From Tokenism To Micro-Management: How Caste Politics Is Evolving In North India

Jagdeep Dhankhar’s resignation from the Vice President’s (VP) post has triggered speculation that it could spark resentment among Jats towards the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

Though Dhankhar resigned citing health reasons, the chain of events before and after his resignation indicate deeper causes for his sudden exit. His stepping down is likely to be perceived as an 'insult to a Jat'.

Dhankhar is a Jat from the Jhunjhunu district of Rajasthan. Seeing his departure as an opportunity, Rajasthan Congress president Govind Singh Dotasra, who is a Jat himself, has begun accusing the BJP of neglecting Jats.

Jat Mahasabha has also expressed concern over Dhankhar's sudden resignation and asserted that it is unlikely he resigned due to health reasons. Moreover, they anticipate its impact on Jat politics.

Undoubtedly, Jats play an important role in the electoral politics of Rajasthan, Haryana, Punjab and western Uttar Pradesh (UP). However, it is unlikely that Dhankhar's exit will significantly impact Jat politics.

This is because caste politics has evolved considerably over the past three decades. Token representation no longer carries much weight on the electoral ground. Rather, a variety of caste-related factors shape the political equation.

This is evident from the fact that even after Dhankhar took oath as VP in August 2022, the BJP has continued to struggle for Jat votes, from the 2023 Rajasthan Assembly election to the 2024 Lok Sabha (LS) elections in Rajasthan, Haryana and western UP.

How have Jats voted

Jats have traditionally voted for the Congress in Rajasthan. This trend remained intact even after Dhankhar's elevation. Congress performed much better than the BJP in the Jat-dominated Shekhawati region, where Dhankhar hails from.

Of Congress's 36 Jat candidates, 16 won in the 2023 Assembly election. The BJP’s Jat candidates had a lower success rate, with 13 wins among 31 candidates.

This occurred despite Dhankhar’s frequent visits to the state. Then-Chief Minister (CM) Ashok Gehlot even taunted the VP for his repeated visits by saying, “Please spare us now.”

The trend continued in the 2024 LS elections, where four out of six Jat candidates fielded by Congress secured victories. In contrast, the BJP, despite fielding more Jat candidates (seven), managed to win only three seats. The party even lost in Dhankhar’s home district of Jhunjhunu.

Jat resentment against the BJP was not limited to Rajasthan. In the 2024 LS election, western UP and Haryana also reflected Jat discontent against the BJP due to the farmers' protests and other related issues.

Despite forming an alliance with the so-called Jat party, Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD), and conferring Bharat Ratna on its ideological father, former Prime Minister Chaudhary Charan Singh, the BJP was unable to fully attract Jat voters in western UP.

The resentment was so intense that the BJP's Jat face in western UP, two-time Member of Parliament (MP) from Muzaffarnagar and then-Minister of State (MoS), Sanjeev Balyan, also lost his seat to the Samajwadi Party’s (SP) Jat candidate.

Jat dissatisfaction reduced the BJP's tally to half in Haryana. In 2019, the BJP swept all 10 seats. In 2024, it was reduced to five due to unresolved reservation demands and perceived marginalisation of Jat leadership.

Similar trends in other castes

It is not just the Jats who distanced themselves from the BJP after symbolic high-level appointments like Dhankhar's. Many caste groups reflect similar trends, demonstrating that token representation has limited electoral impact.

In 2022, UP Deputy CM Keshav Prasad Maurya lost to an SP candidate in Sirathu. Nonetheless, he was reappointed Deputy CM to appeal to Other Backward Classes (OBCs), particularly the Maurya caste.

This move had little effect in the 2024 LS election, where a significant portion of OBC votes, including from the Maurya community, shifted away from the BJP, as seen in its losses across eastern UP. The BJP even lost in Maurya’s hometown, Kaushambi.

The BJP’s own post-poll report identified a notable decline in non-Yadav OBC support, explicitly naming the Maurya and Kurmi communities as having shifted to the INDI Alliance.

The BJP’s losses in western UP were also attributed to discontent among Thakur (Rajput) voters, despite CM Yogi Adityanath, a Rajput by birth, leading the state government.

There were Rajput mahapanchayats urging community members to vote against the BJP. CM Yogi visited several affected constituencies to pacify Rajputs, but these efforts were unsuccessful. The BJP lost important seats such as Muzaffarnagar.

Similar patterns were observed in Rajasthan, where the BJP appointed Prem Chand Bairwa and Diya Kumari as Deputy CMs to represent the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Rajput communities respectively.

However, these symbolic gestures did not translate into votes. In the 2024 LS election, the BJP won only one of the four SC-reserved seats in Rajasthan. The remaining three went to Congress.

Furthermore, the BJP failed to secure even one seat in the Rajput-dominated Shekhawati region. The party’s overall tally fell to 14, down from clean sweeps in 2014 and 2019 when it won all 25 seats in the state.

More than token representations

These examples reinforce the limited electoral influence of symbolic appointments. Even direct representation through ticket distribution does not guarantee a community’s support.

Earlier, fielding a candidate from a specific caste in a corresponding caste-dominated constituency was often sufficient. However, as multiple parties adopted this approach, caste equations became more complex.

Consider a few examples from the 2024 LS election where, despite fielding more candidates from particular castes, the BJP failed to consolidate caste-based support.

Votes from Kurmi, Maurya and Nishad communities shifted away from the BJP as the SP fielded more candidates from these communities. However, this was not the case with other OBC and Rajput communities.

For instance, the BJP fielded 13 Rajput candidates, three times more than the SP. Still, Rajputs are believed to have voted against the BJP. Similarly, both parties fielded a comparable number of non-Yadav OBC candidates, yet these voters largely backed the SP.

