Pakistan's Nuclear Posturing Doesn't Really Make Sense

. . . because if at all deterrence stability exists between India and Pakistan, why would the latter want to disturb it?

A cursory scanning of newspaper editorials, articles and TV talk shows will immediately lend credence to the fact that there is a peculiar smugness and delusion that exists within Pakistan’s strategic establishment vis-a-vis its “deterrence stability” status with India. It is ingrained in the collective psyche of the country’s military and civilian leadership that it has achieved a parity with India in terms of its nuclear weapons and deterrence posture. One of the key reasons for this line of thought is Pakistan’s belief that its nuclear program/assets is the direct answer to India having developed the “ultimate weapon” and in its never-ending quest for parity with the latter, it has succeeded in developing what it calls the “Islamic Bomb”.

Deterrence Stability – Pakistan’s view

Pakistan believes that the enormous disparity between itself and India in virtually every sphere, particularly military, has been effectively neutralized by it through the procurement, development, and possession of nuclear devices with credible delivery mechanisms/platforms and more importantly by a politico-military posture which declares that it would use them in actual war if the need arises. This is further accentuated by the fact that there remains a considerable amount of ambivalence on the Pakistani side in terms of the so-called nuclear “red-lines” beyond which it will go ahead and put the weapons to use. This posture has had its effects on the Indian strategic thought vis-a-vis Pakistan. In the short-term, the idea of “deterrence stability” between Pakistan and India has worked, or so do the Pakistanis believe. However, it is also important to assess this aspect in a long-term perspective.

What are India’s concerns?

The so-called deterrence stability between the two countries gives Pakistan a certain level of comfort and the establishment leaves no chance to assert this claim. Recent comments emanating from an assortment of political leaders and analysts prove this point. This translates in to the idea that Pakistan & India today are at parity by virtue of being nuclear powers and that either side will resist any attempt to escalate confrontations beyond a certain level and thus avert war – deterrence achieved!

From an Indian perspective though, this flimsy status-quo is highly illogical and unstable in the long-run. The Indian problems are further exacerbated by the fact that the Pakistani state is in doldrums today with a multitude of threats emanating from within and without. An imploding society with serious problems of insurgency, ethno-linguistic and politico-religious clashes, and a failing economy keeps India on the tenterhooks. Despite Islamabad’s assertion that its atomic weapons and the related infrastructure is in safe hands with multiple layers of security, there is a deep sense of apprehension in the Indian strategic landscape, should there be a pilferage resulting in the acquisition of a dirty bomb.

The paradox of deterrence stability

Speaking at the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, in March 2015, Lt. Gen Khalid Kidwai, ex-DG of Strategic Plans Division, said that Pakistan now has a new intermediate range ballistic missile – Shaheen 3, with a reported range of 2,750 km. This is designed to liquidate India’s second strike capability based as far as the Andaman & Nicobar islands. Now, this is no deterrence, but an aggressive design in complete contravention to its earlier held posture of minimum credible deterrence. That Pakistan has moved away from the earlier held posture comes as a surprise to the Indian strategic community.

India views its nuclear weapons as strategic assets and not as war-fighting instruments, and also has a declared No-First-Use policy. The Shaheen 3 missile, is the higher-limit of Pakistan’s new deterrence spectrum which can be used in a nuclear first strike to decapitate India’s land-based second-strike capability. This is also a departure from Pakistan’s defensive and reactionary posture to a more proactive posture as far as nuclear weapons are concerned.

While the 2011 test firing and induction of the tactical ballistic missile (TNW) Nasr was a direct response to India’s somewhat ambivalent “Cold Start” doctrine, the eventual induction of the Shaheen 3 missile will have serious negative effects on deterrence stability. While Pakistan had brought down the nuclear red-lines with the introduction of the battlefield/tactical ballistic missile “Nasr”, the introduction of Shaheen 3 missile in the backdrop of a “first use” policy disturbs the strategic deterrence equilibrium.

Can India and Pakistan really achieve deterrence stability?

Some senior analysts have argued on the contrary – that between India and Pakistan there can be no long-term deterrence stability, in fact there has never been one. It is argued that given the geo-political realities that exist, it will be difficult for both the countries to achieve deterrence stability. Evolving technologies, increased production of fissile material, increase in the number of warheads, and sophisticated delivery systems will always ensure that deterrence stability remains elusive.

Michael Krepon argues, that between the United States and the Soviet Union, even at the height of the Cold War, with each having acquired and deployed 10,000 warheads, they did not really achieve deterrence stability. Instead the driving force was to keep their respective force structures at qualitatively & quantitatively advantageous positions vis-a-vis the other. According to this construct, smaller nuclear powers like India and Pakistan are also treading a similar path. The central theme of this construct is that “when states with unequal capabilities are enmeshed in a strategic competition…” like India and Pakistan, “it is extremely hard to establish deterrence stability – let alone maintain it”.

Thus, he induction of Shaheen 3 may force an Indian rethink on its targeting strategy, or even its strategic nuclear posturing. The underlying doctrine espoused by Gen Kidwai, indicating that this has been designed to “not allow” India retain a credible second strike capability, seems not well thought through. Why would Pakistan, which believes that the introduction of the Nasr TNWs has established deterrence stability between itself and India, develop missiles to deny an adversary a second strike capability unless it is intended to gain control through a devastating first-strike. That seems unlikely owing to India’s geographically dispersed nuclear assets. Secondly, when a smaller country intends to deter a larger convention force by overt nuclear posturing so that war is averted, it makes little sense to disturb the equilibrium, if it really exists.

This article was first published in the author’s blog.