Defence

The Next War With China Will Not Begin With A Bang, But With A Blackout — And India Is Not Prepared For It

Prakhar Gupta

Apr 22, 2025, 02:07 PM | Updated May 01, 2025, 12:12 PM IST


India and China Flags.
India and China Flags.
  • China’s silent arsenal of lasers, jammers, and cyberattacks could paralyse India’s satellites, tilting the battlefield before a single shot is fired. 
  • The next war might not erupt with a deafening explosion, but with a chilling blackout.

    Before a single shot rings out, India’s military satellites begin to fail—imaging systems go dark, encrypted communications fracture, and navigation signals grow erratic. No explosions, no debris, no warning—just an eerie silence. Space-based assets, vital for surveillance, targeting, and coordination, are systematically neutralised, leaving the armed forces with diminished situational awareness across air, land, and sea.

    As satellite networks falter, precise cyber intrusions escalate. Ground stations face disruptions, command systems buckle under data surges, and inter-service coordination slows to a crawl. These strikes are surgical—not designed to obliterate, but to disorient, sowing confusion in the fog of war.

    No missiles have been launched. No borders have been crossed. Yet, the battle-space is already skewed. The ability to observe, decide, and act—cornerstones of modern deterrence—is under relentless assault.

    The adversary hasn’t unleashed firepower, but paralysis.

    This isn’t science fiction. This is how the next war could begin. And in this domain, India’s current posture remains dangerously incomplete.

    India is not blind to these stakes. In 2019, it answered with Mission Shakti, a calculated anti-satellite (ASAT) test that obliterated a target in low Earth orbit, its name evoking Operation Shakti—India’s 1998 nuclear tests that asserted strategic defiance against China’s growing might. The ASAT strike was a direct message to Beijing: India could contest threats in space. India had set up a Defence Space Agency in 2018, and a military space doctrine is now in the works as well. 

    Yet, this kinetic show of strength, however precise, cannot shield against threats that strike without sound or trace, tilting the battle-space before a missile is ever launched.

    2019 ASAT Test

    India’s 2019 anti-satellite test demonstrated a precise, high-velocity interception of a satellite in low Earth orbit using a direct-ascent kinetic kill vehicle—a missile launched from the ground that intercepts and destroys its target purely through impact, without using an explosive warhead. The operation utilised a modified version of the Prithvi Defence Vehicle Mark-II (PDV-MK II), originally designed as part of India’s two-tier Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system, which was developed to intercept ballistic missiles—the primary means of delivering nuclear warheads.

    The interceptor, PDV-MK II, is engineered for engagements well beyond the Earth’s atmosphere. It relies on a high-precision inertial navigation system for mid-course guidance and an advanced imaging infrared seeker for terminal targeting—essential for locking onto targets that are small, fast, and constantly in motion.

    Operating at altitudes up to 1,200 kilometres, it is capable of closing in on its target at speeds exceeding 10 kilometres per second. At that velocity, the margin for error is razor-thin—every aspect of the intercept, from tracking to collision, must unfold with split-second precision.

    The target of the test was Microsat-R, an Indian satellite weighing approximately 740 kilograms, launched specifically for this purpose and placed in a 274 km orbit. The satellite’s predictable trajectory and radar profile made it a viable target for real-time tracking and interception. The missile achieved a kinetic kill—meaning no explosive warhead was used—by colliding with the satellite at high speed.

    This required exacting calculations and precise timing, as the satellite was traveling at roughly eight kilometers per second. The interceptor’s onboard sensors and seeker had to acquire and maintain lock-on during terminal guidance, despite the satellite’s rapid orbital velocity and relatively small physical cross-section.

    The technological challenge of hitting a satellite moving at hypersonic speeds in LEO cannot be overstated. Precision is critical, as even a miss by a few centimetres would result in failure. The ability to consistently achieve such accuracy reinforces the credibility of India’s BMD architecture, as the core mechanics of intercepting a ballistic missile warhead and a satellite in orbit are closely related.