The SP fielded 10 Kurmi candidates, seven of whom won. In contrast, only half of the BJP’s Kurmi candidates secured victories. Among the Lodhs, despite the BJP offering four tickets and SP only one, the vote leaned towards the SP.

This pattern extended beyond UP. In Rajasthan, the BJP fielded more Jat candidates than Congress in 2024 but won only three seats. Congress’s four Jat candidates were successful.

In Haryana, the BJP fielded more Brahmin candidates than Congress, yet both BJP candidates lost. Congress's lone Brahmin candidate emerged victorious.

The evolution to complexity

As caste politics evolves, managing it has become increasingly complex. Each stakeholder now seeks to design their own caste calculus, complicating electoral arithmetic further.

Consequently, caste groups are no longer content with token or direct representation. They seek actual influence within political parties and governments.

One illustrative case is that of Yadavs supporting the SP, even without widespread representation. All five Yadav candidates fielded by the SP in the 2024 UP LS election were relatives of Akhilesh Yadav. Yet, the community backed the SP because they believe they have real influence in the party and its potential government.

Similarly, Jats support Congress in Rajasthan and Haryana, and non-Yadav OBCs back the BJP in Haryana. However, most caste groups shift their allegiance based on prevailing political conditions.

For example, non-Yadav OBCs had backed the BJP in UP for nearly a decade. But some switched to the SP after Akhilesh Yadav launched the PDA formula to appeal to OBC and SC communities.

This shift was especially visible among Kurmi (including Patel), Kushwaha, Maurya, Saini, Shakya, Rajbhar and Nishad communities. In contrast, Gujjars, Prajapatis, Binds and Kumhars continued to support the BJP.

Broadly, the shift reflects these castes’ desire to assert distinct identities beyond the umbrella of 'non-Yadav OBCs'. Consequently, targeted messaging became essential to attract specific caste groups.

Narratives shift votes

In the age of social media and smartphones, narratives are powerful in influencing voter behaviour. To alienate the Maurya community from the BJP, a narrative was circulated portraying Keshav Prasad Maurya as a powerless Deputy CM.

The removal of the influential Public Works Department from his portfolio supported the perception of his declining authority. This led many in his community to believe the BJP no longer represented their interests, prompting them to support the SP.

To woo SC voters, the INDI Alliance propagated the idea that the BJP would amend the Constitution and revoke reservation benefits if it returned with a strong majority.

This narrative helped Congress win all SC-reserved seats in Haryana, three of four SC-reserved seats in Rajasthan, and enabled the INDI Alliance to gain broader SC support, securing eight reserved seats in UP.

Rajput discontent, which affected the BJP in Rajasthan and western UP, also stemmed from a narrative war. Comments by Gujarat BJP leader Purshottam Rupala linking Rajputs to the British were widely circulated and criticised.

The loss of Jat votes was also narrative-driven, linking the BJP to anti-farmer policies. This was amplified by the now-repealed farm laws and the prolonged farmers’ protests.

Going beyond narratives

While narratives influence outcomes, local electoral dynamics ultimately play a decisive role. The clearest example is Faizabad LS constituency, which includes Ayodhya. Despite the Ram Mandir inauguration, the BJP lost here in 2024.

The defeat was driven by local caste politics, with most castes supporting the SP’s Pasi (an SC caste) candidate over the BJP’s Rajput candidate. Discontent with the two-time BJP MP and his remarks on amending the Constitution amplified anti-incumbency.

Another example was the BJP’s Rajput candidate winning the Kundarki Assembly bypoll in 2024. Ramvir Singh Thakur, the lone Hindu candidate, triumphed in a Muslim-majority seat with over 80 per cent Muslim population.

His personal outreach and local credibility helped secure the win, defying dominant narratives that Muslims uniformly oppose the BJP.

These cases demonstrate the importance of micro-management. Its absence cost the BJP in UP. Though it fielded 13 Rajput candidates, it still faced backlash due to poor ticket distribution.

It is not just about the number of tickets, but about which caste gets tickets in which constituencies. The BJP faltered in Firozabad and Basti by fielding upper-caste candidates.

In Kaushambi and Pratapgarh, it erred by selecting SC and OBC candidates from the wrong sub-castes. These instances highlight the critical role of micro-management.

The new political playbook

The evolution of caste politics means it can no longer be managed from the top down, or from air-conditioned offices in Delhi, whether by political parties or media.

Only a deep understanding of local politics and caste dynamics enables effective micro-management. This is why the BJP struggled in UP in 2024, where ticket distribution was reportedly centralised.

Conversely, the SP adjusted tickets at the last moment in places like Rampur, Moradabad and Meerut, and achieved greater success than the BJP in UP.

The changing dynamics also explain why most recent exit polls have been inaccurate. They fail to account for hyper-local and micro factors, relying instead on broad assumptions from distant vantage points.

Stakeholders must adapt to evolving caste politics. Political parties need to implement bottom-up feedback mechanisms for ticket distribution. Pollsters must spend more time on the ground to capture subtle shifts.

A nationwide caste survey has been announced. Once its data is released, caste politics will likely become even more intricate, as parties attempt to manipulate new equations in their favour.

Therefore, rather than speculating about the negligible impact of Dhankhar's exit on Jat politics, all stakeholders should focus on preparing for a renewed phase of caste politics in the post-census era.

All political parties and analysts must brace for a more complex and assertive caste matrix. It will demand granular strategies, local intelligence and meaningful power-sharing. The post-census caste landscape will not merely intensify existing equations. It may redefine them entirely.