The Gurdaspur Terror Strike

What is Pakistan attempting? Why did it choose to strike in Punjab this time? What does it mean for India’s counter-terror strategy? Lt. Gen (retd) Syed Ata Hasnain explains. 

I am not going to say “I told you so” but surely anyone who has been observing the chain of events over the last one year or so would predict that it was going to happen. Well, not exactly in North Punjab. That is a new one.

However, the terrorist activity which led to the violent and unfortunate act at Gurdaspur covered a larger geographical area involving infiltration (not yet determined from where), hijacking of a vehicle and then attacking a police station. This has been the pattern of terror strikes for some time except that they have been restricted to the Samba–Kathua belt of Jammu sector. What does the first entry into Punjab after many years indicate? Actually, quite a few things.

The Army’s 15 Corps in Kashmir has over the years tightened its hold over infiltration to such an extent that it is becoming extremely difficult for the Pakistan nexus of agencies to send in terrorists, leaders and wherewithal into Kashmir’s hinterland. 16 Corps deployed south of the Pir Panjal followed suit and made it very difficult to do that in the crucial Poonch and Rajouri sectors.

In both the LoC zones north and south of the Pir Panjal range, the potential of executing high profile terror acts that will deliver strategic messages has all but dried up. It is a basic truism in tactics that when an area becomes difficult to operate in, the flanks are immediately probed.

The probing began in 2014 with ceasefire violations along the international border and terrorist strikes at Samba and Kathua. There were reasons for this. Finding it difficult to execute high profile acts in the Valley and Poonch-Rajouri sectors, the nexus shifted focus to a relatively lower security belt. Here the counter infiltration grid was comparatively weaker.

It did not have the depth, density, linkages, equipment or networks to undertake continuous counter infiltration. It also does not have the benefit of rich experience that the LoC grid has acquired over time. Besides this, unlike the LoC zone where the objectives lie in depth and need deliberate planning and execution, here the National Highway is not too far from the border and there are multiple towns such as Hiranagar, Samba and Kathua along the artery.

After infiltration, through one or two layers, terrorists can reach the highway, hijack a vehicle, and reach anywhere in a matter of a few hours. There are police stations, government offices, schools and just population centers with bus and taxi stands available as targets that can be struck at will. Failure at one can be followed by redeployment in a few minutes to strike elsewhere.

Mindful of all this, the Army’s Western Command, and the BSF have strengthened the grid between Jammu and Pathankot. That means probing by the terrorists must shift southwards, and Gurdaspur is the next big population center after Pathankot. That makes a lot of sense from the Pakistan perspective.

Frankly, I did expect that after the Ufa talks and agreement there would be some testing of waters; it has become routine that even an upstart analyst can assess, besides the fact that there is a history behind it. Very often, large ticket diplomatic events and visits have been closely preceded or succeeded by such acts.

This time the pattern was not too different. Ceasefire violations did take place in Poonch sector and the Jammu border immediately on termination of Ufa talks. There were injuries and an odd loss of life, but it stopped at that. Now we can surmise that it was a well-coordinated ruse to lull our security forces. The surprise factor has been higher because the expected area for the strike was still the same—the Samba-Kathua belt.

While the point of entry is still unconfirmed, the terrorists traveled to Gurdaspur as a choice for strike rather than it being an objective by accident. Much is being made about the suicide nature of the strike forgetting that almost all such acts in the past too have been suicide missions. These are so far just human strikes. Intelligence agencies will need to be wary of possible change in methods of strikes wherein 24 hour intervals are taken after infiltration to steal a vehicle, wire it with smuggled-in explosives, and use the same as car bombs for greater effect.

The choice of a Punjab town is deliberate, not an accident. There are reasons for this belief. If Samba and Kathua have forced greater deployment of the Army, the same is desired by the Pakistan nexus with respect to Punjab. The Army’s formations here are in peace and training mode; this will force them into a greater security mode that takes its toll on conventional military effectiveness.

Pakistan’s long advocated ‘war by a thousand cuts’ through proxy and direct efforts,will expand its arc into another rim land state of India which has suffered much just over twenty years ago and yet has a rump separatist leadership living abroad, including, in Pakistan. If the proxy war in J&K has been largely brought under control, Pakistan’s nexus cannot allow the flame to die; pressure here (Punjab) may relieve pressure in J&K.

Nations that have dubious intent against neighbors will seek ways of keeping them negatively engaged. Also, Pakistan military leadership, in particular, is ensuring that it keeps the ‘good terrorists’ amused because people like Hafiz Sayeed are dangerous when they do not have much to do.