    Both involve high-altitude, mid-course interception governed by orbital mechanics. Demonstrating a successful ASAT test therefore implicitly validates the performance and reliability of India’s interceptor technology under operationally stressful conditions.

    It also has wider implications for strategic stability. In nuclear deterrence theory, BMD systems are seen as potentially destabilising, as they could blunt retaliatory second strikes. Thus, proving such interception capabilities in space sends a dual signal: of technological maturity and credible deterrence.

    India’s ASAT test didn’t just showcase space-targeting ability—it reinforced confidence in the broader missile defence and tracking architecture, demonstrating control over one of the most demanding aspects of modern military technology.

    Yet, on its own, it does not amount to a credible space deterrent.

    The Problem With Kinetic-Kill Weapons

    The most common way countries have shown their ability to shoot down satellites is by using missiles, known as direct-ascent kinetic-kill weapons. China did it in 2007, the United States followed in 2008, and India joined the club in 2019.

    India's Anti-Satellite (A-SAT) missile developed under ‘Mission Shakti’.
    India's Anti-Satellite (A-SAT) missile developed under ‘Mission Shakti’.

    India’s test was carefully designed to avoid turning space into a junkyard. The target satellite was placed in a low orbit, just 282 kilometres above Earth—low enough that most of the fragments created by the impact would burn up in the atmosphere within weeks or months. The satellite itself was small, and the missile hit it while descending. All of this was meant to keep the debris problem contained.

    China’s test, by contrast, created a long-term mess. It destroyed a satellite at a much higher altitude—865 kilometres—producing over 3,000 fragments, many of which are still orbiting the Earth and posing a threat to other satellites even now, more than a decade later. The Chinese test alone is believed to have increased the number of objects in orbit by 20 per cent. The US, like India, also kept its 2008 ASAT test at a lower altitude, around 247 kilometres, for the same reason—to ensure the debris didn’t linger.

    Even so, the debris problem remains the biggest downside of kinetic-kill ASAT weapons. The debris problem is acute because only specific orbital bands, like low Earth orbit (LEO), are practical for satellites. LEO, hosting ~27,000 tracked objects, is increasingly congested with active satellites, defunct ones, spent rocket stages, and fragments from past collisions or tests.

    Every new strike, no matter how carefully planned, adds to the clutter, risking Kessler Syndrome—a cascading collision chain that could render orbits unusable for decades. A single fragment could knock out a billion-dollar asset, disrupting communication, navigation, or defense systems.

    China's Workaround

    China, acutely aware of the debris problem after its 2007 test, has pivoted to non-kinetic counterspace capabilities that neutralize satellites silently, avoiding the orbital clutter that risks global backlash and Kessler Syndrome. These “soft-kill” methods—ranging from lasers to cyberattacks—offer Beijing a strategic edge, allowing it to degrade India’s space-based surveillance, communication, and navigation systems, like Cartosat-3 or GSAT-32, without escalating to open conflict. As India’s Defence Space Agency and military space doctrine evolve, understanding China’s non-kinetic arsenal is crucial to crafting a credible deterrent that matches this silent, precise threats.

    In fact, China's test of its non-kinetic capabilities for targeting satellites came even before it tested its kinetic anti-satellite weapon. In 2006, nearly a year before its 2007 ASAT test, China fired ground-based lasers to blind US reconnaissance satellites flying over its territory. Directed-energy weapons (DEWs), particularly high-powered lasers, are at the core of its non-kinetic counter-space weapons programme.

    Over the years, China has developed ground-based lasers capable of targeting the electro-optical sensors onboard satellites. Low-powered lasers can temporarily blind or "dazzle" these sensors, disrupting imaging and rendering satellites like India’s RISAT-2B unable to collect usable data. This dazzling effect is generally non-destructive and functions more as a countermeasure than a weapon. It requires relatively low power—sometimes as little as 10 watts—to obscure a satellite’s view of a specific area. To inflict actual damage—whether to sensors or the satellite bus—much higher power levels, in the kilowatt range or above, would be needed to generate sufficient heat to impair critical systems.

