on villages suspected to be rebel strongholds in the Chin province, resulting in the deaths and displacement of thousands of people. 

New Delhi can offer to use its influence over the junta to stop these air strikes. India can also offer its capacity-building institutions to train and equip the CNC leadership with the governance skills it will require to administer the province.

Apart from providing more help to Mizoram to look after the more than 32,000 Chin refugees sheltered in that state, New Delhi should also offer help for their repatriation and rehabilitation in the Chin state. 

Such goodwill gestures will go a long way in ensuring that the CNC keeps India’s interests in mind. 

New Delhi must work closely with Mizoram Chief Minister Lalduhoma to offer all help to the Chin refugees, not only now but also once they return to their homeland to rebuild their lives.  

In Rakhine: India has been engaged, though not too closely, with the Arakan Army (AA) and its parent body, the United League of Arakan (ULA).. 

This engagement needs to deepen now. India must immediately offer material support to the Rakhine people, who are facing a severe shortage of food and medicines due to an embargo imposed by the junta on the province. 

Junta forces have blocked many arterial roads leading from Ayeyarwady and Magway regions to the Rakhine state. This has resulted in a severe shortage of food, medicines, and other essential commodities in Rakhine. 

India can use the sea route to supply humanitarian aid to the Rakhine people through the ULA. The distance between Haldia Port in Bengal and Sittwe is just 348 nautical miles and takes a cargo vessel a little over 1.5 days to cover. 

In fact, India should not shy away from offering even military hardware to the AA. The argument that such assistance will anger and alienate the junta, resulting in New Delhi losing all leverage over the junta, is completely wrong. 

China has been arming, training, and assisting ethnic armed organisations in Myanmar’s Kachin and Shan provinces for a long time now, especially the United Wa State Army, which is seen as Beijing’s stooge. 

At the same time, China engages deeply with the junta. This dual engagement has served China very well: Beijing effectively hedges its bets and has leverage over both state and non-state actors, thus ensuring that its interests are always protected. 

India must abandon its policy of caution and learn from China. A lot of gains will accrue if New Delhi extends military and tactical help to the AA and also humanitarian assistance to the Rakhine state. 

Though Rakhine shares a 271-kilometre-long border with Bangladesh to its northwest, receiving any help from Bangladesh is out of the question. That’s because Bangladesh is only interested in protecting the interests of the Rohingyas who have been displaced from Rakhine. 

It is, thus, India alone that can extend much-needed humanitarian and military assistance to the ULA and AA. 

That will allow India to become, like China, an important player with leverage over both the junta and the AA/ULA. 

New Delhi can then facilitate a negotiated settlement of the armed conflict in Rakhine between the ULA and the junta that will, perforce, involve granting autonomy to the Rakhine state. 

For all this to happen, New Delhi must forsake its traditional circumspect and wary stance and adopt a spirited proactive policy. 

The vestiges of the over-cautious and reactive Nehruvian foreign policy must be swept out of the corridors of South Block (which houses the MEA) and into the dustbin of history.