    By 2021, China unveiled a 1-megawatt pulse laser weighing under 1.5 kilograms, compact enough for potential space-based deployment within a decade.

    At least five where China could have deployed DEW aimed at satellites, including on in the Xinjiang Province, have been identified by researchers.

    China is advancing high-powered microwave (HPM) weapons, which emit concentrated electromagnetic pulses to fry satellite electronics. They can interfere with onboard electronics, corrupt memory data, force system reboots, or even inflict permanent damage on circuits and processors if the energy levels are high enough.

    In a "front-door" attack, the HPM weapon uses the satellite’s own antennas to channel the damaging energy inside. A "back-door" approach, on the other hand, targets vulnerabilities in the satellite’s construction—such as tiny gaps or seams near electrical connectors and shielding.

    These DEWs, deployable from ground stations or future co-orbital platforms, allow China to impair Indian satellites with plausible deniability.

    Vulnerabilities of Indian space assets to Chinese counter-space threats (Ashley J Tellis/Carnegie)
    Vulnerabilities of Indian space assets to Chinese counter-space threats (Ashley J Tellis/Carnegie)

    Another key non-kinetic tool is electronic warfare (EW), specifically satellite jamming. China has invested heavily in ground-based jammers that emit high-powered radio-frequency signals to disrupt satellite communications and navigation. These systems target the uplink and downlink channels of satellites, overwhelming their signals with noise. For instance, jamming could sever India’s GSAT-32 communication links, disrupting secure military networks, or degrade GPS signals used for precision-guided munitions.

    Chinese analysts, including scholars at the PLA’s Space Engineering University, highlight EW’s advantages: it’s technically simpler, politically less provocative, and rapidly recoverable compared to kinetic strikes. Beijing was reportedly refining jammers to target Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) systems, aiming to neutralise India’s reliance on foreign GNSS or its nascent NavIC system. This capability, deployable from mobile platforms, poses a persistent threat to India’s command and control in a crisis.

    Cyberattacks represent a third pillar of China’s non-kinetic strategy. The PLA’s Strategic Support Force has developed sophisticated cyber tools to infiltrate satellite ground stations, manipulate data, or redirect satellite operations. A cyber intrusion could corrupt the telemetry of India’s Cartosat-3, feeding false imagery to military planners, or alter a satellite’s orbit, rendering it useless without physical damage.

    Chinese researchers have highlighted that cyberattacks offer a “controllable attack range” and allow for quick recovery—making them well-suited for limited, calculated escalation without triggering full-scale conflict. Such attacks could target India’s ground infrastructure, like the ISRO Telemetry, Tracking, and Command Network, disrupting coordination without leaving a trace. The 2022 Russian cyberattack on a commercial SATCOM provider, which affected Ukrainian military users, illustrates this threat’s real-world impact, a tactic China is likely emulating to exploit India’s growing satellite network.

    China established the Strategic Support Force (SSF) in 2015 as part of broader military reforms to unify its capabilities in cyberspace, space, and electronic warfare under a single command. Reporting directly to the Central Military Commission, the SSF serves as the backbone of the PLA’s information warfare.

    People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (SSF) Installations.
    People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (SSF) Installations.

    China is also exploring co-orbital systems, including microsatellites and robotic satellites with dual-use capabilities. Since 2008, when the BX-1 microsatellite passed dangerously close to the International Space Station, China has tested satellites equipped with robotic arms or proximity operations. These can “inspect” or manipulate other satellites, potentially grappling or repositioning them to disrupt their function.

    In 2022, China’s Shijian-21 satellite maneuvered a defunct BeiDou navigation satellite into a high graveyard orbit above geostationary altitude. Another Chinese satellite, Shijian-17, is equipped with a robotic arm—highlighting China’s growing capability in space-based manipulation technology.

    Such robotic systems could eventually be used to physically interact with other satellites, including potentially hostile actions. For instance, they could push an Indian satellite like RISAT-2B into a non-functional orbit or interfere with its solar panels, effectively neutralizing it without creating debris. Chinese military analysts have described these as “parasitic” platforms—spacecraft designed to quietly shadow enemy satellites, lying in wait for an opportunity to sabotage. This offers China a covert and deniable way to degrade India’s space-based surveillance and communication assets.

    China’s non-kinetic arsenal—lasers, jammers, cyberattacks, co-orbital systems, and HPM weapons—exploits the vulnerabilities of India’s kinetic-focused ASAT strategy.

    These methods, honed over decades, enable Beijing to wage space warfare with precision and deniability, tilting the battle-space before a shot is fired.

    India's Dilemma

    There’s every reason to believe that in a future conflict, one of Beijing’s first moves would be a disabling strike on Indian military and dual-use satellites.

    Over the years, China has methodically targeted key components of India's critical infrastructure linked to military readiness — from compromising satellite communications in a confirmed 2017 breach to infiltrating power grid systems near Ladakh.

    Power Grid in Ladakh.
    Power Grid in Ladakh.

    India would face a tricky choice if it has to respond to a Chinese attack on its satellites using non-kinetic means, such as lasers, jammers, cyberattacks, or co-orbital manipulation, which can quietly and reversibly disable critical assets like Cartosat-3, RISAT-2B, or GSAT-32 without creating debris or leaving clear evidence of Beijing’s involvement. These silent, deniable methods contrast sharply with India’s primary counterspace weapon, the kinetic-kill ASAT showcased in 2019’s Mission Shakti.

    Deploying a direct-ascent missile like the Prithvi Defence Vehicle Mark-II (PDV-MK II) to destroy a Chinese satellite in retaliation would generate thousands of debris fragments, threatening India’s own orbital assets and risking long-term contamination of low Earth orbit. This mismatch—China’s clean, reversible strikes versus India’s destructive, debris-heavy response—puts New Delhi in a bind: a kinetic strike could escalate tensions and invite condemnation for worsening orbital clutter, while inaction might signal weakness, allowing China to disrupt India’s military capabilities without triggering open conflict.

    India’s kinetic ASAT, while a technological feat, is thus ill-suited to deter or counter China’s preferred non-kinetic methods. The PDV-MK II, designed for high-precision interception at hypersonic speeds, excels at destroying satellites through physical collision, as proven against Microsat-R. However, its strategic utility is limited to deterring kinetic attacks—China’s least likely approach, given its investment in debris-free alternatives.

    The threat of retaliating with a debris-generating strike when the original attack caused no physical damage is unlikely to be seen as credible by China—and therefore fails to serve as an effective deterrent. Chinese researchers with links to the PLA have already questioned the utility of India's 2019 ASAT test, arguing that such "tests have to be above 800 km in order to be of use against military satellites".

    India would also have to consider the broader implications of kinetic retaliation. Destroying a Chinese satellite could escalate a crisis, inviting counterstrikes against India’s limited satellite constellation, which is vital for military and economic functions. Unlike China, which has a robust space infrastructure, India’s smaller network—~80 to 100 operational satellites versus China’s ~700—makes it more vulnerable to losses.

    Ultimately, India’s ASAT missile offers only a narrow form of deterrence. It might dissuade China from launching direct, destructive strikes on Indian satellites, but such an attack is already an unlikely choice for Beijing. China is far more invested in subtle, non-destructive, and deniable methods of disabling space assets. That’s the crux of India’s dilemma—possessing a sledgehammer in a battlefield increasingly dominated by scalpels.

    Prakhar Gupta is a senior editor at Swarajya. He tweets @prakharkgupta.


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